

VOLUME 21

NUMBER 1

SPRING 1977

ORBIS


A Journal of World Affairs

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A SPECIAL ISSUE DEDICATED TO
FRANK N. TRAGER

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William Henderson	William R. Kintner
Klaus Knorr	Sol W. Sanders
Robert A. Scalapino	Joseph Schiebel
William Schneider, Jr.	Gaston J. Sigur
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FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GRADUATE GROUP
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

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ORBIS, A Journal of World Affairs

Published by the
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The International Relations Graduate Group
University of Pennsylvania

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ORBIS is published four times a year by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Editorial and business offices: 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. **Subscription rates,** per year: \$12.00 for individuals, \$20.00 for institutions. (Plus \$2.00 per year, overseas.) Single copy, \$5.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editor. Address correspondence relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP).

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reflections

ON THE QUARTER

IN RECOGNITION

All too often, Americans of outstanding dedication retire before their numerous contributions are recognized. In the hope of ensuring the success of the American experiment, at home and abroad, Frank Trager has devoted more than three decades to the creation of disciplined security studies. ORBIS takes this opportunity to recognize his achievements, by publishing essays by those who have benefited greatly from their years of association with Frank and his work.

The articles in this issue reflect the many areas of Frank Trager's involvement. His early years spent in Burma and time later devoted to the study of other Southeast Asian themes can be seen in several essays. The broader issues of great power relationships — among China, the Soviet Union and the United States — are equally prominent. Finally, the major conceptual problems of security studies, including the use of force in today's world and the need for the United States to arrive at an understanding of the modern international system, can be seen in three other articles.

We hope that the readers of ORBIS will gain new insights into these spheres of international relations. We recognize that the search for greater comprehension of these many-sided problems will continue, and we commend Frank Trager for his contribution to that search.

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

ORBIS welcomes articles that examine problems in international relations. All correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

Manuscripts

- ☐ Authors should submit an original and two clear copies, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if return of the manuscript is desired.
- ☐ The entire manuscript (*including footnotes and tables*) should be typed double-spaced. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Tables should be typed on separate sheets, and all internal rules should be omitted. Articles that do not follow this format will be returned for retyping.
- ☐ Care should be taken that footnotes contain complete bibliographic information. For the proper footnote form — and all matters of style — please consult the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press).
- ☐ The title page should include only the article title, author's name, and a fifty-word biographical statement (positions held, area of specialization, publications, and research-in-progress).

ON THE INTERNATIONAL USES OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

by Klaus Knorr

In 1965, this author wrote a book (published by Princeton University Press in 1966) — *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* — in which he was one of the first to advance the thesis that the usability and usefulness of military force in interstate relations, compared with previous historical periods, had been diminished by several changes in underlying conditions. Twelve years later, it seems interesting to review this proposition in the light of subsequent writings that greatly amplified it, on the one hand, and in consideration of the actual uses of military power and the preparations for its use that have occurred since, on the other. Do the relevant events of the past decade or so, and what they foreshadow, confirm or disconfirm the thesis and the amplifications it has received?

Before taking up this task, two things need to be said by way of introduction: one to warn the reader of the precarious nature of any attempt at interpreting recent history and predicting the future, the other to clarify certain conceptual problems.

To identify any trend from events observed over a decade or two and, still more, to assume that such a trend will continue in the future is obviously extremely speculative. From 1871 to 1914, although the European powers, as before, regarded war as a legitimate means to resolve international problems, no war took place among them; and there was indeed considerable speculation that progressive economic interdependence rendered these countries increasingly incapable of waging war, certainly any prolonged war, against one another.¹ But World War I and, two decades later, World War II nonetheless did occur. In light of the virtually incessant warfare among European states during the seventeenth and

¹ See Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion*, 1933 (New York: Putnam, 1933), a revision of his famous work published in 1910.

Klaus Knorr is Professor of Public and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and Editor of *World Politics*. His recent publications include *The Power of Nations* (Basic Books, 1975) and, as editor, *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (University Press of Kansas, 1976).

eighteenth centuries, it would have been easy to assume in 1815 that the final defeat of Napoleon would soon be followed by new wars. Yet, in Europe at least, no major military conflict took place for several decades. Evidently, to establish and project historical trends in these matters is a hazardous business. This does not mean that such speculation should be shunned. Neither the planner of foreign policy nor the scholar interested in statecraft, current international problems and world order can avoid prospective enterprise. It does mean, however, that we cannot have much confidence in the results of such speculation.

The conceptual problems concern the meaning and utility of military power. National military forces can be used internationally for threatening, deterring and making war. They can be employed coercively in order to influence the behavior of opponents or in order to alter or preserve the status quo by the sheer military feat of attack or defense. Armed forces per se do not equal military power.² They are meant to achieve such power in particular situations when their employment, actual or threatened, results in coercion or in the direct defense or upset of the status quo. Many variables intervene in any attempt to achieve effective power. There is one additional way in which the armed forces, or the military strength, of a nation can effectively yield actual power—when Country A will not choose or even consider a policy that, it fears, might prompt a military response from Country B. Though B has done nothing in this case, its imputed military capacity and will to use force have nevertheless been effective in restricting A's choices of action. Forces-in-being can thus become politically effective.

The employment of military forces in making or executing threats, in attacking and defending, is evidently costly in various ways—as is the development and maintenance of these forces. Threats involve risks, including the risk of defiance or counterthreats by the target state or by third countries. War is costly on many dimensions, including the loss of life, treasure and reputation and the risk of defeat. The range and magnitude of costs is indeed potentially so impressive that most international conflicts are settled in other ways, for the expected gains do not justify incurring the expected costs. To the rational actor, the availability and use of military force has utility only so long as expected gains exceed expected costs. It is these estimates that govern decisions on the use of force. However, estimates can be faulty and frequently are—

² For a systematic analysis of these distinctions, see Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 1.

which is another risk to be taken into account. While it is the actual gains and costs that will define the utility of each use in the end, actual experiences affect, by way of feedback, future expectations. At any rate, if governments came to expect fewer gains or more costs from the employment of force in certain types of conflict than they did before, the expected utility of force would have declined to that extent.

Of course, deviations from rationality are not uncommon, but in matters of such grave consequentiality, the incentive to avoid gross deviation is very strong. It is also to be noted, finally, that nations are not unitary actors and that governments, elites and larger publics can be divided on the use of force. Division can result either from differing estimates of costs and gains or from the anticipation that domestic distribution of the expected costs and gains favors some sectors of society while disadvantaging others. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that such national disunity is apt to figure as one more possible cost of the international employment of force, although the refusal to use force can, of course, likewise be divisive.

II

In *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*, I argued that some traditionally important goals for going to war had lost appeal, that the anticipated costs of doing so had markedly risen, and that the expected utility of using military forces internationally had therefore probably declined, in the sense that governments and elites found their useful employment more restricted than was previously the case.

The following were the principal points. The desire for territorial conquest has been the most powerful motive for using force throughout recorded history. Economic and security considerations are among the major concerns that have propelled governments to conquer or defend territory. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, an expansion of territorial possessions meant more control over manpower and resources, sources of supply, markets and outlets for investment. In recent decades, elites have gradually learned, in large part as a result of modern economics and education, that the prime sources of national wealth are ultimately domestic (i.e., savings and investments, technological progress and the upgrading of human resources). They also came to believe that international trade and investment do not require territorial control so long as

there is an international economic order that fosters such intercourse. Historical experience has confirmed these expectations. Several countries became highly developed and wealthy while remaining strictly confined to a small home base (e.g., Switzerland and Sweden), and West Germany and Japan became rich after they lost territories in World War II.

Until not long ago, expansion of territory and territorial control also appealed on grounds of security. Territorial expansion meant more population, more assured access to raw materials and food, which could not be cut off in times of war, and more space that an enemy had to cross in order to reach the local centers of power. These strategic values have also tended to diminish. Manpower is a military asset only to the extent that it is loyal and skillful, and sophisticated technological capacity has become a base of military strength more important than sheer numbers of people. Dependence on foreign supplies that can be cut off in wartime is a serious vulnerability only if war is protracted. The expectation of prolonged warfare, however, has decreased in recent decades because the most powerful modern technology has lent to offensive weapons a vast superiority over defensive arms. Moreover, the development of nuclear missiles has greatly lowered the protective value of territory and distance from prospective enemies.

Four factors have been operating on the cost side. First, memories of the stupendous destructiveness of World Wars I and II, the watching of recent televised conflicts (e.g., Vietnam and Lebanon), and profound anxieties about a possible nuclear holocaust have sensitized an increasing number of people to the costliness of war, and this sensitivity has become particularly important in societies that are no longer governed by traditional warlike elites. Second, nuclear weapons technology has rendered the most destructive arms useless for anything but deterrence between states encapsulated in a balance of terror. In fact, the fear that lesser conflicts between them might escalate to the level of strategic nuclear exchanges gives nuclear powers a strong incentive to refrain from employing conventional forces against one another. Third, the global spread of nationalism, and of the capacity for political and military mobilization, and the export of modern arms to the less-developed parts of the world have made these unattractive targets for intervention or conquest by great powers. The opportunity for cheap colonial aggrandizement and overseas military intervention that the great powers enjoyed from the fifteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth has disappeared. Fourth, while roughly until the end

of the nineteenth century aggressive war was generally regarded as natural, legitimate and inevitable, recent decades have witnessed a growing normative revolution; as a result, at least the aggressive use of military force is increasingly held to be illegitimate — a rule imbedded in the charter of the United Nations. The normative costs of resorting to military aggression have thus risen palpably.

Although these developments seemed to this author (in 1965) to point at least tentatively to a diminishing utility of the international use of armed force, he noted (though in retrospect not emphatically enough) two significant qualifications. For one, even if the appeal to use force in behalf of certain economic and security objectives has become deflated, this does not, of course, exhaust the reasons for which governments may resort to arms. Ideological goals, especially, ethnic unification (or liberation) and world order objectives may suggest worthwhile gains. Changes on the cost side appeared to be more conclusive. Even here, however, it was doubtful that military force for purposes of deterrence and defense had lost utility. The ability to threaten nuclear reprisal was felt to be highly useful as an instrument of deterrence. The enhanced capacity of less-developed countries to resist military attack by great powers had high utility to the former. In addition, normative changes had engendered no normative costs in regard to defense against aggression. The other qualification — about which more will be said below — noted that the various changes in expected utility were not evenly distributed over the world. They had much more of a hold in some societies, especially the capitalist-democratic countries, than in others.

III

This theme of the declining value of military forces has been pushed a great deal further in more recent writings. For the sake of economy, I will briefly sum up these opinions and propositions without attributing them to individual authors.³

This new school of thought asserts that international relationships have recently been experiencing, and are still undergoing, a revolutionary transformation in the following terms. First, the nuclear balance of terror, which is assumed to be safely stable, has inhibited any large-scale use of force between powerful states, whose leaders, as rational actors, are completely self-deterred.

³ Stanley Hoffmann has written an excellent analysis of this school of thought, which he calls the "modernist" school. "Choices," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1973, pp. 3-42.

Second, societies everywhere are now preoccupied with the solution of economic and social problems on which national welfare depends. The fading of serious questions of military security has facilitated this emphasis on domestic priorities over the previous stress on defense budgets and military service. Third, rapidly growing international interdependence, particularly economic, has been accompanied by the vigorous growth of transnational forces and organizations, including multinational business corporations, which in turn have undermined the primacy of governmental interstate behavior in favor of that of private actors and have greatly reduced the significance of state boundaries. Indeed, as many see it, the classic nation-state, in which military sovereignty reposed, is being increasingly hemmed in and dominated by these forces and is probably on the way out. Fourth, contemporary international affairs are more and more devoted to problems—economic, environmental and normative—that generate negotiations in which military power is irrelevant, which are more subject to international economic power, and which in any case increasingly require management by authorities and institutions that transcend national boundaries.

The world, according to this concept, is being shaped by forces and visions that are creating new forms of “international life,” in relation to which the realities and teachings of the past are largely, if not wholly, irrelevant. The extent to which the members of this new school assert the presence of novel realities or express a vision of the future is often unclear. They apparently believe they are addressing themselves to an international reality that is in the process of swift and irresistible change and that is evidently escaping from the grim shackles of the premodern world.

IV

If these are the arguments alleging that the utility of force is declining, what do we find if we turn to the actual behavior of governments in military matters? Taking the period from 1964 to 1975,⁴ and excluding civil wars in which no country intervened directly with troops, we find the following major armed conflicts erupting: (1) the war in Indochina (already under way since 1962); (2) the Six-Day War between Israel and Arab states (June 1967);

⁴ The following account is based on David Wood, *Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 48, 1968), for the period from 1964 to 1966, and on the IISS's annual *Strategic Survey* for the subsequent years.

(3) the invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany (1968); (4) repeated armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops (1969); (5) the war between India and Pakistan after Indian forces intervened in the civil war in East Pakistan (1971); (6) the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Arab countries (1973); (7) the landing of Turkish troops on Cyprus to intervene in a local civil war (1974); and (8) Soviet-Cuban and South African interventions in Angola's civil war (1975).

In addition, the period witnessed numerous local clashes between Israeli and Arab forces as well as Israeli raids on Arab targets. There were also many minor military violations of the truce between North and South Korea; for example, in January 1968, North Korean commandos raided Seoul, and in January 1974, North Korean gunboats sank a South Korean patrol boat in waters south of the boundary. The list of border clashes and small-scale fighting over disputed territorial claims is lengthy: the low-level Indonesian-Malaysian conflict (1963-1966); Kenya versus the Somali Republic (1963-1967); the Rann of Cutch incident between India and Pakistan (1967); the so-called Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras (1969); Guyana and Surinam (1969); El Salvador and Honduras (1970); the Soviet Union and China (1972); India and Pakistan over Kashmir (1972); the second phase of the Cod War between Iceland and Britain (1972-1973); South Vietnam and China over the Paracel Islands (1974); Iran and Iraq (1974); the third phase of the Cod War (1975); Thailand and Cambodia (1975); Morocco and Algeria over former Spanish Sahara (1975); and India and Pakistan over Kashmir (1975).

Other direct interventions in civil wars occurred: Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Yemen (beginning in 1962); Syria in Jordan, when the Jordanian government fought to subdue the local Palestinian guerrillas (1970); intervention by South Yemen, on the one hand, and Iran and Jordan, on the other, in the Shofar rebellion in Oman; and the seizure of ex-Portuguese Timor by Indonesian forces (1975).

The United States was involved in the following minor incidents: the North Korean capture of the U.S. intelligence ship *Pueblo* (1968); North Korea's shooting down of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan (1969); and the recapture by American forces of the *Mayagüez* and its crew, which had been seized by Cambodia (1975). Military forces are, of course, also used to threaten other countries. The period from 1964 to 1975 was

studded with military threats. Some were dramatic, such as the military alert on which American forces were placed during the Yom Kippur War in order to deter the Soviet Union from intervening militarily. Many were minor, such as when Spain, in February 1975, dispatched gunboats to its North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in response to the assertion of territorial claims by Morocco.

Another body of evidence worth examining is the range of defense efforts maintained by states during the period. While domestic concerns may be an important—and in some instances the dominant—factor in determining the scale of these costly efforts, few will dispute that their chief purpose was to provide for international deterrence and defense, if not aggressive action.

Expressed in constant dollars (current 1973 prices in the United States),⁵ world military expenditures rose from \$222 billion to \$286 billion, or about 28 per cent, from 1965 to 1974. Total outlays of the NATO countries, the Warsaw Pact countries and the less-developed countries (LDCs) increased by 23 per cent, 29 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively. Of course, these aggregate data conceal large individual differences between states, but it is precisely the group data that interest us here. When military expenditures are expressed as a proportion of GNP, total world outlays decreased from 6.7 per cent to 5.7 per cent; that is, by around 15 per cent over the period. Expenditures by the European NATO countries fell by more than 18 per cent in these terms, and those by the United States and Canada decreased by 20 per cent while those of the LDCs as a group mounted by 22 per cent. (Owing to statistical difficulties, no comparable figures were computed for the states of the Warsaw Pact, but the figures do suggest that the world decline in percentages of GNP devoted to defense is accounted for by the reduced expenditures of the NATO nations.)

A comparison of changes in the number of personnel in the armed forces is also revealing.⁶ Military manpower in all armed services of the world increased from 20.7 million in 1965 to 25.7 million in 1974; that is, by more than one-fifth. In the NATO states, however, the aggregate number fell by a little over 7 per

⁵ The data that follow were taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-1974* (Washington: GPO, 1975). The reader should be warned that, because of various conceptual and statistical problems, these comparative data do not represent a precise picture of reality, but they probably do reflect gross changes in the real world. (The difficulties are detailed in *World Military Expenditures*. . . , pp. 6-11.)

⁶ Here, too, difficulties obstruct accurate comparisons, but order-of-magnitude changes are probably reliable.

cent, while that of the Warsaw Pact countries and the LDCs rose by more than 26 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively.

Although the data on which these comparisons are based must be taken very much *cum grano salis*, they probably do not grossly misrepresent reality. The data suggest that military efforts expanded considerably in the Warsaw Pact countries, taken as a whole, increased greatly in the LDCs, and contracted somewhat in the NATO states. Because most of the last-mentioned are capitalist democracies, it is interesting to note changes in some other countries of this character. In Australia and New Zealand, taken together, actual defense expenditures declined by nearly 6 per cent, and their share in GNP fell by 39 per cent over the period while military manpower increased by one-fifth. In Japan, expenditures expressed in constant dollars expanded by nearly 100 per cent, but they fell somewhat as a percentage of GNP and military manpower increased slightly.

International transfers of arms are another interesting phenomenon.⁷ Expressed in constant 1973 dollars, world arms shipments rose from \$5.3 billion in 1965 to \$8.4 billion in 1974, or almost 60 per cent. The striking thing here is what happened in the LDCs. While weapons imports by the developed nations, taken together, remained the same, accounting for around 35 per cent of the total in 1974, arms imports by the LDCs more than doubled. Whereas those of the countries of South Asia declined (probably as a result of the termination of the war in Vietnam), those of countries in East Asia, Africa and Latin America increased by 11 per cent, 50 per cent and 256 per cent, respectively. The sharpest rise occurred in the Near East, where imports grew by no less than 600 per cent. Modern means of threatening the use of force are evidently being spread extensively around the world.

In connection with this horizontal proliferation of arms, we must also take note of the incipient ability of a rapidly growing number of countries to develop nuclear weapons. By itself, this expansion of capacity, of course, does not tell us anything about attitudes toward the use of military force. The strong disposition of many LDCs to augment military expenditures and import sophisticated armament, however, is relevant from our point of view. India's announcement in May 1973 that it had exploded a nuclear device was a spectacular event. The Indian government claimed that it was interested in developing nuclear explosives only for peaceful application. But the technology for developing nuclear weapons is

⁷ The data here are from *World Military Expenditures*. . . , pp. 54-55.

fundamentally the same, and the intentions of governments can always change. In any event, the Indian "peaceful nuclear explosion" jolted many observers and led to renewed interest in preventing or delaying further nuclear weapons proliferation. Nuclear technology is being spread rapidly around the world as more and more countries plan to acquire or expand the capacity to generate electricity from nuclear reactors (which produce plutonium as an inevitable by-product). In 1974, 170 nuclear power plants were in operation in nineteen countries, fourteen of which, among them six LDCs, did not possess nuclear weapons. It is estimated that twenty-eight countries will operate 393 reactors by 1980.⁸ According to another estimate,⁹ by 1985 about forty countries will have enough plutonium for each to make at least a few bombs, unless more effective control measures are instituted.

Finally, still in the realm of government behavior, we may note two other components. If governments had been cognizant of a declining utility in military force, one would have expected considerable activity in attempts at international arms control and disarmament and a general weakening or crumbling of military alliances. While there was a great deal of activity in the area of arms control, it was overwhelmingly confined to relatively peripheral issues or to ways of regulating ongoing arms races. Not much was achieved in minimizing the probability or destructiveness of war. Nor was there any substantial change in the attachment to military alliances. Those that were based on a fairly solid core of commitment remained intact.

V

We are now ready to assess, to the extent that it can be done, recent scholarly theses on the contemporary utility of force in the light of actual state behavior. First, however, we must amplify the cautionary note expressed at the beginning of this essay. The evidence we have described is necessarily ambiguous. It must be interpreted, and interpretations that draw inferences from ambiguous information can differ, and cannot be compelling, because ambiguous behavior can be attributed to alternative motivations. A firm believer in the thesis that international resort to military force has become and is becoming less useful, possible and relevant can

⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1975* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1975), p. 23.

⁹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control Report* (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 18.

contend that there have been no wars between major powers, that the military conflicts that have taken place have been small-scale, short-lived or both, and that the continued high level of military spending results from the lagging ability of governments to comprehend the real changes that are going on around them or from bureaucratic and special-interest-group politics.

The same evidence can be interpreted differently. As pointed out earlier, prolonged periods without wars between major powers have occurred before, and the number of international military conflicts in recent years has certainly not been small. If many of these conflicts have been on a modest scale, this has been because many of the states involved have modest capabilities that do not permit them to wage war for very long or very far beyond their boundaries. If several of these conflicts have been of extremely short duration, this has been either because of the condition just mentioned — the weapons supply, especially of sophisticated imported arms, was quickly exhausted — or because one belligerent proved far superior to the other and achieved quick results. In regard to the persistently high level of military expenditures, it is possible that governments do perceive serious security problems and believe scholarly assertions of a transformed world to be premature.

VI

The frequency of armed conflict in recent years, the rise in global military expenditures and manpower, and the expansion of the international trade in arms does not appear *prima facie* to support any thesis asserting a secular diminution in the use of force or in the expected utility of military capabilities. If there is a pronounced trend, it expresses a remarkable international shift. Military conflicts have occurred mostly in the Third World, mainly between Third World countries, and this shift is paralleled by the fact that the proportion of world military spending, manpower and weapons imports outside the developed capitalist states has sharply increased.

All this is incontrovertible. Nevertheless, it is arguable that most government behavior in these respects is lagging behind changes in underlying realities. Whether it is or is not we cannot know. But we can subject to critical analysis the components of the theses asserting a decline in the utility of force. To what extent is it true or plausible that the costs of employing force have been rising relative to the gains that may be expected from its use?

The evidence concerning the range and imputed value of expected gains is naturally very poor because motivations are involved. It does seem, though, that the notion of economic gain as a justification for the aggressive use of force is far less in evidence, at least superficially, than it was for millennia prior to World War II. This certainly holds true of the highly developed countries, including the communist ones. With two exceptions, the subject has not been raised in public in any of the developed states during the past two decades; and, among them, only the United States and the Soviet Union enjoy military capabilities suitable for the purpose at some distance from their territories. One of the exceptions was the Cod War between Iceland and Britain, which involved a minuscule, quaintly circumscribed use of force. The other was the American threat in 1974 to consider military options if the OAPC countries imposed an oil embargo having a "strangling" effect on the industrial importing states. How serious a threat this was is unclear. In any case, it related to a remote contingency under which a truly paralyzing blow of economic warfare might justify an essentially defensive, remedial use of force. Otherwise, the military sanction played no role in international economic conflicts, even though there were many of them, both among the developed states and between these and the LDCs. The evidence is somewhat less clear in the case of the LDCs. Brief clashes between El Salvador and Honduras over the drift of Salvadorian farmers across the boundary, between China and South Vietnam over the Paracel Islands (off-shore oil), and the low-scale conflict between Morocco and Algeria over former Spanish Sahara (phosphates) may have involved economic stakes. But all other recorded military conflicts between LDCs have been entirely or primarily waged over other matters.

It would nevertheless be imprudent to disregard or unduly belittle economic motives that might fuel military conflict in the future. Severe shortages of food and raw materials, combined with the attempt of states controlling scarce supplies to exploit such control for economic and political purposes, may well serve to preserve some potential—even if a lesser one relative to other issues—for dangerous conflict. Current moves to extend territorial control over the sea are indicative of this prospect.

The use of force to seize or control territory for reasons of military security, also a traditionally important motive, likewise seems to have lost attraction. Yet it has not disappeared altogether. The 1968 Israeli conquest (or at any rate, retention) of the Sinai as a *glacis vis-a-vis* Egypt and (in 1973) of the Golan Heights, *vis-a-vis*

Syria, come to mind. Since it is doubtful that the Soviet divisions now stationed in Czechoslovakia are required to assure Soviet domination over that country, it is conceivable that their deployment on the Czech-German boundary was an objective of the Soviet invasion from the beginning. But perhaps it was a mere afterthought. Finally, while the United States and the Soviet Union, rivals in the exercise of worldwide naval power, secure overseas bases and support facilities by diplomacy and contract, or by the invitation or consent of allies, it is possible that their activities to support friendly countries and to help overthrow hostile regimes, at times by direct intervention, has had the retention of such facilities, or their denial to the rival power, as a significant objective.

However, the fading importance of some objectives does not mean that there are not other goals that may justify the use of military force. Several other traditional objectives of this kind have lost little, if any, of their urgency or legitimacy, either internationally or domestically. Deterrence of, and defense against, attacks on political or territorial integrity as well as the rescue of citizens facing organized violence abroad fall into this category. Nor is there any lack of grounds on which to justify force for the purpose of revising the status quo. Aside from the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is in some ways unique, the recent military conflicts listed above suggest the contemporary importance of three major issues capable of generating the decision to go to war. One involves disputes over established boundaries that are regarded unjust by one side or the other. A second, sometimes overlapping with the first, is the protection or liberation of ethnically related peoples; that is, ethnic unification or national reunification. The third issue, apparently the one most productive of international conflict in the world today, is intervention in civil strife, either to support or help combat incumbent regimes. The precise objective or combination of objectives no doubt varies from case to case, but ideological commitments and the desire to maintain or extend spheres of influence, or reduce the interest of a rival power, evidently play an important part. Anyhow, contemporary governments do not seem to lack incentives to consider force or to be militarily prepared for executing that option.

Turning to the cost side, the deterrent effect of the nuclear balance of terror has figured as a major reason for speculations about the declining utility of military force. The risk of a nuclear war that would destroy both sides, it is argued, keeps each side from using lesser military force against the other. So long as this balance of terror prevails, the aggressive use of military force is undoubtedly

curbed. But if deterrent power is needed for this purpose, that power has extremely high utility as an insurance of self-protection. Moreover, because strategic nuclear reprisal against lesser military attacks, including attacks against allies, is suicidal under these conditions, and because its threat therefore has low credibility, the maintenance of adequate conventional forces for defense also has a great deal of utility. The effective balance of both types of forces accounts for the military stability in Europe in recent decades—provided, of course, that deterrence was needed to stifle the emergence of aggressive designs. The claim that nuclear technology has engendered a decline in the utility of military force can only refer to one thing: namely, fear that a serious conflict might increase the risk of escalation to the strategic nuclear level has restrained adventurism. This consequence, however, will endure only so long as the nuclear balance of terror and that of associated defense capabilities remain solid. The future is by no means certain in this regard. New technological choices or an unreciprocated decay of the will to retaliate or to provide sufficient capabilities for deterrence and defense could upset this balance.

States without nuclear weapons are apparently little, if at all, restrained in their behavior toward states possessing nuclear arms. (The behavior of North Vietnam and North Korea toward the United States is illustrative.) This is so because a powerful moral stigma has become attached to the use of nuclear weapons, especially against a nonnuclear opponent. The magnitude of the expected moral and political costs constrains their use and reduces their utility in these relationships. The fact that states possessing nuclear weapons are thus inhibited from bringing their most effective military technology into play against the vast majority of countries is greatly to the advantage of the latter. It tends to increase the utility of *their* military forces against the nuclear superpowers, thereby making the distribution of military deterrence and defensive power less unequal than it would otherwise be.

This, then, is another reason why the international distribution of military power is now far less uneven than it was, say, from the end of the fifteenth century to World War II. Other factors are the intensity of anticolonialist sentiment and the spread of nationalism and effective government—resulting in a greater capacity to mobilize for defense—within the Third World. The progressive diffusion of modern weapons is yet another factor. Some of the new weapon systems that are being traded (e.g., some kinds of precision-guided munitions) seem, on balance, to favor the defense

of lesser powers against superpower attack. They can be used effectively by small units and require little training, as the North Vietnamese, Egyptians and Syrians have demonstrated; and they can be cost-effective against the complex and extremely expensive weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers (e.g., "high-performance" ships, aircraft and tanks). As a result, the military superiority of great powers over lesser ones has diminished markedly. Quick-and-easy victories are much less likely. Thus, while realistic cost expectations lend less utility to the application of force by great powers against lesser ones, this change at the same time enhances the utility of force that the small powers can threaten to employ. These conditions go a long way toward explaining why the effective military power of the United States and the Soviet Union over the rest of the world is, despite vastly superior military capabilities, much less than that enjoyed by great powers during previous centuries.

It is also worth noting that one basis for the increased deterrent and defensive strength commanded by lesser powers in the Third World — namely, anticolonialist fervor — is for historical reasons effective mainly against capitalist states, although the Chinese doctrine of "social imperialism" tries to extend it to Soviet behavior. There is a discriminating vigilance at work here that tends to increase the international political costs of any exercise of interventionist power against Third World countries. Today, this affects chiefly the United States because it is the only capitalist state in possession of the requisite military capabilities. This factor is notably absent when military force is used by LDCs. An act of military intervention, such as that by Syria in the 1976 Lebanese civil war, is naturally censured by governments and groups that are disadvantaged by the act, but the world at large accepted the Syrian intervention with remarkable equanimity. One can guess that the reaction would have been vastly different if it had been the United States that intervened.

Heightened awareness of war's destructiveness, claimed to have greatly increased in recent decades, should lead to greater reluctance to use military power. Indeed, numerous surveys in highly developed countries provide evidence that confirms this awareness of the costs of using military force. The historical experience of World Wars I and II has apparently lost little impact in Europe and Japan. Such sensitivity is also a function of the development of higher education and communications systems in these societies. Sophisticated news media, in particular television, have reinforced this awareness by the rich display of violence and de-

struction in more recent conflicts (e.g., Vietnam), and more widespread education has enabled more and more people to appreciate the effects of nuclear war. Freedom of speech and press in these democratic countries facilitates the diffusion of this sensitivity to the physical and psychic costs of warfare, and democratic constitutions permit the awareness to become politically influential.

However, there is far less evidence that this sensitivity is equally developed in other parts of the world, specifically in the communist societies and the LDCs. Of course, restricted access to opinions and attitudes in these countries obstructs the assembly of relevant evidence one way or the other. Such evidence is sparse. But it would not be surprising if this awareness were more thinly spread in those societies where some of the conditions that seem to account for its development in the capitalist-democratic nations are absent or nearly so: namely, a strong sensitivity to the destructiveness of war, broad-based higher education, a huge volume of news production and dissemination under conditions of freedom of speech and press, and lively media competition.

Sensitivity to the destructiveness of war has also inspired the new normative restraints that are part of the UN Charter. These norms prohibit all resort to war except in self-defense. Like all constraints, this one can become effective only to the extent that violation threatens the perpetrator with additional costs (i.e., punishments) which are sure, swift and substantial. These conditions are absent. To begin with, violation is not always easy to identify. Aggression is often difficult to distinguish from defense, and it can be masked to appear as defense. No wonder the UN found it hard to define military aggression operationally. Furthermore, sanctions to date have been far from sure to take place, slow to develop when they do occur, and usually weak. Because the UN is constitutionally unfit for imposing sanctions, other than verbal disapproval by General Assembly majorities on some occasions, the only feasible source of punishment, in the form of political costs, is world public opinion and, more importantly, public opinion in the aggressor state itself, provided its public is not subject to government control or manipulation. Public opinion as an effective source of sanction has not amounted to much, especially when the act of aggression is consummated quickly. The negative reaction to the protracted American intervention in Vietnam is an exception. Clearly, the only way in which the new norm can be very effective is when it is fully accepted by a society and leads to self-denial.

What little normative restraint has taken place seems

likewise to be distributed unevenly over the globe. There is considerable evidence that this form of restraint has gained an appreciable hold in Western Europe and Japan. Down to the beginning of the twentieth century, political culture in the European societies still accepted war as natural, inevitable and legitimate without making sharp distinctions between its aggressive and defensive use. Culture conformed to practice. This traditional view has been subject to rapid erosion in recent decades. At least in a substantial proportion of the publics concerned, and in the declared credos of political leaders, war is no longer regarded as legitimate except in self-defense. There is, of course, a problem with the definition of "defense" and of the values that are sufficiently attached to the preservation of self to justify the use of force. And the concept of "self" is extended to include other countries when defensive alliances are maintained. There can also be doubts about the solidity of the new normative commitments. Yet some of the strong negative reaction to the American intervention in Vietnam, both from Europe and Japan and within the United States itself, indicates a substantial change from previous precepts.

Again, it is impossible to know how widespread and how firmly anchored these normative commitments are outside the capitalist-democratic societies. Beyond the use of the new rhetoric at the United Nations and in other forums, we lack proper information. Communist societies, for example, have been indoctrinated with the view that the capitalist countries, out of systemic necessity, are aggressively warlike while socialist societies are supposed to be truly peaceful — a supposition that has been disturbed by anxieties about the possibility of Soviet aggression (especially in China, Yugoslavia and Albania). Such teachings, however, do not exclude the use of force in support of the liberation of peoples being oppressed by capitalist rulers. But, as in the case of capitalist societies, the real strength and meaning of these commitments is impossible to measure.

The frequency of recent armed conflict in the Third World does not encourage the view that the new norm has attracted more than a shallow adherence. This is not surprising. After all, the prohibition of aggressive warfare in the UN Charter was a Western, particularly an American, idea, and it was lodged in the charter at a time when relatively few Third World states were present — at a time when decolonization had only begun. Given their historical experience, countries in the Third World are primarily anxious about aggression by great powers.

Thus, it is not difficult to be skeptical about the profound systemic transformations that, as a number of writers have proposed, governments will increasingly be compelled to adapt to, and that tend to make war less feasible and relevant. We have already dealt with the consequences believed (with inadequate justification) to stem from the evolution of nuclear arms. The thesis that contemporary societies are primarily preoccupied with solving domestic political, economic and social problems seems to be true by and large. How much of a systemic change this sense of priorities represents is problematical. Moreover, the thesis often associated with this finding — that the forementioned preoccupation has generally caused societies to turn “inward” — is implausible. The economies of the highly developed capitalist countries are far too dependent on one another to encourage this sort of isolationism, and the vast majority of the LDCs seek the solution of their economic problems predominantly through the establishment of a new world economic order. While these are not problems that commend the use of military force as a solution, the historical record does not suggest that other pressing issues cannot come to dominate the agenda and the international behavior of states. In the past, certainly, societies have not rarely been content to devote themselves for considerable periods of time primarily to domestic problems, only to be seized by, or have forced on them, international issues that claimed priority. There are a number of countries whose structure of priorities is largely shaped by international considerations that do not rule out the use of force.

The further thesis that growing international interdependence and the rise of transnational actors and institutions are threatening the demise of the nation-state, to which military sovereignty is attached, thus far has scant claim to validity. The citizens of democratic-capitalist nations have been making greatly increased demands on their national governments. In the communist states, the national governments reign supreme. The Third World is engaged in an intensive effort to establish and strengthen national government. If anything, the nation-state as an institution, long restricted to Western societies, is only now coming into its own in the rest of the world.

VII

It now remains to integrate the above observations, hypotheses and suppositions, tentative though they must be because

of the paucity of empirical information and the inherent impediments to deducing trends and projecting them into the future.

Changes on the cost side have altered the international *distribution* of expected utility from the use of military force much more than they have modified its global level. The primary impact of strategic nuclear technology is restricted to those states with nuclear weapons; even among them, it has diminished the utility of force only for changing the international status quo. Its usefulness for preserving the status quo has been enhanced. It is this consequence, and the resulting stability in the military relationship between the superpowers and their primary alliances, that has greatly contributed to the impression that the usability, if not the utility, of military forces has diminished in recent decades. Yet few analysts believe that the striking prepotency of military deterrence precludes, even now, the outbreak of hostilities between the superpowers so long as they continue to engage in active rivalry, including an unremitting arms race. Prudent behavior can minimize this prospect but cannot eliminate it altogether, and whether the stable balance of deterrent power on both the conventional and strategic levels will persist is something we do not know.

Other changes on the cost side have reduced the superiority of the great powers vis-a-vis the states of the Third World. Although the nuclear powers, especially the two superpowers, commit a large portion of their defense resources to the development and deployment of nuclear weaponry, and although these armaments are technically far superior to conventional forces, the moral and political costs of employing them have so far inhibited their use against states without nuclear weapons. As a result, the countries of the Third World are less intimidated militarily by the great powers, and the military capabilities of the former have more utility than would otherwise be the case.

The spread of nationalism to, and the strengthening of government organizations within, the Third World add to the distributional effect, as does more recently the substantial importation of sophisticated arms, particularly precision-guided munitions, by Third World countries. Any future proliferation of nuclear weapons is apt to reinforce this effect. Impending changes in the Law of the Sea are likely to curtail the freedom of superpower navies to use the oceans and narrow passages. Even the rising normative and political costs that have become attached to the use of force for purposes other than self-defense are more of a problem for the great powers, in particular for the United States, than for the Third World govern-

ments. The aggressive use of force by great powers, especially by once imperial states, arouses normative censure much more readily than does its use by smaller and non-Western countries. It is also possible that the heightened awareness of the human and material costs of war is more effectively diffused in the developed democratic countries than elsewhere. The ability of the two superpowers to derive influence and other advantages from their huge military capabilities has substantially diminished as a result. A few countries' loss in this respect makes for other countries' gain. The implication of recent changes in expectations of what can be gained by the international application of force is far less conclusive than that of the changes on the cost side. Even if the use of force in support of certain (e.g., economic) values appeals less today than in the past, other values (e.g., ideological ones and world order objectives) may have risen in attractiveness.

Moreover, the impact of change appears to be uneven internationally. If one compares the contemporary world with the periods preceding World Wars I and II, by far the most significant event regarding the international use of military force has been the vastly changed behavior of the countries sometimes referred to as the "middle powers": the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan.

All these countries employed force readily and often rapaciously — some for many centuries — both against one another and against lesser powers in what is now called the Third World. These nations still possess populations as well as economic and technological infrastructures capable of supporting formidable military strength, even if second to that of the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet they have lost interest in the use of force, except for deterring attacks and military pressures on themselves, and they are no longer worried about such aggressiveness arising among themselves. The military forces they maintain have only a minimum capacity for engagement beyond the perimeters of their posture for deterrence and defense. In fact, since the ill-fated Suez Canal adventure of 1956, they no longer entertain foreign objectives that make a military option desirable. Their interests are overwhelmingly economic and, ultimately, domestic. At the same time, their elites and publics have become keenly sensitive to the costs of war and hospitable to the new normative restrictions on the use of force. As our data on world military expenditures and manpower revealed, it is among them that one sees a growing reluctance to provide resources for defense. They seem content, furthermore, to rely on

the United States for their security to a much greater degree than is necessitated by their limited material resources. That these rather affluent societies apparently find it more onerous to finance deterrence and defense than do the majority of poorer and very poor societies is remarkable. Indeed, with regard to the future, the speculative question has arisen as to whether their will to provide adequately for deterrence and defense has not atrophied to an alarming extent.

The world would be a far more peaceful place and the use of force would shrink dramatically if all societies shared this behavior. There are, to be sure, many other countries that likewise organize military forces solely for purposes of deterrence and defense, and not many countries possess in any case the military capabilities to operate very far beyond their boundaries. But, other than the capitalist-democratic states, countries have no apparent difficulty in setting aside resources for defense, and many of them have not forgone the option to use force against their neighbors. Indeed, one wonders whether the conditions that revolutionized relevant behavior in Western Europe and Japan — conditions about which we know very little — are easily reproduced elsewhere.

The United States has recently displayed some of the behavior patterns that characterize other democratic-capitalist societies, although not yet to the same extent. Sensitivity to the costs of war and of preparation for it has increased markedly over the past decade, and this is probably not just a temporary response to the debacle in Vietnam. Awareness of the normative costs of using force has also grown. On the other hand, the United States still adheres to world order objectives — including the security of the West European nations, Japan and Israel — that recommend having military options and that sustain the will, even if more restrained than two decades ago, to consider their use. However, if one compares the capitalist-democratic societies' willingness and ability to use force today with their previous posture, the past few decades have evidently wrought an enormous change. The international record of recent military spending and warfare does not suggest that corresponding changes in behavior and underlying attitudes have taken place the world over.

One can only conclude, unhappily and disappointingly, that the global picture is far from clear so far as the utility of military force is concerned. The components of this picture do not encourage the prediction that the use and usefulness of military force are definitely on the decline. What look like considerable changes in

parameters are too ambiguous and have been with us for too short a time to permit confident answers to the questions we have raised. The changes on the cost side (actual, probable, possible?) certainly do not establish the disutility of force, and they could not do so even if we accepted the changes as substantial and if their impact were uniform throughout the world. Rational actors, to be sure, will not resort to force unless they expect gains to exceed costs. But aside from the circumstance that deviations from rationality are not unknown among political leaders, there is a powerful subjective element and a great deal of unavoidable guesswork in estimates of costs and gains. All we can argue is this: if cost-increasing factors persist and become less unevenly distributed, then war will become a less likely choice of action statistically speaking. This would be an important change, but such a downgrading effect would be acting only marginally on a historically high level of readiness to consider military options when vital, or seemingly vital, values are at stake. Even if the costs of using force rose substantially, rational actors would be willing to meet them when expected gains have exceeding appeal. The recent behavior of governments in regard to military conflict, both engaging in it and preparing for it, is in line with this judgment.

The conclusion I arrived at more than ten years ago did maintain that the utility of military power was on the decline, but several qualifications were attached. Among them, I noted the uneven global distribution of the relevant changes in parameters. Yet I did not then perceive their importance nearly so much as I do at this time, and I regard my overall assessment now to justify less optimism than I expressed then. The world would seem to contain plenty of state actors for whom the avoidance of violence, including international violence, is not the supreme good; and, as if in recognition of this fact, there are even more actors who still find the aura of military power attractive, if only for reasons of security. I now expect international military conflict and direct foreign intervention in civil wars to continue at a high level, and I expect, too, that the superpowers will have diminishing military influence in the Third World. Whether or not the military relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, both on the strategic level and in Europe, will stay calm and stable depends on the ability of each to maintain solid deterrence. Conflicts in the Third World are likely to remain localized so long as this condition obtains.

It seems to me also interesting that the appreciably more optimistic analyses and predictions that have been offered in more

recent years are virtually all the product of scholarship in those societies wherein the new distaste for the use of force is most highly developed. This suggests the possibility that these comforting interpretations suffer from being a bit culture-bound, unless one takes the patronizing view — which seems to be congenial in the West — that revolutionary, systemic transformations have been first generated in the West, that the rest of the world is only lagging behind, and that it is therefore only a matter of time before it catches up.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MAO AND THE FUTURE

by Robert A. Scalapino

The King Is Dead! Long Live the King! Or, in the parlance of contemporary China, Uphold the Thought of Our Beloved Chairman Mao! Give Full Support to Our Wise Leader, Chairman Hua!

According to official reports, several hundred million Chinese have been caused to attend rallies throughout China to reaffirm their loyalty to Mao Tse-tung's Thought and to pledge their allegiance to Hua Kuo-feng as the new leader of "the whole party, the whole army and the whole country." Not since the height of the Cultural Revolution has mass mobilization in behalf of a single political event taken place on such a scale. In comparison, the anti-Teng Hsiao-ping campaign and even the twin onslaughts against Lin Piao and Confucius were modest.

The speed and extent of this mobilization are an impressive testimony to the New China. From Canton to Urumchi, from Harbin to Kunming, the masses were summoned, sometimes in their separate categories, sometimes as an undifferentiated citizenry. Party cadres, soldiers in the People's Liberation Army, militiamen, youth corps, trade unionists, women's organizations and ordinary people — all were assembled. Special emphasis was naturally given to Shanghai, the old headquarters of the "Gang of Four." As might be expected, moreover, the rallies were largely an urban phenomenon. Yet China's hundreds of millions of peasants were kept informed and involved via radio and small-group political sessions. Given the intensive, incessant propaganda, can there be any adult in the People's Republic of China who is still unaware of the momentous events of the recent past, or of the dangers from which he so narrowly escaped?

Everywhere, the central theme expounded is the same, indicating the importance of a centralized nerve center that can

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determine with precision what should be said (and what should be left unsaid), disseminate this downward via the party organization, and thereby cause millions of citizens throughout a vast nation to repeat the key lines in rote fashion within a matter of days. In some respects, it is reminiscent of the provincial or imperial examinations of dynastic times. Then, aspiring scholars journeyed to a designated spot and sought to qualify for a degree by reproducing maxims from the classics in as faithful a fashion as possible. Now, in less voluntary manner, those for whom the titles New Socialist Man or Woman await are assembled so that they can absorb and repeat maxims from the party.

What are the primary concepts currently certified for public use? The following themes, with some minor variations in terminology, have been expounded countless times in recent months — in speeches, in print, on wall posters, and in the millions of small-group meetings upon which the government depends in its drive to make certain that the word reaches the end of the line:

We must diligently study the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Chairman Mao. Faithfulness to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought remains the crucial determinant as to whether one is a Marxist or a revisionist, a proletarian or a member of the bourgeoisie, a part of the people or an enemy of the people.

The Gang of Four — Mao's widow, Chiang Ching, and her Shanghai accomplices, Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan — opposed Mao completely and committed vile crimes against the party, the army and the state. They are the enemies of communism and the working class.

The tasks before us are these: to uphold the Party Central Committee under the wise leadership of Chairman Hua, whom Mao personally designated as his successor; to unite and avoid splitting, fighting against the factionalism that was promoted by the Gang of Four throughout the country and did so much damage; to advance socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat, grasp revolution and promote production, building our country into a powerful socialist state and taking the class struggle as the key link; to take the correct attitude toward the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; to unite with the international proletariat and the revolutionary people of various countries, especially the people of the Third World, fighting against imperialism, revisionism and reaction, especially the hegemonism pursued by the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

In these themes the platform of the current Chinese leadership is spelled out. Like most party platforms, it contains elements of compromise and ambiguity. Studied carefully, however, it tells us a great deal about politics in the People's Republic of China today.

By its own admission, the Chinese communist government has just been through one of the most serious crises since its ascent to power in 1949. Nor is the crisis over. Like the giant earthquake that struck northern China so savagely in the summer of 1976, Mao's death and the struggle over succession in September-October of that same year continues to produce aftershocks that reverberate throughout the nation. Reports of trouble come from various provinces and urban centers. Most of these relate to past events, and it is not clear whether there have been recent upheavals. The reports, however, are all the more significant, considering the government's rigid control over communications and travel, and suggest that we may have been allowed to glimpse only the tip of the iceberg. In any case, the euphoric reports of unity, order and a thoroughly planned succession, which were a part of the general romanticism regarding the PRC held in some American circles, have now been exploded — and by no less than Chinese officialdom at the highest levels.

Violence on a wide scale has been acknowledged, and there are repeated exhortations to fight against those "counter-revolutionaries" engaged in "sabotage, destruction and pillage." At several points, assert party spokesmen, China was on the verge of civil war, and on various occasions it was necessary to call upon the military to restore order. Since this deplorable state of affairs is presently blamed upon the Gang of Four, an element of exaggeration may be involved, and the situation may now be in hand. Certainly, it would be unwise to predict at this point that China is in danger of disintegration, just as it was unwise to proclaim earlier that all was harmonious, notwithstanding important signs to the contrary. But even if exaggeration for political purposes exists, all indications point to concern over the past — and the future: traveler reports over the past year, insistent pleas for unity, and massive efforts to cultivate support for Hua.

In this context, the struggle for Mao assumes critical importance. Consider the delicacy of the present situation. The four individuals just purged are persons with whom Mao Tse-tung was most intimately associated over the past decade, the last decade of his life. Chiang Ching, his widow, could not have risen to political prominence without Mao's support — and no one can challenge the fact that her prominence ended only with his death. Wang Hung-wen was Mao's protege, the young man whom he supposedly picked to lead the party and serve as a symbol of the capacity of the revolution to revitalize itself perpetually. Of the proletariat,

youthful, and a “rebel” during the Cultural Revolution, Wang epitomized the virtues that Mao heralded throughout the latter part of his life. Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan were prototypes of the New Socialist Intellectual, men upon whom had fallen the heavy burden of steering the correct Maoist course during and after the Cultural Revolution. Had they not dared to revolt against the Peking “establishment,” working closely with Mao in the days when Shanghai was his headquarters, in the period just before the Cultural Revolution? Had they not set the ideological tone for China’s socialist revolution for more than ten years, guarding both the party and the army against revisionism and “capitalist roaders”?

Thus, the intricate task for Hua Kuo-feng and his associates is to separate Mao Tse-tung from those who have spoken in his name and utilized his ultimate authority so thoroughly in recent years. This must be accomplished, moreover, without damaging Mao himself — at least at this point in time — and without falling into the “rightist” error of seeking to reverse former verdicts, particularly that which declares that, on balance, the Cultural Revolution was a necessary and healthy event.

II

How is this to be done? First, it must be shown that Mao’s confederates betrayed him and that Mao himself, disappointed and disillusioned, decided in the waning months of his life to turn to others for leadership in the post-Mao era. The case being presented publicly for this version of events, stripped to its essentials, runs as follows:

In a variety of ways, the ousted group ignored, misinterpreted and sought to sabotage Mao’s Thought and Mao’s specific instructions. As early as 1966, they confused the Maoist position on how to handle contradictions, injecting an undue amount of violence and turmoil into the scene. Subsequently, they disrupted party and army unity, creating dissension everywhere in the course of seeking to build up their own faction and discredit most veteran cadres. This was done, moreover, in the face of Mao’s repeated injunctions not to constitute themselves as a Gang of Four, a phrase he himself coined. Thus, they utterly betrayed every aspect of the basic principles taught by the chairman: “Practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and don’t split; be open and above-board and don’t intrigue and conspire.”

As Mao’s illness grew more serious, they stepped up their

efforts. Taking advantage of the anti-Teng campaign, they sought to widen the search for capitalist roaders in order to ensnare many senior party and army figures, including Chou En-lai. Mao's words were twisted to this purpose. Thus, anyone who emphasized production was denounced, as were those who insisted upon the importance of technical training. Chang Chun-chiao attempted to focus the struggle on empiricism in order to abet these attacks.

Meanwhile, when they found it impossible to subvert the bulk of the People's Liberation Army, they sought to turn the militia into their instrument, planning to use it in the power struggle. They also established their faction in many provinces and municipalities, proffering high office and other emoluments to those who would serve as their agents. The result was growing division at every level, with chaos threatening.

Although he recognized Chiang Ching's "wild ambitions," Mao found himself trapped. But in a crucial decision, he selected Hua to be his successor after the demise of Teng, thwarting the Gang of Four's plans. At the end of April 1976, moreover, he gave a clear indication of his confidence in Hua by handing him a three-point written directive, the final point of which was, "With you in charge, I am at ease." The gang, however, having control of the media, continued to threaten the party-military leadership, speaking ominously of the need to wipe out the many capitalist roaders still in high positions. As Mao's condition worsened, their maneuvers became bolder, and immediately after his death they tampered with his papers in an effort to falsify the chairman's final instructions. They thus sought to make it appear that Mao wanted the party to advance Chiang Ching to power, and to hew to the gang's phony "leftist" line. But Hua Kuo-feng's resolute action of October 7, 1976, eliminating them from the political scene, saved China from civil war and the possible restoration of capitalism. The Thought of Mao Tse-tung was rescued in the nick of time.

The above account, it should be reiterated, is the official version of the complex events that transpired during the struggle for succession. Some aspects of this account, moreover, are highly personal. It is alleged that Chiang Ching had not lived in the same house as Mao since 1973, that he no longer wished to see her, and that he pined for the happy marital life of Chou En-lai and his wife, Teng Ying-chao. Indeed, Chiang Ching is charged with having made Mao's existence miserable in his final weeks, actually abetting his death by insisting that he be shifted in bed when he was gravely ill.

III

For the people of China, as for the outside observer, it is impossible to judge the elements of truth and falsity, omission and exaggeration in the official account. As is always the case in an authoritarian society, the deposed will not be allowed to tell their version of events publicly. That must be garnered from the charges made against them, and from other bits of indirect evidence. From a political standpoint, however, the important questions are two: Is the official story a credible one? and Has Mao been successfully extricated?

In the absence of hard data, it is impossible to answer these questions with assurance. We have no means whereby to measure either public or elitist opinion. Favoring the Hua government is the fact that neither Chiang Ching nor her companions appear to have achieved any broadly based popularity. Indeed, among certain groups, such as veteran leaders and the intellectual community, they were generally regarded as anathema. How successful were their efforts to appeal to the youth, including the upwardly mobile lower- and middle-rank functionaries? We cannot say, but clearly some of the attacks upon Chiang Ching are aimed at blunting that appeal, such as the charges concerning her extravagant living and her desire to cast herself in the role of empress dowager. The savageness of the personal attacks is well revealed by the crude, sometimes pornographic, cartoons appearing in public places. And one should not underestimate the power of a media-saturation campaign combined with a sustained, intensive propaganda effort at the grassroots level, conducted via the party in every commune, factory and ward.

Thus, the reports of a carnivallike atmosphere and rejoicing in the streets following the news of the purge can be given some credence. The fact should not be overlooked that China has been in the throes of political crisis for years, with only sporadic intervals of calm. By the summer of 1976, instability had communicated itself to the man in the street as well as to low-ranking cadres. The numerous accounts of lowered morale, frequent breakdowns of discipline — including serious violence in some regions — and a widespread lassitude have now been generally admitted by the top leadership. In a sense, the dramatic events of early October may have created a feeling in many quarters of relief, of a “break-through” that would render the signals coming from the center clearer and more consistent.

It would be amazing, however, if there were not a substantial quotient of cynicism and doubt within China regarding politics at this juncture. Any political act, too often repeated, becomes suspect. The charges against every loser in the Chinese political arena in recent times have been essentially the same, however incongruous the result. To be sure, terms such as "leftist" and "rightist" or "radical" and "moderate" have a very limited utility in exposing the realities of the People's Republic, and they are often misleading. Yet if there were any "leftists" on the stage, the Shanghai Group would appear to have qualified. Certainly, their writings and actions consistently took the "leftist" line. The fact that they played the leading role in the Cultural Revolution, working closely with Mao himself, cannot be taken away from them, even in this time of disgrace. And was not the Cultural Revolution a conscious rebellion from the Left, so proclaimed by Mao?

Thus, one of the least credible aspects of the campaign against the Gang of Four is the insistence that, in reality, they were "rightists" consistently pursuing the capitalist road. Indeed, their "rightist" antecedents — as must always be the case with those declared "enemies of the people" — have now been traced back to the very beginnings of their political careers and, in the case of Yao, to his father as well. Why? Since Mao called upon his supporters to sustain the Left, and defined his own position as on the Left, his opponents must be labeled "rightists." This places the Gang of Four in a long line of renegades that includes Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and, until recently at least, Teng Hsiao-ping. In contrast to Soviet orthodoxy, which preserved a "leftist extremism" to offset a "rightist opportunism," reserving for itself the centrist position, Chinese orthodoxy currently insists that all is governed by the struggle between two lines, pitting the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Hence, Chiang Ching and her friends have to be agents of the bourgeoisie, smuggled into the party.

Perhaps turnabout is fair play. The game of politics in contemporary China is played in a very rough fashion. If the vanquished do not lose their heads, they lose nearly everything else, including their respectability in Chinese historical annals. Had the Shanghai Group emerged victorious in the power struggle, the evidence leaves no doubt that they would have labeled Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying and many others as capitalist roaders. Using the same charges that have been leveled against Teng Hsiao-ping, the record would have shown how *they* betrayed Chairman Mao. Quite possibly, the masses are not concerned with these questions,

but for those who are directly involved in the political process at any level, the repetition of stereotyped assaults must create gnawing doubts.

Most of the personal charges are oft-used ones, too. Was not Liu Shao-chi's wife, Wang Kuang-mei, also accused of extravagant living and bourgeois habits — and by none other than Chiang Ching? And are these two the only offenders? Might not the suspicion grow that privilege accompanies high officeholders — and their wives — proclamations of egalitarianism notwithstanding? In sum, it is impossible to believe that the repeated purges of recent years, the charges and countercharges involving almost all segments of the political-military elite, have not taken their psychological toll, both among the key actors who survive and among subordinates and the masses down below. Even if the toll at the latter two levels is no more than an increasing tendency to view political extravaganzas as theatre, demanding attendance and ritualized performance, but not to be taken literally, is this not a serious challenge to the essence of the system? Consequently, one of the critical tasks confronting the party and the government at present is to reduce the cynicism and suspicion so widespread as a result of repeated upheavals and rampant factionalism, and to recapture those elements of legitimacy and authority that once gave the Chinese communist movement its strength.

IV

What of Mao? As indicated earlier, no errors, no lapses of judgment, no ill-advised policies are ascribed to Mao. On the contrary, the cult of Mao is perpetuated at least as strongly in the aftermath of his death as it was in the final years of his life. Every individual continues to be measured against his faithfulness to Mao. Every policy must be justified in terms of select passages from Mao's Thought. Mao seemingly reigns supreme in death as in life, his image shielded from the recurrent storms that have struck China's political shores.

In this connection, however, there are two fascinating anomalies. The first relates again to the credibility of the present carefully constructed campaign. Is it possible to denounce Mao's wife and other members of his family, together with those whom he personally selected and elevated to high office, and yet leave Mao's image intact? In broader terms, will it not occur to many that almost no one survived politically who got too far up the power

structure — too close to Mao? It must not be forgotten that when Wu Han published the drama *Hai Jui's Dismissal* in 1961, its reception was extraordinary, particularly in intellectual circles, despite the fact that it was a thinly veiled attack on Mao's treatment of Peng Te-huai, another "loyal and honest official, unjustly accused and basely treated." Indeed, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution — long heralded as being personally initiated and supervised by the chairman — was launched against this and similar works. And who was Mao's instrument for this purpose? None other than Yao Wen-yuan, then a rather minor journalistic figure in Shanghai.

There is thus a legacy of criticism that could be resurrected, particularly since those who played the role of spear carriers in silencing that criticism — Yao, Chang Chun-chiao and Chiang Ching — have themselves now fallen, together with Lin Piao, who provided the military muscle for Mao's self-proclaimed rebellion. It should not be forgotten that many who were cast into oblivion in the ensuing struggle — along with their followers — remain alive. Indeed, a number have been rehabilitated. Others continue to hope.

Mao might still be exonerated. It might still be claimed that the emperor had been misled, false charges having been brought against certain advisers which he was caused to accept. Even this defense, however, raises questions of the emperor's judgment, of whom he should trust. If Teng Hsiao-ping is rehabilitated, moreover, it will be all the more difficult to protect Mao against criticism, since in the anti-Teng campaign extensive use was made of the chairman's criticisms of Teng as an incorrigible "rightist." And, privately, there must be some of the same resentment against Mao among elements of the topmost elite as existed among disillusioned members of the Red Guard at the end of the Cultural Revolution. One could talk to such individuals in Hong Kong — young people, filled with idealism at an earlier point, who had turned bitter, convinced that Mao used them when it was politically advantageous and then deserted them when their services were no longer needed.

This is not the place to attempt any extended psychological analysis of Mao, either the man or his political style.¹ However, one cannot avoid reflecting upon Stalin at this point. During his

¹ For recent, stimulating and diverse analyses of Mao and his role, see Parris H. Chang, *Power and Policy in China* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975); Lucian Pye, *Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Edward Rice, *Mao's Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); and Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

lifetime, as is well known, Stalin struck out against close associates at will, flaying some as “leftists,” others as “rightists,” and purging both with impunity. Stalin, alone among all his contemporaries, was always right. When the de-Stalinization campaign finally came (recall that it did not follow immediately after the leader’s death, but awaited the ripening of internal cleavages among his successors), Stalin was revealed as a cruel and increasingly paranoid ruler, a man who came to trust no one and who caused the deaths of countless innocent individuals.

The fact that Mao did not cause his opponents to be killed may or may not redound to his advantage. Depending upon the unpredictable peregrinations of Chinese politics, one group or another may have the opportunity to rewrite the history of the past twenty years. Indeed, it might be asserted that the most basic issue dividing the PRC’s political-military elite is precisely that: Who will write the “definitive history” of the Cultural Revolution, those who benefited by it or those who suffered from it? Mao’s ultimate fate — his place in history — is at least partly connected with the answer to this question.

If Mao is vulnerable, however, it does not necessarily follow that he will be treated to Stalin’s fate. Were Mao to be criticized in the near future, even mildly, the current leadership in Peking would face an enormously complex and threatening problem: to an unprecedented degree, the authority and legitimacy of the entire Chinese communist movement rests at this point on the reputation of Mao Tse-tung.

The assault upon Stalin from the Kremlin itself caused very serious problems for the Russians, particularly in their relations with foreign communist parties, including the Chinese Communist Party. It also shook the Russian people and raised questions about modern Soviet history and leadership that have not yet been put to rest. But behind Stalin was Lenin — and Lenin has remained sacrosanct. Thus, the USSR has a “father of country,” and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has a solid hero — Stalin’s demise notwithstanding. No such solution is available in the case of China. To resurrect Wang Ming, for example, or any of the Returned Students would be to make fatal concessions to the Soviet version of Chinese communist history, and thus to outrage the spirit of Chinese nationalism. To go back to Chen Tu-hsiu would be equally illogical, and Li Ta-chao — who was martyred sufficiently early to retain his reputation in all official sources — could scarcely serve the necessary purpose. There is currently under way a campaign

to enhance the prestige of Chou En-lai, and it may even reach “cult of personality” proportions. It seems doubtful, however, that Chou — who was always subordinate to Mao in life and reportedly a faithful follower — could replace him as “the” leader in death.

Given these sober facts, and given also the intellectual tradition of China, it seems more likely that Mao will be treated to the fate of Confucius rather than that of Stalin — at least for the period immediately ahead. In point of fact, Mao is already being “Confucianized”; that is, he is being reinterpreted to serve the purposes of the current officeholders.

This can be noted on several fronts. Let us return for a moment to the Cultural Revolution issue, surely one of the most sensitive questions on the political landscape. If the party, army and government are to achieve and maintain any substantial degree of unity at this point, the issue must be handled with great skill. On the one hand, those who benefited from the Cultural Revolution, including Hua Kuo-feng himself, together with a large number of younger cadres, will resolutely oppose any attempt to paint the Cultural Revolution entirely in black. On the other hand, the countless victims of that era, including a number of individuals who have been rehabilitated, are all too aware of what they regard as rank injustice, if not sheer insanity.

The current answer is to insist upon the basic validity of the Cultural Revolution but to deplore its excesses, blaming these upon the Gang of Four. Chairman Mao, we are told, strongly urged that discussion and disputation of a nonviolent character be the principal routes through which the problems giving rise to the need for this revolution were to be handled. It was the Shanghai Group that insisted upon using violence, pitting one group against another in bloody clashes.

The issue of revolution versus development is of equal importance in the contemporary scene, cutting across almost every specific controversy of recent times. When the Gang of Four controlled the news media, Mao was utilized mightily in behalf of the struggle against revisionism and the restoration of capitalism. The central charges against Teng, for example, all related to the thesis that he had deliberately misinterpreted the chairman’s writings and thoughts on these crucial matters. Mao was extensively quoted as having emphasized that the primary danger lay in the fact that capitalist roaders remained powerful *within* the party, and that the struggle between the two lines would continue into the indefinite future. To substitute managerial for worker control at the factory

level, to consider a program of increased centralized planning, to pay primary attention to material incentives, to shift the educational system back to its pre-Cultural Revolution status in the name of improving its quality — all of these proposals or acts were to sacrifice revolution for the sake of bourgeois-style progress. And when necessary, Mao — then still alive — could be caused to issue a new statement which, however esoteric in some cases, provided definitive evidence of his views.

V

Today, Mao — safely dead — is in other hands. His quotations remain an indispensable aspect of the struggle for legitimacy. In every speech and directive of the Hua administration, they are to be found in liberal amount. Nor has there been any effort to change some of the key phrases. The principal threat is still that of modern revisionism, and as we have noted, to be a “leftist” is still the only means whereby one can be loyal to Mao’s teachings. The struggle between the two lines remains crucial, and it will continue for the foreseeable future. But Mao is now also quoted on the importance of unity, military strength and economic development. At present, it is those who deliberately misinterpreted Mao on *these issues* who are excoriated. Thus, the Gang of Four are accused of denigrating the workers’ need for culture (technology), of being prepared to sacrifice productivity by one-sidedly emphasizing revolutionary zeal, and of recklessly using the term “capitalist roaders” against all whom they would destroy in their ruthless quest for power. By seeking to split the party, weaken the military, sabotage the nation’s agricultural and industrial production, and leave the proletariat in a state of technological ignorance, were they not violating Chairman Mao’s most sacred injunctions, revealing themselves both as renegades to his Thought and traitors to the country?

We have not seen the last of the struggle to interpret Mao. It will be a permanent and central part of the drama of politics within the People’s Republic. For the immediate future, at least, Mao will be used as the loving comrade of Chou En-lai — a man who wanted above all an essentially flexible, pragmatic approach to problems, an approach aimed at making China a powerful socialist nation by the end of the twentieth century; a man who emphasized unity and put a high premium upon harmony among the party, the army and the whole people; a man who understood that in organization lay the key to success, and that the esprit de corps of any

organization depended upon secure interpersonal relations and strong elements of predictability and external support.

There is another Mao, possibly a more representative Mao — although who can safely pick the “real” Mao out of this many-faceted and deeply contradictory man? There is the Mao of continuous revolution, who regarded strife and struggle as a normal, even healthy, aspect of human relations and political progress; a man who, as he himself moved to an elevated position above organization, seemed on occasion prepared to violate his own earlier principles, to risk weakness and division in behalf of vaguely enunciated principles — which many of his opponents felt merely camouflaged his drive for renewed power; a man many of whose words could be used to place revolutionary purity above economic and social development.

It is not impossible that some later elite will resuscitate and reemphasize *this* Mao as it suits their purpose. Even more likely, perhaps, is the possibility that some aspects of this Mao will be mixed with the Mao set forth first. The gap between rhetoric and reality, it cannot be overly stressed, has persisted in post-1949 China, irrespective of the precise powerholders.

There have been many attempts to assess Mao, and these will no doubt continue: few men of our time present such a challenge, both in terms of the complexity that surrounds his personality and in terms of his impact upon one of the world's more important societies. Mao has been defined variously as theorist, poet-intellectual, teacher, revolutionist. It is my view that the first two designations do not truly fit him, and that they can be very misleading if applied rigorously. Mao wrote about theory, but he was not a theorist, just as he wrote poetry without being a poet. A theorist must consciously work his ideas into a coordinated philosophical whole, creating a conceptual framework susceptible to cosmic generalizations. Mao wrote in an aphoristic manner, acknowledging his heavy debt to Marx, Lenin and Stalin but leaving largely unacknowledged his debt to Chinese classical literature. For Mao, ideas were primarily weapons for action; hence, they had to be consciously fashioned and refashioned for the task immediately at hand. One can find a few themes that run more or less consistently through Mao's writing, but his very career as an activist precluded his being a theorist in any true sense.

For similar reasons, Mao should not be categorized as an intellectual. This is not to assert that he was unintelligent. On the contrary, he was a very able man intellectually — though he often

hid this fact under a coarseness of speech. In his purely intellectual efforts, however, Mao clearly revealed himself to be out of his milieu. His political writings should be studied as guides to action, not as intellectual exegeses. And his poetry would not be given serious attention were it not for its source. The world of the intellectual was not that of Mao. On the contrary, he held the deepest resentment against the orthodox, urban Chinese intellectual, perhaps partly because he had at one time aspired to this vocation, only to abandon it. Subconsciously, he saw himself in competition with China's modern intelligentsia, and he was determined to best them in the task of changing and modernizing the nation.

Par excellence, Mao was a revolutionary. From his early adult years, he lived and breathed revolution. It dominated his thoughts as well as his actions. As one result, his early speeches and writings were strongly oriented toward questions of tactics and strategy, organization, and the need to mobilize the masses politically and militarily. In these latter terms, he was indeed a teacher of the masses, and this was Mao's own definition of his primary role. But he was also an "organization man," as any successful revolutionist must be. From this fact derived many of his strengths — and some of the giant paradoxes that were to mark the man, especially later in his life.

In his final years, Mao often appeared to be at war with the very organizations he had constructed, notably with the party. The fact should not escape us that in fighting the "establishment" during the Cultural Revolution (or, perhaps more accurately, in fighting a majority from an initial minority position), Mao and his followers built a new set of revolutionary organizations, of which the massive Red Guard constituted only one. It was as if Mao were back in his heyday, creating the conditions that challenged and finally toppled the existing order, fighting from the outset as a rebel.

Perhaps this is the central key to Mao's political behavior during the last two decades of his life. To be sure, one can find signs of ambivalence in the young Mao over such questions as centralism and organization. Up to the point of victory and beyond, however, the basic direction of his writings and policies was to aggregate the communist movement into larger, more intricate, more highly structured units. How could it have been otherwise? But as the institutions of the New China took shape, particularly after the new constitution of 1954, Mao eschewed the type of role that would have involved him directly with routine, or even with the essential state institutions (the military being a critical excep-

tion). Consciously or unconsciously, Mao seemed desirous of playing a suprainstitutional role as Philosopher-King, formulator of basic policies, gadfly and critic. Reserving the right to intervene at any point, yet aloof from many of the concrete problems thrust upon the administrator, was not Mao projecting forward his traditional role as revolutionist?

A revolutionist without a revolution must create one. Mao, precluded by China's weaknesses from playing such a role externally, turned inward against the very structures that he had helped create. To know when to die is an important part of the art of politics. Had Mao passed from the scene at the beginning of China's communist era, his place in history would have been unassailable, whatever perspective one took concerning his personal attributes and his basic political values. But Mao lived on — to continue being a revolutionist in China's postrevolutionary age. As a result, he bequeathed to his successors weak institutions and an elite in conflict.

VI

The task of building China into a strong, unified, developing socialistic state has thus been made more difficult. Perhaps it will be accomplished, notwithstanding the immediate problems. One should never underestimate the extraordinary capacity of the Chinese people, nor the remarkable strength of Chinese culture — both apart from and intertwined with any given ideology or set of political institutions. If the task is accomplished, however, it is likely to be the nationalist, organizational, flexible but authoritarian Mao that triumphs, not the iconoclastic, quasi-anarchist, revolutionary Mao. Communism is not an ideological environment in which the latter attributes can thrive — as even Mao discovered.

NORTHEAST ASIA: AREA OF CONFRONTATION OR ACCOMMODATION?

by Gaston J. Sigur

In Northeast Asia four great powers meet. Not only are the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Japan in geographical propinquity in that region, but the major security, economic and political interests of these nations converge.

Presently there exist two great alliance structures in the area. The United States and Japan work together in security, economic and political areas, in accordance with the Japanese-United States security treaty signed in 1952. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are involved in a *de jure* relationship by their treaty of 1950. In actual fact this agreement, at least at this time, appears to have no validity.

Given the divergent ideological configurations of all four countries and their individual interpretations of their national interests, the dangers of confrontation are great. The military build-up in the area makes for a particularly dangerous situation.

As of the end of 1976, the Soviet Union continued to maintain a great army and air force on its long Chinese border, with massive offensive capability. While the numbers of Soviet military personnel may vary from time to time, the amount of sophisticated Soviet equipment kept in place, including nuclear weapons, seems constant. The Soviet Union is also rapidly expanding its Pacific fleet. This involves a large increase in the number of submarines assigned to this naval force.

The Chinese, on the other hand, have a large standing army, but it is not well equipped with modern weapons. China's tanks are outdated and her antitank guns are not designed to stop the newest Soviet tanks. In short, the Chinese equipment is no match for that of the Russians. The Chinese depend, so they state, on the concept of "people's war" to defeat a Soviet attack, if one ever comes. However, the People's Republic of China has more than

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people's war with which to face the Soviets. China also has a growing nuclear arsenal with a delivery system that places some of the USSR's major cities in the danger area. The Soviet Union cannot easily disregard this real threat when she considers her policy toward China.

The United States retains a strong, forward position in Northeast Asia. The United States Seventh Fleet patrols East Asian waters. There are major and powerful United States bases in Korea and Japan. But the United States maintains its naval forces and army and air bases for defensive purposes only: they are necessary to assure any potential adversary that the United States intends to honor its treaties with both the Republic of Korea and Japan. American military power in the Northeast Asian area is not sufficient in quantity to cause concern that the United States would instigate aggressive military action.

The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are what the name implies. Japan's military can be used only to hold back an aggressor for a limited period of time until American force can be employed in full. Japanese air, naval and ground units are limited in number, though their quality is constantly improving with the purchase of new, modern equipment. Japan is giving consideration to building its antisubmarine warfare capability since it is so dependent on sea lanes for the raw materials necessary for its survival. But it should be remembered that the Japanese military establishment is geared solely to a holding capability, with United States backstopping essential to Japan's defense.

Besides the "Big Four" in Northeast Asia, there are two other countries whose armed forces are strong enough to engage in a major military confrontation. These are South and North Korea. Both Koreas have large well-equipped standing armies.

For many years now, North Korea has maintained her regular military forces in an almost constant state of readiness for war. Large reservist units are also available within hours of an emergency call-up. The Pyongyang leadership has often rattled the sword, by words and by the alerting of its military and the movement of combat-ready troops to the frontier with the South. The tunnels dug by North Korea into the South are an added concern to those who question the credibility of the statement of Kim Il Sung that he wants only peaceful reunification. The air power of North Korea can be a cause for concern, too. Until fairly recently it appeared that the North Korean air force was defensive in nature. However, there was some evidence available in late 1976 that this air force was becoming more offensive-oriented.

The Republic of Korea in Seoul has a strong army and a reasonably powerful air arm. Her navy, like that of North Korea, is negligible. Unlike the North, however, South Korea has never threatened offensive action. While the people of South Korea desire reunification, they are fully aware of the great obstacles in the way of such a step and totally abjure the use of force to bring it about. South Korea's army and people are prepared to face an attack from North Korea, but they are not geared for a first-strike offensive against Pyongyang.

In Northeast Asia, then, powerful military forces of large and small states are concentrated. These forces are in a state of readiness. Military action could begin at any time in Korea and on the Sino-Soviet border. However, it is not likely that a military confrontation will take place in this area under present circumstances. There are several reasons for this.

First of all, neither the USSR nor the People's Republic of China stands to gain from large-scale fighting with the other. Not only would both countries suffer tremendous losses in such an engagement, but the resultant international tensions would lead to a change in the power-balance configuration that might very well be detrimental to the interests of these two communist states. Japan might feel constrained to move toward full rearmament, and the United States and Western Europe would certainly act quickly to improve their military strength. This reaction would not seem to be in the best interests of Moscow. It is more likely that the Soviet Union will attempt to improve its status with the Chinese through pressure, carefully and subtly applied, at the same time as negotiations are carried forward. A Chinese military thrust at the Soviet Union is not feasible, though the People's Republic of China is not without cards in her game of balance with her Marxist-Leninist neighbor. Not only are masses of Russian troops and equipment tied up on the China border, but the Chinese cause the Soviets great concern in Third World countries and among other communist states.

On the Korean Peninsula, it is difficult to foresee military action on a large scale. Certainly the North Koreans will not wish to become involved once again with the United States in full-scale war, which aggression against the South would in all likelihood initiate. North Korea's providers and protectors, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, would equally oppose moves that would further American positioning on the Asiatic mainland. Moscow must, after all, consider its policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. The Soviets may believe that they are

gaining more from this policy than would be won by adopting a more bellicose attitude. And the Japanese factor has to be considered a deterrent to war. Any war in Northeast Asia, even one limited to the Korean Peninsula, could make Japanese leaders conclude that a militarily powerful Japan, in every sense of the term, is essential to Japan's existence.

There are other reasons in addition to those just stated, but these should be sufficient to uphold the thesis that at present no state in Northeast Asia sees war as contributing to the furtherance of its national interests. It is too great a risk at this time. What then do the powers want of and from each other in this area of the world?

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, since the death of Mao Tse-tung, has become more than ever preoccupied with the "China problem." As 1976 drew to a close, Moscow had adopted a seemingly conciliatory attitude toward its Chinese opponent. Border talks began again in Peking, and the Soviet news media were singularly non-denunciatory in their comments on events in the People's Republic. This was in marked contrast to the vitriolic reporting that previously had accompanied every news story from and about China.

Just how much the Soviet Union has attempted to interfere in China's internal affairs since the death of Chairman Mao is a mystery. Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, in his message to the Chinese people in late December 1976, implied that the so-called Gang of Four had sought assistance from the forces of social imperialism. In Communist Chinese parlance this means the Soviet Union. The accuracy of Hua's accusation is, of course, in question. However, we can assume with some certainty that power seekers, Chinese or Russian, will accept strange bedfellows to attain their ends.

The Soviets say in private conversation that what they hope to achieve is a kind of "peaceful coexistence" with Peking. They want to accomplish, they insist, the establishment of normal state-to-state relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. If such normalization would lead to party-to-party cooperation, the Soviets would, of course, be delighted.

So far, however, there are few signs that Soviet policy—maintaining massive military forces on a war footing along the Chinese frontier while, at the same time, pushing negotiations on the border issues and abandoning strident, propaganda attacks on the Chinese—has met with any real success. It would seem, then, to

be in the Soviet national interest to continue to do what is possible to weaken and isolate the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union does not want to see a strong China unless that China is in some kind of an alliance with her. The Soviets feel that a powerful China, acting independently on the world scene, can, more often than not, serve to deter Soviet ambitions. On occasions there may be areas where cooperation between the two communist powers can be worked out, such as in Vietnam. But even there, the cooperation was based not so much on working together as on each trying to "get the edge" over the other.

The Soviet Union has not ceased to advocate its collective security system for Asia, though it has been less vocal about it since Mao's death. This proposal has generally received little acceptance from Asian states because of its perceived purpose of isolating the People's Republic of China.

There is a second purpose to the advocacy of an Asian collective security system by the Soviet Union. This is to weaken and eventually destroy United States multilateral and bilateral security arrangements in Asia and the Pacific. Soviet Russia has consistently opposed the Japanese-United States security treaty, in particular, and has worked for its dissolution. The Soviets can be expected to step up their efforts to further this goal at any opportunity.

Additionally, the Soviet Union has shown more concern in the past couple of years over what is seen as a possible "Pacific entente" among the United States, Japan and the People's Republic of China. The Soviets become concerned every time it seems that either the United States or Japan is about to strengthen ties with China. In 1975, for instance, the Soviet Union exerted heavy diplomatic and political pressure to influence Tokyo not to sign a pact of peace and friendship with Peking. In this particular case, Soviet language was especially intemperate.

To fully understand Soviet policies in Northeast Asia one must look at Soviet global objectives. These objectives are designed basically to weaken the United States position in every part of the world. If this is recognized as a fundamental Soviet goal, the carefully conceived policies of the Soviet Union toward the People's Republic of China, Japan, Korea and the United States in the Northeast Asian region can be placed in proper perspective.

On a global scale the Soviet Union is rapidly increasing its military strength. This is apparent in Asia not only by the forces on the Sino-Soviet border, but also by the Soviet build-up of its Pacific fleet. This build-up is most likely directed against the United States

and Japan, rather than against China. The larger number of submarines being added to the fleet would indicate that their use would be directed against maritime powers (i.e., the United States and Japan) rather than against a great land power (i.e., the People's Republic of China).

The Soviet Union, therefore, is playing a game of power in East Asia as she is elsewhere. With an increase in military power, the Soviets will attempt to increase correspondingly their political influence and leverage.

In Korea, as has been pointed out, it would not seem to be in the interests of the Soviet Union to have a large-scale war. At this stage, the USSR benefits more from peace. While war on the Korean Peninsula might put United States-People's Republic of China relations back into cold storage, it might also lead to a United States-Soviet confrontation undesirable from the Soviet viewpoint—undesirable, at least, as long as United States military and naval power remains credible. It seems likely, therefore, that the Soviets will continue to provide arms and economic assistance to the government of Kim Il Sung but will caution him not to seek the reunification of Korea by force.

In the economic area, the Soviet Union is moving, as rapidly as is feasible, to develop its Siberian region. Soviet plans for Siberian development are both extravagant and detailed. If they can be achieved, the Soviet Union's power will be immensely increased. To move quickly and efficiently, however, the USSR needs assistance from states with more advanced technologies, such as the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Until the end of 1976, the aid provided the Russians by the West and Japan has not been of exceptional quantity or quality. This obviously is a reflection of concern over the growing military power of the Soviet Union and the ways in which greater industrialization and modernization might serve to further this power. This concern is evident in all negotiations between Moscow and Washington and between Moscow and Tokyo.

Some Western observers believe that the USSR has given up the Khrushchev aim of catching up with and surpassing the United States in economic terms and is instead devoting its entire effort to gaining supremacy over the United States in the military arena. During the coming months, the seriousness with which the Soviet Union approaches the West and Japan to gain technological support for development projects in Siberia will help us to understand the truth or falsity of this proposition.

The People's Republic of China

Since the death of Mao Tse-tung, the new government of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng is directing all its efforts toward the assertion of its authority. In late December of 1976, there were numerous admissions from Peking that the transition power period had not gone smoothly. Supporters of the so-called Gang of Four have not calmly accepted the charges that their former heroes were, in fact, working all along against the interests of Chairman Mao. There were disturbances in several Chinese cities, which were put down by the People's Liberation Army. Chairman Hua, on his part, has accused the Gang of Four of wanting to foment civil war in China. Whatever the truth of such accusations, it is clear that the internal situation in the People's Republic is far from serene and that it will be some time before the central power will be in the firm control of Hua and his military supporters—if indeed this ever happens. However, for now we must look at the Hua regime as the authority in the People's Republic of China and speculate as to what this means for the Northeast Asian power balance as it relates to Chinese hopes and objectives.

When the leadership of the People's Republic of China considers its foreign policy, Sino-Soviet relations has to be given priority. The only threat to the security of China at the present time comes from the Soviet Union. No other power has either the strength or the perception of danger to conceivably threaten the existence of China as a nation.

Since Hua Kuo-feng assumed power in Peking, there has been no letup in the Chinese verbal thrusts at the Russians. In fact, Hua's claim in late 1976 that the Gang of Four might have invited foreign (i.e., Soviet) intervention had they succeeded in their plan to take power in China seemed to augur no good for Soviet efforts to reach agreements with the new Peking regime. Also, the Chinese press, radio and television have not softened their comments about Soviet imperialism.

At the same time, Chairman Hua has indicated that he would like to see some improvement in relations with Moscow. This would seem to make sense from the Peking view, if improvement can be accomplished without sacrificing independence or fundamental national interests. More normal ties between the People's Republic of China and the USSR could lessen the dangers of a military confrontation between the two countries, which might presumably be useful to China as she experiences the succession

crisis. On the other hand, it could be argued that the Chinese communist leaders need an outside enemy to foster a sense of unity among the people. If this is true, then Hua and his government may seek better relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States and, at the same time, condemn the two as "dangerous, independent superpowers," held in check only by a benevolent People's Republic of China and the so-called Third World countries. Thus, the Chinese would be able to train their heaviest propaganda guns against the USSR or the United States, according to Chinese perception of which seemed the greater threat at any given time.

For the moment, the Soviet threat requires the People's Republic of China to bolster relations with the United States and Japan. Peking has urged the United States to maintain its military strength in East Asia and the Pacific. Chinese leaders have told leading Japanese socialists that it is in the best interests of peace in the region to retain the Japanese-United States security treaty. The People's Republic of China no longer considers the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to be instruments of United States and Japanese imperialism, nor does their existence signify the rebirth of Japanese militarism. Instead, they have become a stabilizing influence in Peking's eyes.

On the Korean Peninsula, the People's Republic of China has expressed unqualified support for the regime in Pyongyang and sees it as the only legitimate government there. While it may be that Peking does not want to see Kim Il Sung use force to gain control of all Korea, Chinese leaders support his claims of sovereignty and publicly agree with him that United States forces in South Korea must be withdrawn. They have refused to accept the proposal of the United States that a meeting of interested parties in the Korean situation sit down and discuss ways of settling problems and lessening tensions in the area.

The Korean policy of Peking is clearly based on Chinese national interests and on the ideology of a communist state. These two elements, national interest and ideology, can be found in all foreign policies of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. National interest may take precedence over ideology in most situations, but both are always present.

It would seem that China's national interest is first in the minds of the People's Republic of China leaders as they ponder relations with the outside world today. This means, in real terms, that in order to preserve the nation, build a communist state, and expand its influence in the Asian region and globally, the People's

Republic of China will have to exert great efforts on internal development. Statements from Chairman Hua and other Chinese leaders have emphasized the need for China to progress economically and militarily. In order to accomplish this in the most effective manner, the Chinese will need to acquire technical assistance from the outside world, for example, the United States, Japan and Western Europe. China is already receiving some aid, but not nearly enough to allow for rapid and efficient development.

One can make the case that what the People's Republic of China needs and wants most is stability, both within and without its borders. Peace at home and peace abroad are necessary if the People's Republic of China is to become a great industrial and military state in the shortest possible time. Internationally, at least, the People's Republic of China may well see that it is in its best interests to be a status quo power, for the time being. In specific terms, this means that Peking will seek some agreements with Moscow to cool the Sino-Soviet confrontation and will move to improve relations with the United States and Japan.

The United States

The basis of United States policy in Asia and the Pacific is the United States-Japanese alliance. This alliance has assumed global proportions as Japan has emerged as one of the great world powers in economic and, increasingly, in political terms. In the Northeast Asian region, the alliance is central to the determination of United States policy.

The United States approaches its policy toward the Soviet Union in Asia as part of a total relationship with that country. It has been seen to be in American interests to reach various agreements with the Soviet Union when such agreements would be designed to further world stability and peace. This concept—to attempt to create stability and prevent major war—is at the heart of American foreign policy.

In looking at the Sino-Soviet dispute, it has been argued by some that a military conflict between those two giants would serve the interests of the noncommunist world. This is not the case, however. A war of such magnitude would bring about not only terrible death and destruction—which no sane person could possibly desire—but also would upset world power balances, which could very well be both detrimental to United States interests and responsible for dragging other countries into battle. In other words,

the possible consequences of such a struggle are simply not acceptable.

There is no reason why the United States should be overly concerned about some kind of improvement in relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, as long as this improvement does not coincide with aggressive, militant, communist action in Asia and elsewhere. For the United States, "the more stable the world, the better" would seem to be a proper dictum. This does not mean that the United States can do anything about the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Indeed, it would be inappropriate and improper for Washington to stick its nose into this matter. Any such attempts might, in fact, exacerbate the situation and lead to a deterioration in United States relations with one or the other of the disputants. The United States will, therefore, probably continue its hands-off policy toward the conflict while trying to improve relations with both parties.

In the case of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, the United States has shown concern over the increasing size of the Soviet Pacific fleet and, earlier, the military build-up on the Sino-Soviet border. The growth of the Soviet fleet is directly aimed at the United States-Japanese alliance and American commitments in the Asian-Pacific area. To guard against this Soviet activity, the United States maintains a powerful Seventh Fleet presence in East Asian waters. Additionally, U.S. air bases located in South Korea and Japan are needed to reinforce U.S. guarantees to those two nations.

In regard to the People's Republic of China, since 1971 the United States has followed a policy of normalizing relations with that country. This has resulted in the establishment of quasi-diplomatic missions by both states in Washington and Peking, visits of two U.S. presidents to the Chinese capital, exchange of persons, and expanded economic relations. The United States has indicated to the People's Republic of China its willingness to provide technical assistance for development purposes. The president and secretary of state have stated that a prime goal of the new administration will be to strengthen relations with the People's Republic of China.

At the same time, the United States has security and political commitments to the Republic of China on Taiwan, as well as broad and deep economic ties with that country. It is in American security, political and economic interests to keep these commitments while the administration actively pursues ways to reach significant and positive agreements with the People's Republic of China in numerous areas.

The United States has made clear its position in Korea. American forces are stationed in South Korea, and the American guarantee of that country's independence has not diminished. This is true in spite of strong criticism in the United States Congress of certain antidemocratic steps taken by President Park Chung Hee and the giving of funds and favors by some Korean officials to influence congressional voting on issues involving Korean national interests. Basically, the United States wants a lessening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula to avoid the dangers of war either by design or accident. U.S. military units are in the Republic of Korea for defensive purposes only, and prudence requires that they remain until the threat of war is no longer present.

To sum up, the United States has broad-ranging and deep commitments in Northeast Asia. After the disastrous results of United States policy in Indochina, there was speculation that the United States would begin a withdrawal from Asia. This has certainly not been the case in Northeast Asia. The United States has reaffirmed its position as a Pacific power with undiminished economic, political and security concerns in East Asia. The United States-Japanese alliance, strongly endorsed by President Carter, ensures the determination of Washington to play an active and, in some instances, decisive role in events in East Asia.

Japan

As it is to that of the United States, so is the Japanese-U.S. alliance central to the foreign policy of Japan. This is as true today as it has been for the past twenty-five years. It is significant to note that the Japanese public is, if anything, more positively supportive of the "American connection" than it was at any previous time. Even the opposition parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, have moderated their criticism of the United States-Japanese security treaty, and many of their leaders accept it—with reservation, but they accept it nonetheless. The conservative-liberal leadership of the country firmly believes in the necessity of the United States-Japanese alliance for Japan's security and prosperity. This leadership is apparently convinced that Japan can best act out her independent role in the international arena if her policy is rooted in the closest economic, political and security ties with the United States.

In her relations with the other great global power, the USSR, Japan is acutely aware of the concentration of military might

by the Soviet Union in the Asian area. Soviet planes, with considerable frequency, overfly Japanese air space. Soviet vessels interfere with Japanese shipping and seize fishing trawlers with some regularity. The Soviet Pacific fleet is headquartered only a short distance from the main Japanese islands, and the large numbers of modern submarines being added to this fleet can only cause concern to the Japanese, who so much depend upon uninterrupted sea lanes for their national existence. For this reason, Japanese civilian-military planners are requesting an expansion in Japan's antisubmarine warfare capability.

While Japanese leaders worry about the growth of Soviet military power, Japan is pursuing efforts to improve relations with the USSR. It is in the economic area that these efforts are especially noteworthy. Several years ago Japanese business leaders and government officials expressed interest in the Siberian development plans and possible Japanese technical aid in carrying them out. A joint Soviet-Japanese commission was formed to deal with this matter. The Japanese are helping in a number of ways, one of the most significant being in the area of natural gas exploitation in Siberia and on the island of Sakhalin.

The Soviet request for Japanese technical assistance in oil exploration is much more complicated, as it involves highly important considerations of security and Sino-Japanese relations, as well as economic evaluations. The Japanese have proceeded with great caution with the Soviets on these oil negotiations.

Late in December 1976 Japan and the Soviet Union signed a protocol to conduct joint oil exploration on the continental shelves of Sakhalin. Two or three test wells are to be sunk in 1977. Under the terms of the protocol, Japan will receive 50 per cent of the crude output, if and when oil production proves feasible commercially.

Diplomatic and political relations between Japan and the USSR are correct, but not cordial. This reflects not only the difficulties that exist in all relations between noncommunist and communist states, but also the distrust that the Japanese have long felt for the Russians. It can be anticipated that the government of Japan will continue its attempts to better relations with Moscow, not at the expense of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, but with the strength of the alliance behind these attempts.

Japan has long had a special relationship with China. After 1949, while keeping full diplomatic ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Japanese expanded trade with the People's Republic on the mainland. Washington's opening to Peking in 1971 gave

Japan the impetus many Japanese had been waiting for to move its ambassador from Taipei to Peking the following year.

Many Japanese, particularly businessmen, had dreams of capturing the huge China market for Japan's goods. They had underestimated both the communism and the chauvinism of the People's Republic government, which was not about to allow itself to become too enmeshed with the Japanese in economic relations. While trade did increase and Japanese technical assistance was allowed in limited ways, on the whole the Chinese attitude was bitterly disappointing to the Japanese. Also, Japanese hopes to receive a significant portion of their oil requirements from the People's Republic of China did not appear near realization in early 1977. The amount and quality of oil the Chinese really have was in question and how much they could or would ship to Japan remained undetermined.

The Japanese tried to move forward on the political front thinking that perhaps this would lead to the attainment of their economic objectives with China. In 1975, drafts of a peace and friendship treaty were prepared by both sides. It seemed that Peking and Tokyo were about ready to sign, but disagreement arose over the inclusion of a statement opposing one-power hegemony in Asia. The People's Republic of China refused to accept any draft that did not come out clearly against such hegemony. Of course, the Soviet Union was the target of this phrase. The Japanese attempted to finesse the issue with several suggestions on how to handle the matter, but the Chinese refused all compromise solutions. The Miki government in Tokyo, faced with strong Soviet representation and opposition within the Japanese political world, decided against concurrence with the Chinese formula. In 1977 the new Fukuda administration in Tokyo and the government of Hua Kuo-feng in Peking are considering the issue anew.

In security terms, the Japanese do not see any major threat to their independence and freedom from the People's Republic of China at this time. However, the fate of Taiwan is of critical concern. There are several reasons for this, but the main one has to do with the protection of the Japanese sea lanes. With Taiwan in the hands of an unfriendly power, Japanese shipping from the Middle East and Southeast Asia could be threatened and even interdicted. Japanese spokesmen have officially urged the United States to move cautiously toward recognition of Peking at Taipei's expense and have underlined the importance of Taipei's security to peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific.

Japan has extensive and increasing economic interests in

the Republic of Korea. For this reason and for security and political ones as well, Japan has requested that the United States retain its commitment to defend South Korea against aggression. The Japanese showed concern over certain statements made during the presidential election campaign in the United States indicating that President Carter would withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea. The president has clarified these statements by saying that he will gradually phase out the numbers of U.S. ground forces in Korea, but only after consultation with the governments in Tokyo and in Seoul. He presumably has no plans to end the American air presence in South Korea. This position has eased Japanese fears. For Japan, a peaceful, stable and noncommunist South Korea is regarded as a requirement for Japan's own security.

In sum, Japanese foreign policy seeks good relations with all countries. With the United States, there exist special ties, which the Japanese leadership believes must remain firm and unbroken if Japan is to prosper. Japan still sees economic advancement as the principal goal of her international relations, but she is more and more recognizing that politics and economics go hand in hand. Consequently, the Japanese government can be expected to take political initiatives increasingly in the future.

An Uneasy Relationship

Large military forces face one another in Northeast Asia. The United States and Japan want to ensure that these forces never go on the offensive. They are concerned with maintaining peace and stability in the area. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China may not share this concern to the same extent, but, at least at this time, the cost of war would appear to be prohibitive to anyone who would contemplate beginning it.

In the Sino-Soviet dispute there is little that any outside power can do. It is up to these two communist states themselves to choose what course they will take—either continuing confrontations or the normalization of relations.

In order to provide the best chances for peace and stability in Northeast Asia, it is imperative that the United States retain a leadership role in the region. This requires a powerful military, political and economic posture by America. There can be no perception on the part of the three other major nations in the area that the United States is withdrawing. If she pulls back, in fact, or seems to retreat, the delicate power balance in that part of the world would be dangerously upset. This means that the U.S. Seventh

Fleet cannot be weakened and that United States air bases, at the very least, must be maintained in full strength in Japan and South Korea. Politically, it means that the Japanese-U.S. alliance will be vigorously fostered.

At the same time, the United States can pursue policies which will tend to reduce tensions in the area. Washington has the opportunity of pressing for better relations with Peking. By mutual consent, efforts to reach cooperation, particularly in the economic area, can be undertaken. American initiative would be desirable. This does not mean that the very real problems that separate the countries can simply be placed on the shelf. However, it may be possible to warm bilateral relations while agreeing to disagree over the interpretation of the 1972 Shanghai Communique and other difficult issues.

American policy in Northeast Asia toward the Soviet Union cannot be separated from overall global relations with that country. The United States can make it clear that the Soviet military build-up in the region is not conducive to a peaceful climate and, in fact, makes agreement in economic, political and security terms more difficult everywhere. It is not possible for the Soviet Union to reconcile soft words and actions in one part of the world with harsh words and actions in another. If the Soviets genuinely want peaceful coexistence, they must pursue it on a global scale. If they do not do this, then their expressions of peaceful intent will only lack credibility.

The Korean Peninsula in some ways is a testing ground for Soviet and Chinese intentions. The United States has called for a recognition that though reunification is a worthy goal, Korea is a divided land. If all involved and interested parties were to accept this, then the dangers of war on that unhappy peninsula would recede. Kim Il Sung has flatly rejected the United States proposition for talks to discuss basic questions regarding Korea. Moscow and Peking have sided with him. The United States can only continue to press its suggestions and make it clear that the hard-line attitude adopted by the communist grouping is not conducive to improved relations between Washington and Peking or between Washington and Moscow.

As can be seen, relations among the four great powers in Northeast Asia are complicated and uneasy. Dangers of war exist. Acting in tandem, however, the United States and Japan are exercising a peaceful stabilizing influence in the area. If the situation is not to deteriorate, they must exert ever greater efforts in the future.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF “VIETNAM”

by Sol. W. Sanders and William Henderson

“Vietnam” has come to occupy a peculiar niche in contemporary American history, and it continues to figure prominently in political discourse. The reference has many, often ambiguous, meanings. For some, it evokes the trauma of a misunderstood war, which came close to tearing apart the fabric of American society. For others, who early or late opposed our involvement and professed to find it morally wrong, Vietnam has become a kind of litmus test, assaying the public or private fitness of others for positions of responsibility. Even Secretary of State Vance, at his confirmation hearings last January, felt it necessary to assert his tardy conviction that “it was a mistake to intervene.”¹ And there are a few — not many — for whom Vietnam is still the symbol of a whole complex of profoundly difficult political and strategic issues that existed before our engagement there, and which remain to haunt us two years after it ended in humiliating defeat.

What is perhaps most remarkable is the determined effort in almost every quarter to avoid any serious analysis of the episode. The American people are still weary of Vietnam, and most of us — even the doves — are at least a little touched by feelings of guilt. It was perhaps to be expected that the vast bureaucratic apparatus assembled to study the war and its problems would be quickly dismantled after the fall of Saigon. Vietnam had absorbed the energies and resources of a disproportionately large segment of the federal government for too many years, and other problems clamored for attention. Indeed, within weeks of the final debacle, it had become a working assumption of officialdom that close association with Vietnam was a hindrance to career advance-

¹ *New York Times*, January 12, 1977.

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ment;² and today, Indochina is left to the most junior officers of the principal departments concerned. Unfortunately, the scholarly community has not yet taken up the slack, although the doves of Academe have permitted themselves a good deal of postbellum clucking in print.

It is a great pity, for surely there are lessons to be learned from Vietnam that might have great relevance for the future. For example: Have the principal propositions of those who supported American involvement been borne out by events in the two years since the end of military action? To what extent have their more somber predictions been fulfilled by defeat and the abandonment of that commitment? The time span is severely limited and hardly constitutes a fair test; but, even though this has not yet been fully reflected in the pages of the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, enough is already on the historical record to yield some suggestive results.

We are aware, of course, that there was no thoroughgoing consensus among those who supported our Vietnam policy, any more than there was one among the critics. On both sides, the end product of shared prescription often stemmed from sharply differing premises. Those who sought to engage the United States in Indochina, and those who supported the involvement thereafter, did so for diverse reasons; and the propositions whose validation by the events of the past two years we propose to explore represent the whole spectrum of support at its zenith. Moreover, it would be naive to assert that the United States made its commitment in Vietnam upon the basis of some short list of specific objectives.³ The formulation of foreign policy is much more elusive, evolving out of an immense web of domestic and international complications. In any given situation, our initiatives and responses are governed — to a far greater extent than most people realize — by the events and policies and attitudes of 200 years of history.⁴ Finally,

² Unless, perhaps, one succeeded in disengaging from that commitment at the right time. A number of the so-called Saigon Mafia have been given important posts in the new Carter administration.

³ John Paton Davies presents just such a list in "America and East Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, p. 392.

⁴ Reporters of the Indochina tragedy often seem to have particularly short historical memories. William Shawcross, writing on "The Untold Story of Cambodia's Agony" in the *Washington Post* of January 2, 1977, critically analyzes the U.S. intervention in 1970 with little reference to the long history that preceded it, or to the intimate, tangled relationship between Vietnam and Cambodia. He does not attempt to explain the implications of Sihanouk's collaboration with the United States in bombing Vietcong-PAVN emplacements in Cambodia prior to that intervention, Sihanouk's final trip to Moscow in a desperate effort to prod Hanoi toward moderation, and so forth—if, indeed, he is aware of these factors at all.

the passage of time assigns different values to transient human judgments, and those rationales for our intervention in Indochina that seemed less significant in the past may assume much greater consequence in today's context.

II

In the post-World War II period, as in the past, the foreign policy of the United States has been based upon an acceptance of the necessity to preserve the independence and vitality of the nation-state system as it has evolved in the West. This commitment has had both practical and moral aspects. From a practical standpoint, we have been convinced that the multistate system afforded the only kind of political environment in which the United States could survive and prosper. And because this country was the conscious creation of immigrants (and their descendants) who believed that their handiwork reflected lofty ethical norms, we have ascribed a high moral value as well to the principle of national independence, especially as manifested in the liberal-oriented American polity.⁵

Our commitment to the nation-state has given U.S. foreign policy enormous momentum in the postwar period. Far beyond the expectation of most political scientists, nationalism has remained a dominant force in world politics, and in some respects it is more important now than in earlier periods. U.S. policy, in short, has had a built-in bias for the momentum of modern history; although, in the years since World War II, it has also become increasingly apparent that nationalism and the setting up of new nation-states modeled on the Western experience were by themselves insufficient responses to the problems of underdevelopment in the former colonial and semicolonial areas of the world.⁶ Internally, this almost instinctive commitment to the principle of national independence, especially when enshrined in regimes with liberal tendencies or possibilities, has been a powerful element in mobilizing the kind of domestic political support necessary to

⁵ President Carter reflected something of this faith in his inaugural address on January 20, 1977: "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clearcut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights. We do not seek to intimidate, but it is clear that a world which others can dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being of all people." *New York Times*, January 21, 1977.

⁶ Harold R. Isaacs saw this earlier than most. See his *No Peace For Asia* (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

carry out a highly activist foreign policy; and this is despite our history as a great continental power that had often opted successfully for political self-sufficiency and aloofness from the outside world. It has, indeed, provided much of the “moral” content of our foreign policy in the postwar period; and it is the alleged absence of this kind of moral underpinning that, according to various critics, made it so difficult for Secretary Kissinger to sustain public support for some of his policies.⁷

In Vietnam, the principle of national independence formed the basis of our policy from the very beginning — from the earliest flirtations by some of our intelligence community with Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh movement. Consistently since World War II, the United States has seen itself as the chief sponsor of a new Vietnamese nationalism. At first, this brought us into serious conflict with the French, who often judged us to be nearly as difficult to deal with as the communist-led Vietminh. After the Chinese communist victory on the mainland, when it became apparent that Ho and his followers would pursue a policy of close alignment with the communist bloc, the U.S. posture shifted — first, to hesitant support for the half-hearted French effort to install a pliable, noncommunist nationalist alternative in Vietnam; then, after the French defeat of 1954, to all-out support for the vigorously independent, noncommunist nationalist regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in the South.

The reason was that a potential communist victory in Vietnam was seen as a major defeat for the policy of encouraging the emergence of independent nation-states in Asia to replace the former colonial powers. It meant the substitution of a totalitarian political regime and centralized economic planning and control for the *possibility* of a more liberal regime in the South, characterized by, among other things, a free-market economy. The argument that a communist Vietnam would be “Titoist,” that is, independent of immediate control by either communist superpower and therefore of no particular concern to the United States — an argument advanced with increasing fervor in some quarters as American difficulties in Vietnam began to multiply⁸ — was re-

⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s new national security adviser, frequently criticized Kissinger on this score.

⁸ Appropriate American policy, so the argument went, could somehow transform Ho Chi Minh into another “Tito.” But Ho’s whole career, from his early service as a Comintern agent onward, argued against that possibility. More serious

jected for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most important was the conviction that the United States as we know it today could not long endure in a world made up of increasing numbers of communist states, even where a measure of political polycentrism still existed among them, not least because adaptation to the changed international environment would impose far-reaching institutional modifications on American society. Mechanisms for the conduct of foreign trade in a world dominated by communist state trading organizations provide a prosaic example.⁹ The emergence of polycentrism in the communist bloc following development of the Sino-Soviet split has not materially decreased the risk of war or greatly affected the U.S.-Soviet adversary relationship. Castro's Cuba is a stark example of the expansionist potential of one of the smallest communist states — first throughout Latin America, more recently in Africa.

Two years after the communist victory in Indochina, can we deny that one of the fundamental norms of U.S. foreign policy — one of the principles that imparted a measure of uniqueness to the American experience and its claim to moral superiority — has been gravely compromised? In Vietnam, the communists are systematically building a pervasive totalitarian state devoid of all pretense of democratic responsibility or respect for civil rights. Even the leaders of the old National Liberation Front have been swept aside, and the South is governed today — as conquered territory — by the same cabal of veteran, hard-line communists who have run the North since 1954.¹⁰ To be sure, the widely predicted bloodbath has not yet been unleashed — in part, no doubt, because of the widespread publicity given to this possibility in the closing years of the war, and also because more than a quarter-million refugees, many of whom would have been the first targets of the holocaust, managed to flee the country. On the other hand, the most repressive measures have been taken against political

questions are the following: How would it have benefited the United States if Ho and his colleagues had become Titoists? In what way would this have moderated their policies and ambitions?

⁹ For a perceptive discussion of this theme, see Marshall D. Shulman, "On Learning to Live with Authoritarian Regimes," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, pp. 325-338.

¹⁰ Nayan Chanda—a correspondent generally sympathetic to the Hanoi regime — notes in an analysis of appointments to the Politburo of the newly renamed Communist Party of Vietnam, after the recent Fourth Party Congress, that only one southerner has been added to the expanded list. Leading members of the old National Liberation Front, long thought to be pro-Chinese, have been pretty much shunted aside. None was given a post in the party's inner circles. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 31, 1976, pp. 11-12.

opponents, real and imagined. A group of former antiwar activists, presenting a protest to the Vietnamese permanent observer to the United Nations in December 1976,¹¹ estimated 300,000 political prisoners incarcerated in "re-education camps" or worse. Whether or not one accepts this figure, surely the numbers exceed anything that the Thieu regime was ever responsible for.

It is still too early to predict with certainty, but thus far there has been nothing in the nature of the regime to indicate that it will not repeat the wasteful patterns of economic development that have characterized other communist countries. Hanoi has not yet attempted to undo the far-reaching land reform program successfully implemented by the Thieu government, which distributed most of the available land to the tillers, but the communists have begun to impose patterns of agricultural "cooperation" and "mutual aid" that are perhaps a forecast of the future. In any event, the grim record of agricultural "reform" in North Vietnam in the 1950s suggests what is in store for the South. There has been a great deal of talk about opening up the country to foreign investment,¹² and some French enterprises have been permitted to continue operations. The prospect of a major role for foreign business in the Vietnamese economy, however, runs so counter to the purposes of the regime in the past that it seems little more than wishful thinking.

There have been innumerable occasions in our history where the United States has responded ineffectively—or not at all—to challenges to the independence of other countries. Czechoslovakia and Hungary are painful postwar examples. This is not to say that every such challenge constitutes an overwhelming threat to the vital interests of the United States. What is unique about the Vietnam experience is that here we did commit ourselves to defend the independence of the Republic of Vietnam against external aggression. We intervened massively and over a long period of time to accomplish this purpose. But despite great sacrifice of blood and treasure, we were unable permanently to turn that aggression. Gradually, we grew weary of our responsibilities and withdrew; and in the end, we failed.

¹¹ See *New York Times*, December 21, 1976.

¹² See, for example, the speculation in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 31, 1976, p. 47.

III

The U.S. commitment in Vietnam was based in considerable measure on the felt need to preserve a noncommunist regime in that country as an obstacle to further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. This was the so-called domino theory. Historically, Vietnam had been one of the strongest states in the region. If Vietnam were to "go communist," it was argued, it would be difficult if not impossible to safeguard the rest of Southeast Asia from eventual communist absorption. The importance of Southeast Asia, in turn, hinged upon the numbers of its people, the richness of its raw materials, its economic potential, and its strategic location along the main communication routes between Europe and the Far East. The region had a special significance as the economic hinterland of postwar Japan. If the Japanese economic miracle were to be sustained, then unimpeded access to the markets and raw materials of Southeast Asia must continue; this prospect would be in jeopardy if the region were taken over by the communists.

To what extent has this forecast been validated over the past two years? At the outset, it should be pointed out that the domino theory—in the hands of its more sophisticated protagonists, at least—never assumed that the fate of Vietnam was the only factor relevant to the future of the other Southeast Asian countries, or that the dominoes would fall immediately upon the capitulation of the Saigon regime. The problem that proponents of the Vietnam involvement envisioned was that the fragile postcolonial regimes of Southeast Asia (among which Thailand should also be included, although it was technically never a colony, having managed to maintain its independence during the long period of British, French, Dutch and American dominance in the region) would find it difficult, perhaps impossible, to maintain their internal security while at the same time attempting to accommodate externally to neighboring communist powers.¹³

The fate of Laos and Cambodia was always linked to

¹³ A suggestive commentary on the domino theory—by an author who opposed the commitment—may be found in Earl C. Ravenal's "Consequences of the End Game in Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1975, pp. 651-667, which analyzed the final phase of the Vietnam tragedy and its implications. He states: "Both those nations that have depended on us and those that have feared our response will, respectively, hedge against our default or probe our further reactions. Each nation will do this in its own way, according to its peculiar strategic situation. This is why the 'dominoes' are neither perfect as an analogy nor obvious as a fact; but it is also why they are nonetheless real." (p. 658.)

what happened in Vietnam, and thus it may not constitute a fair test of the validity of the domino hypothesis elsewhere in the region. Laos has fallen victim to pure-and-simple Vietnamese imperialism. Its communist leadership is dominated by ethnic Vietnamese, large tracts of territory are occupied by Vietnamese troops, and its economy is increasingly tied to Vietnam. If Laos does not demonstrate the domino theory, at least it tells us something about the ambitions of the Hanoi regime. Cambodia, on the other hand, has been taken over by an indigenous communist movement; here a blood-bath of unspeakable proportions has taken place, and it has been widely reported in the Western press. Some estimates place the dead at upward of one-tenth of Cambodia's 7 million people. Phnom Penh's relations with Hanoi are reserved, to say the least. It remains to be seen, however, whether the new Cambodian regime's alignment with Communist China will enable it to maintain its independence of Vietnam over the long run.

Thailand, the most important player in the domino scenario, has experienced a dramatic radicalization of its youth and a general polarization of political life — both brought about, or at least accelerated, by the withdrawal of American power from Southeast Asia and the defeat in Vietnam. Its brief experiment with representative government has collapsed in the face of an expressed necessity to maintain internal stability as a prerequisite to the search for external accommodation with the communist powers, in particular with the new and powerful regime in Hanoi. Faced with its own long-term communist insurgency, a failure to maintain tight internal security — either through a political consensus (which seemed impossible to restore) or by a return to more authoritarian methods of government — would have resulted in further domestic disintegration, even if the external communist threat were not more intensively focused in the years ahead.

Indeed, the strengthening of or trend toward authoritarianism has been replicated in one form or another in all the countries of Southeast Asia in the years since the American withdrawal was set in motion, and it has accelerated since the final collapse in Vietnam. The reasons are the same — either a genuine conviction that authoritarian rule was necessary to maintain internal security or because the growing external threat provided a convenient pretext for doing away with existing democratic institutions. Everywhere in Southeast Asia, the aspiration for democracy has been a major casualty of the Vietnam disaster. At the same

time, Vietnam has speeded up the efforts of our traditional allies to disengage from military ties with the United States. Thailand, for example, has already expelled all U.S. military forces, while the Philippines has made clear its desire to reduce the American military presence substantially.

It is true that the Vietnamese communists have taken an initially conciliatory line toward their Southeast Asian neighbors. The immense difficulties of digesting their conquest of South Vietnam have presumably kept them fully occupied at home and, in all likelihood, will serve as a powerful deterrent to risky adventures elsewhere in Southeast Asia for some time to come. On the other hand, it is also true that communist Vietnam is now overwhelmingly the strongest military power in the area,¹⁴ and that power must figure importantly in the calculations of its neighbors, all of whose governments are now targets, to a greater or lesser extent, of communist-led insurrections aimed at their overthrow.¹⁵ Moreover, relations between Vietnam and Thailand have deteriorated sharply since the military takeover in Bangkok, and Hanoi continues to give material assistance to the communist insurgents in northeastern Thailand.¹⁶

IV

Has the abandonment of our commitment in Vietnam, by advertising the unreliability of our support and the transitoriness of our friendship when the chips were down, undermined the effectiveness of American policy in other parts of the world? Many people, both advocates and critics of the Vietnam involvement, have taken comfort from the fact that at least we did not abandon large numbers of South Vietnamese who had worked directly with the United States, and who would have suffered immediately had

¹⁴ Apart from the sophisticated weaponry obtained from the Soviets, the North Vietnamese also captured an estimated \$3 billion in U.S. arms. The disposition of this hoard continues to puzzle American observers. Thus far, the weapons have not begun to appear on the international arms market, despite Vietnam's desperate need for foreign exchange and its inability to make use of—or even store—such vast supplies. Some optimists have suggested that Hanoi's restraint derives from a clear warning that Washington would look upon their sale as an unfriendly act.

¹⁵ There is a general awareness—and fear—of communist Vietnam's military power throughout Southeast Asia. Evidence of this is the recent surfacing of proposals to convert the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) into a military alliance to replace the defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

¹⁶ According to U.S. intelligence reports, schools for terrorists continue to function in central Vietnam near Vinh, where they have been operating for almost two decades. There is also a continuous flow of arms from Vietnam to guerrilla forces in Thailand.

they been left behind. The acceptance and resettlement of some 135,000 Vietnamese refugees in the United States was a historic act of mercy; but it was no substitute for sound policy. Few of the Vietnamese wanted to leave their country and did so only to avoid the holocaust. Nor will other countries solicit U.S. friendship and support simply to preserve an escape route from ultimate disaster.

It is too early to judge how our European allies have assessed the Vietnam debacle. There is some truth to the argument that Vietnam had become a special case to many of them, especially where unconscious racism and a traditionally powerful ethnocentricity combined to dismiss the whole Vietnam experience as an aberration of American policy. In Asia, however, it is clearly a different story. The South Koreans, for example, have been deeply affected by the Vietnam disaster, and they have altered their basic strategy to take into account what they consider to be the new realities of their situation. They are moving rapidly to make themselves independent of U.S. military assistance, insofar as this is possible, and they are also preparing for the day when U.S. forces are withdrawn entirely from the Korean Peninsula.

No doubt the critics of our Vietnam involvement would argue that this is all for the good, and that it reduces the danger that we may again be "trapped" into another Asian war. But surely another attempt by the communist regime in North Korea to take over the South by force of arms would place in jeopardy one of the most vital of American interests, namely, the security of Japan. Certainly the Japanese see it that way, and they have continued to urge us — uncharacteristically, in public¹⁷ — not to act precipitously in South Korea. Nothing illustrates more clearly the domino effect of our defeat in Vietnam than does the harried effort of the South Koreans to achieve a self-sufficient defense posture, despite the heavy burden that this places on their rapidly developing economy, and — even more unfortunate — despite the resulting stress upon the fragile political fabric of a society without much historical experience in the proper functioning of democratic institutions. Perception of heightened external threat almost inevitably leads in such circumstances to a tightening-up of internal security by all available means, even at the risk of suppressing

¹⁷ See, for example, the statements of Japanese Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka, as reported in the Pacific edition of *Newsweek*, November 1, 1976, and of Ambassador to the United States Fumihiko Togo, in *Japan Times*, November 11, 1976.

legitimate dissent and thereby further polarizing the political environment.

The most severe test of the post-Vietnam credibility of U.S. security guarantees, however, will come in the Middle East. There we increasingly find ourselves in the position that, if there is to be a lasting settlement, we must persuade the Israelis to accept assurances of American support in return for substantial military — including territorial — concessions. The December 1976 action of Saudi Arabia in breaking ranks with OPEC,¹⁸ imposing much smaller price increases than were most of the oil-producing countries, illustrates the dilemma. The Saudis have made it perfectly clear that, in return for their restraint, they expect political reciprocity from the United States. Under the circumstances, this can only mean pressure on the Israelis to accept substantial policy modifications at the forthcoming Geneva talks on the Middle East. There are other considerations involved, of course; but the validity of American guarantees and the history of our broken promises in Vietnam are certain to be a major factor in the equation, as many Israelis have stated publicly.

V

Supporters of the Vietnam involvement often argued that there was much more at stake than the fate of three small, backward Southeast Asian countries. Indochina was the test of a major communist world strategy, the so-called War of National Liberation. In the context of Vietnam, this meant an indigenous communist guerrilla insurgency, supported — in the end, massively — by outside communist countries, especially by the Soviet Union. If a communist-led nationalist movement, so supported, could achieve victory over “American imperialism” in Vietnam, this would stimulate similar insurgencies elsewhere in the Third World, and the established communist powers would be encouraged

¹⁸ “Though the precise impact throughout the developing world of the American failure in Vietnam remains a matter of uncertainty and controversy, it is only reasonable to conclude that the effects were considerable. The argument of liberal critics of the war had been that Vietnam demonstrated above all the triumphant force of nationalism in the Third World. Whether or not the argument was well-taken, Vietnam was seen by the new states as a successful challenge to the foundations on which the American-inspired postwar order rested.

“It was in these general circumstances of the early 1970s, circumstances in which American power came increasingly into question both at home and abroad, that a growing assertiveness of the major OPEC producers became manifest and took on a new significance.” Robert W. Tucker, “Oil and American Power—Three Years Later,” *Commentary*, January 1977, p. 29.

to search for other targets of opportunity and to assist with their revolutions.

A strong case can be made for the proposition that the audacity of the Cubans and their Soviet sponsors in Angola, during the summer of 1975, was in no small measure encouraged by the U.S. defeat in Indochina. Unlike Vietnam, where the nationalist movement fragmented at an early stage and was always on the defensive against the communists, in Angola there were major political elements in opposition to the communists, and they had every reason to anticipate that they could at least hold their own in a civil war. What happened, of course, was that the United States failed to give adequate support to the two main noncommunist groups; and in the end, they proved no match for a communist-led guerrilla force supported by Cuban mercenaries and lavish Soviet material aid. It is true that the policy of the Ford administration was to assist the noncommunist elements; but this initiative (in fulfillment of a covert commitment) was vetoed by Congress, and the strongest argument used against the administration was that it was getting us into "another Vietnam." It was this argument that the Soviets and Cubans undoubtedly counted upon most when they undertook to support a minority communist movement that faced (in contrast with Vietnam) strong opposition in neighboring countries.¹⁹ At this writing, Rhodesia looks like it is becoming the next "Angola."

Again, would Libya's Colonel Qaddafi have dared to intervene — first with money and arms, later as a diplomatic third party²⁰ — on the side of the Muslim insurgents in the Philippines, one of our closest allies in Asia, if the Vietnam debacle had not

¹⁹ The impact of the Vietnam defeat on the Angolan situation in 1975 seems evident, although it has not been much discussed in print. According to Gabriel García Márquez, a Colombian communist writer who discussed the matter with Fidel Castro, the Soviet-Cuban intervention proceeded on the following assumption: "The possibility that the US might intervene openly, rather than through the mercenaries and South Africa as it had been doing for some time, was obviously one of the most disturbing unknowns. But a rapid analysis suggested that at least Washington would think twice about doing so."

"It had just freed itself from the quagmire of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. It had a President no one had elected. The CIA was under fire from Congress and low-rated by public opinion. . . . Furthermore, Cuba was sure it could count on solidarity and material aid from the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, although it was aware of the implications its action might hold for the policy of peaceful coexistence and international detente." *Washington Post*, January 12, 1977.

²⁰ For a discussion of the spectacle of Imelda Marcos, wife of the Philippine president, visiting Colonel Qaddafi in November 1976 to request that he mediate the dispute between Manila and the Muslim insurgents, and bring a halt to the money and arms he was pouring into the insurgency, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 31, 1976.

paved the way? Has not the same disaster also inhibited the United States, certainly a more probable intervener than was Libya, from actively trying to find a solution to an insurgency that threatened not only the stability of the Philippines but also the intervention of Manila's Muslim neighbors in support of their coreligionists? Qaddafi, and other Arab powers as well, is playing a similar role in the Eritrean insurgency against Ethiopia.

Hardly any of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa lacks an ethnic or territorial issue that can be similarly exploited if outside third parties are willing to invest the resources necessary to activate them.²¹ It can, of course, be argued that, even if the United States had successfully met the communist challenge in Vietnam, which was actively supported by the Soviets and, to a lesser extent, by the Chinese, insurgencies of the kind discussed here would certainly have arisen elsewhere. They are, more than anything else, the product of specific local conditions and not primarily a manifestation of ideological conflict. Yet the willingness and the ability of the major communist powers — and other troublemakers — to support and supply such insurgencies must surely have been affected by the impunity with which this was done in Indochina, which was by any measure a cheap victory from the Soviet and Chinese points of view.

VI

As the American stake in Vietnam became more and more difficult to defend against a rising crescendo of domestic criticism, proponents of the commitment warned that withdrawal in defeat would have adverse effects on the internal political situation. It was argued, for example, that the impact on the morale of the armed forces would be damaging, that it could lead to a

²¹Burma continues to be plagued by guerrillas of various complexions; those along the northern border are supported by the Chinese communists. Indonesia has a new guerrilla problem in the former Portuguese colony of Timor, which the Jakarta government occupied in order to forestall a communist takeover in 1975-1976, after the collapse of Portuguese authority. The Philippines must still cope with Huk remnants and other communist-led factions, as well as with the Muslim insurgents in the south. The guerrilla movement in Malaysia, based along the northern border with Thailand, has become much stronger and bolder in the past two years, despite a reported split between pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions. Singapore announced the discovery of a widespread communist espionage plot in mid-1976. Whether any of these insurgencies escalates to the point where it seriously endangers the stability of the regime depends on a variety of internal and external developments. But the mere possibility that Hanoi might seek to exploit them through judicious use of its overwhelming military power in support of "Wars of National Liberation" is a matter of great concern throughout Southeast Asia.

pathological search for a scapegoat—the “OAS syndrome,” a reference to the sense of alienation that pervaded the French army after the Algerian war. Happily, this prediction has not come to pass. The officer corps, and even more the conscript army that served in Vietnam, was indeed a mirror image of American society as a whole. They shared the same general attitudes, and they were influenced by the media in the same way as other segments of the population. There is some bitterness today among the professional military over the “mistakes” of the war. But just as the public at large tends to spread the blame among civilian as well as military leaders, so do the soldiers; there has been no search for a scapegoat. Moreover, the frequency with which the military turns over its cadres—which is a reflection of the mobility that characterizes American life in general—guarantees that most of those who served and suffered in Vietnam will soon be ushered out of the armed forces.

A more serious consequence of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the ultimate collapse of policy there has been to cast a cloak of automatic political respectability over those who opposed the war, early or late, and to lend credibility to their arguments as to its origins, nature and outcome. For example, the thesis that it was the misguided initiatives of the United States that escalated the war from 1954 onward is now enshrined in the popular literature. In historical fact, a much better case can be made for the opposite thesis, namely, that it was the communist side that was responsible for increasing the tempo of the conflict at almost every stage.²² The My Lai massacre and other criminal acts of brutality committed by U.S. personnel in Vietnam are now often presented as a significant reason for our defeat—one of a litany of explanations for the “inevitable” outcome of an “immoral” war. Atrocities committed by the communists, on the other hand, and Hanoi’s cynical attitude toward the loss of human life and the sacrifice of its own troops, which at times reached such proportions as to threaten to break the morale of the com-

²² In July 1964, for example, when the North Vietnamese began sending regular PAVN troops south into the Republic of Vietnam, U.S. policy was to deny that there had been a change in the nature of the war. Reports on the new character of the conflict—that is, that Hanoi was infiltrating not only southerners who had gone north with the communists after the 1954 defeat of the French and the partition of the country, but regular North Vietnamese army units as well—were denied both in Washington and by U.S. authorities in Saigon. Thus, when the United States announced the deployment of massive American ground forces into Vietnam in spring 1965, it was—and still is—depicted as “American escalation.”

munist forces, are almost never mentioned. Such realities have largely disappeared from the American consciousness — if, indeed, there was ever much awareness of them.

Most important of all has been the extent to which the Vietnam defeat has affected the basic attitudes of the American people toward the substance and conduct of our foreign policy. There can be little doubt that the defeat, and the general consensus that the sacrifices of Americans and Vietnamese alike were in the end to no avail, greatly strengthened the traditional American preference for isolation from world affairs. Almost every American commitment overseas is now examined in terms of whether it may lead to “another Vietnam,” and whether there is not some way to limit or terminate our involvement. In our view, this perception that the United States has a valid choice as to whether it should play a leading role in world affairs, or relinquish that role, comes at a time when the prospects for a successful “continental policy” are more remote than ever before in our history. Yet it will undoubtedly constrict the formulation of policy for a long time to come.

An atmosphere of impending doom seems to have settled upon the United States in the past few years. The intractability of world problems, the complexity of our domestic concerns, a dawning realization throughout the Western world that, despite our postwar prosperity, deep and fundamental political, economic and social problems persist and in many instances have grown worse — all these have fed the prevailing pessimism. It would be absurd to assert that none of this would have occurred except for Vietnam; but that catastrophe has certainly contributed to the present mood. This mood, in turn, has become an important ingredient in all political decision-making. Secretary Kissinger reportedly justified much of his foreign policy on the basis of a fundamental inability to mobilize popular support to meet the challenges of world leadership, while his critics have accused him of anticipating this weakness and thereby feeding it.

No doubt the critics of the war were right when they argued that withdrawal would quiet the domestic scene, although the fact that this occurred does not prove that the upheavals of our time were attributable mainly, or even importantly, to the Vietnam experience. We would also point out that most wars are followed by popular disillusionment and disquiet, as was the case

with the Civil War and the two world wars of this century. But in the flow of history, these times of troubles were much less important than were the policy goals vindicated by the outcome of the wars that preceded them; and few would now argue that we should have remained aloof. One wonders how important the anti-war protests of the 1960s and early seventies would now appear if our commitment in Vietnam had ended in victory.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP*

by Joseph Schiebel

Relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China may be moving toward a critical state. At the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev proclaimed that it was no longer enough to say that Maoist ideology and policy were incompatible with Marxist-Leninist teaching, but that "they are plainly hostile to it." This substantially revises the position the Soviet Union had taken on the Maoist "heresy" until then: Communist China is no longer to be treated as a temporarily errant fraternal socialist country, subject to the restraints prescribed for adversaries in that category, but as an out-and-out enemy nation instead. This redefinition provides the doctrinal and, more importantly, propaganda base for drastic and theoretically unlimited action against China. Whether such action is in fact anticipated or contemplated is, of course, another matter, but there are indications that the possibility of a serious confrontation must now be considered.

After the most recent party congress, Brezhnev assumed the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Before and after the congress, Brezhnev's effort to reactivate the State Defense Council was noted. And Dmitry Ustinov, having been elevated to full membership in the Politburo at the congress, was later appointed to replace the late Marshal Grechko as defense minister.

There has been little public evaluation of the signifi-

* This paper was presented by the late Professor Schiebel at the National Security Affairs Conference, conducted by the National Defense University, Washington, July 12-14, 1976, and was first published in the conference *Proceedings* in October 1976. It appears here in slightly different form.

Joseph Schiebel died on October 9, 1976, in St. Louis, while attending a conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. He had been a professor at Georgetown University, where he was Director of the Russian Area Studies Program, since 1966. Professor Schiebel had a rare grasp of the relationship between Lenin's Marxism (and hence "Marxism-Leninism") and its strategies for the revolutionary conquest of power and for substantive statecraft. This came through in his numerous speeches, testimonies and writings on Soviet history, Marxism-Leninism and international relations, and especially in his teaching.

cance of the first two events, and Ustinov's appointment has generally been thought to bespeak a resurgence of the civilian elements in the Soviet leadership and a weakening of the military group. The view prevails that Soviet politics and policies remain unclear and unsettled.

Policy debates will continue even when a firm course has been entered upon, especially when its pursuit is dependent on unpredictable responses from other countries; but an argument can be made that the Soviet leadership has arrived at a clear perception of the current international situation and has decided on a firm set of contingency actions aimed at exercising the initiative in events anticipated in the near future. The basis for this hypothesis is an argument made in a book on the opening phases of wars and widely distributed and discussed in the Soviet Union.¹ The authors, led by General of the Army S. P. Ivanov, claim to have concluded from an analysis of warfare since the nineteenth century in general and World War II in particular the general principle that a war is decided in the opening phase; that is, initial operations create the objective battlefield as well as larger political, strategic and morale conditions that make the eventual outcome of the war a foregone conclusion. In a historical review of how this principle was applied to the opening phase of the German-Soviet war in 1941 (the purpose of which was, no doubt, an oblique argument for a corresponding strategic posture for the immediate future rather than an elucidation of history), the authors conclude that the preparations Stalin made in anticipation of war were correct—with one exception. They came too late to prevent the severity of the personnel and equipment losses incurred in an operation that conceded Hitler his tactical victories as a way of denying him his strategic objective: the elimination of the Soviet Union from the war.

What were these preparations? An enormous armed force was assembled along the border with the assumed enemy, but without clearly evident defensive or offensive deployment. Stalin took on top military rank, and unity of command was established by centering all decision-making functions in the State Defense Committee (GOKO). Coupled with the practice of placing influential political leaders under military control by making them

¹S.P. Ivanov, ed., *Nachal'nyi period voyny* (Moscow: Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1974). See especially the introduction and chaps. 8 and 11.

generals,² Stalin obtained the central control and chain of command needed to operate the Soviet Union in a period of extreme crisis.

The similarities between these aspects of Soviet conduct in the first halves of 1941 and 1976 are obvious. Assuming that the admonition in the Ivanov compendium — to shift essential preparations to the prewar phase — is being taken to heart, we may be seeing since the Twenty-fifth Congress an effort by the Soviet leadership to create the unity and chain of command required for the Soviet Union to function effectively in an anticipated period of serious international crisis. But what international crises could reasonably be anticipated? One immediate prospect is the death of Mao Tse-tung and the possibility — or desirability, from the Soviet point of view — of internal turmoil arising from that event. I will argue that the question of who, if anyone, dominates China strategically involves power factors and issues of such magnitude that the Soviet Union cannot hope to play a significant role by the mere manipulation of a friendly political faction in a Peking succession struggle. The other possible crisis perceived, not without justification, by the Soviet Union involves a hardening of Western positions after the U.S. elections.

The two issues are, of course, connected, and the Soviet Union may be encountering a renewed Cold War situation on its western frontier at precisely the time when a major preoccupation in Asia is anticipated. The underlying assumption of the analysis which follows will be that the Soviet Union can live with the status quo of her strategic position vis-a-vis Europe for some time even if it means having to defer some current expectations of expanding her political influence there; but, having lost the initiative in East Asia as a result of losing strategic access to Asia with the activation of U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation, the Soviet Union must move to regain her ability to project her power to that battleground of global competition. Soviet policies toward Europe, the United States and related areas are, then, in the first instance, functions of Soviet strategy toward China.

² There is no counter to this move at present, but it may be argued that Ustinov's appointment, rather than splitting the military factions in the decision-making group from the others, reinforces unity because Ustinov represents a symbiosis of different interests. He has a high party position, has been in command of armaments production since 1941, and has held the rank of colonel-general for a number of years.

II

It is assumed that those principally responsible for the international strategies and policies of their respective countries have a rational understanding of the main issues involved. From this assumption it follows that the core meaning of their public statements and their actions reflect these issues and reaction to them. Decisions are not made on the basis of the lengthy and detailed scholarly analyses made of them, usually long after the fact, although obviously these provide the eventual intensive reconstruction and interpretation that will meet the criteria of the professional historian. If all this is true, then the analysis and aims evident in current policy statements and actions of various national leaderships are proper sources for testing the hypothesis.

The general Chinese communist view that the Soviet Union has aggressive or meddlesome designs on the People's Republic and that Soviet pressure on China could be measurably reduced if the Soviet Union were vigorously confronted in Europe is too well known to be argued or documented here. There is, however, one instance where the perception of the problem in strategic terms, as well as the preferred direction of policy, have been made very explicit in what may be called an "international media event" staged by the Peking leadership. The visit of former President Nixon to the People's Republic between February 21 and 28, 1976 was the kind of exercise in international communications that was designed to assure that no one missed the messages communicated or misunderstood their meaning.

The trip may have had all the varied purposes that have been ascribed to it, but it had one clear and unmistakable result: namely, a Chinese redefinition or reassertion of the goals of the Shanghai Communique — the most important of which may not be those mentioned specifically in the document itself. No mention is made in the communique of any strategic cooperation between the two countries, although surely the principal result of the initial Nixon visit to Peking in 1972 had to be such a cooperation, both with respect to Communist China's contribution to the extrication of U.S. forces from the Indochina war and the firming up of China's posture toward the Soviet Union by the United States.

The *New York Times* cautiously suggested that "Nixon's visit may [also] indicate certain irritation and disappointment with President Ford and Washington's failure to live up to the goals of

the Shanghai communique more fully."³ Indeed, it had been Nixon's "toast" of February 22 that, judging from the attention given to it, appears to have contained the essence of what he had come to China to discuss — and that toast mainly involved a review of the Shanghai Communique, four years later. Since popular wisdom would insist that it is the so-called Taiwan issue to which progress in U.S.-PRC relations is linked, one would have expected attention to be focused on that problem; but instead there was a controversy over precisely what Nixon meant in his remarks (which he felt the circumstances required) on the Helsinki agreement. A survey of the Chinese communist press would in fact suggest that there is far less concern over the Taiwan issue than there is about the Helsinki agreements and other "failures" of the American government to uphold its end of the "bargain" with the PRC.⁴

What precisely is it that the United States has not lived up to in the Chinese view? First, the preoccupation with criticism of the American participation in Helsinki and other measures designed to stabilize East-West relations in Western Europe bespeaks, because of its intensity, a severe disappointment for a government that was led to believe — or led itself to believe — that the Sino-American rapprochement created a strategic partnership for the containment of Soviet power. Second, the persistent denunciations of U.S. failure to counter the Soviet takeover in Angola show explicit irritation with American failure to resist the expansion of Soviet power. Thirdly, a nation which almost heroically refused to cooperate significantly with the Soviet Union in the Indochina war could be forgiven a profound disappointment at the American collapse of its postsettlement political presence in Vietnam, after it had helped make the American military withdrawal a possibility. Although that theme does not generally appear openly, it certainly compels inclusion in a roster of major points of dissatisfaction that the PRC would want to bring to the attention of the American administration. Shorn of verbiage, these expressions indicate that the Chinese communists are, and have reason to be,

³ *New York Times*, February 22, 1976.

⁴ Indications abound that the Chinese communist leadership is as insistent on a statement of principle regarding its claim to rule in Taiwan as it is prepared to remain patient about implementing the transfer. Since any liquidation of the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan and the transfer of the island under PRC jurisdiction is unlikely to proceed as smoothly as the Western proponents of this policy appear to believe, the attempt would more likely create precisely the kind of political instability or military confrontation the Chinese communist leadership has an interest in avoiding if it is to remain in an effective position vis-a-vis the USSR. Under these circumstances, it is not unlikely that at least one school within the Peking establishment would hold it unwise to provoke a Taiwan crisis at this time.

displeased that their political rearrangement of relations with the United States did not produce the intensification of U.S.-Soviet conflict that strategic and political necessity compelled them to seek. (I don't argue that such intensification of conflict should have resulted — only that Peking is unhappy that it did not.)

To complete the point, how was the Nixon visit the appropriate vehicle for conveying the message? To begin with, the former president is obviously the principal symbol of the original terms of the relationship to which the Chinese communists evidently want to return. In addition, it would be as difficult to miss his connection with the issue as it would be to prove any connection between him and his successor in this matter.⁵ It is important here to stress the degree of Chinese initiative, not the degree of any prior administration involvement. Peking went to considerable lengths, through Nixon's visit and the earlier visit of the Eisenhowers, to demonstrate its sole responsibility for establishing this "institution" for conveying its messages — presumably for the principal reason of indicating the urgency of the situation by assuring attention as well as credibility.

The significance of the "communication" is also underscored by its timing and connection with other events. The first open attack in the Chinese communist press on Teng Hsiao-ping occurred on the eve of Nixon's departure for Peking. Hua Kuo-feng's first public appearance took place during the Nixon visit. Teng presumably is the chief opponent of the policy of strategic cooperation with the United States, at least under its current terms. The Soviet Communist Party congress opened on February 24, 1976 and provided a ready audience of listeners no doubt immensely interested in the news from Peking. Chinese dissatisfaction with the United States can be subsumed under one catch term — Soviet-American detente. On March 2, 1976 former President Ford announced the replacement of the term "detente" with "peace through strength."⁶

Returning to the original proposition, then, the fore-

⁵ There is no shortage of speculation alleging prior collusion between former President Nixon and the Ford administration on the trip. Suffice it to say that it was officially acknowledged that President Ford and his secretary of state received and read written reports from Nixon on the China trip. *Time* magazine thinks Nixon indicated that Mao invited him to demonstrate China's desire that the United States remain in Asia as a counter to the USSR. *New York Times*, March 22, 1976.

⁶ I have no interest in disputing those who tie the event to voter dissatisfaction over U.S.-Soviet conduct in Angola; the fact remains that the Chinese communists have reason to be as satisfied with the implications of the new term as they were irritated with those of the old one.

going indicates that the current leadership both in Moscow and in Peking works under this assumption: that a serious deterioration in the relationship between their two nations may lead to a confrontation that will be qualitatively different from the conflicts of the past — a confrontation requiring internal stability and, above all, a secure international position. The basic motivations, however, are not symmetrical. Peking's advantage would lie in avoiding any confrontation; hence its interest in lining up U.S. support and in wanting to identify with what it perceives to be American designs for creating an international environment that would put the Soviet Union on the defensive. Moscow, on the other hand, could stand to lose from a perpetuation of the status quo under which Chinese communist independence is solidified and the industrial nations consolidate their relations among themselves and with other noncommunist countries. Moscow, then, would appear to be acting less on the basis of a favorable prognosis than from a sense of urgency and a need to take some risks.

The underlying perspective for Moscow, in broad outlines, would appear to be this: the U.S.-PRC rapprochement and the termination of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam eliminated direct strategic access to Asia for the Soviet Union and hardened the Sino-Soviet front. By intensifying the movement toward detente with the United States and the "normalization" of political relations in central Europe, the Soviet Union sought to reduce the U.S. strategic pressure and the instability in Europe; thus, it would gain the freedom from multiconfrontational involvements necessary to concentrate its efforts on regaining the initiative in East Asia. The liquidation of the American political presence in Indochina, meanwhile, had the effect of allowing the Soviet Union to open a second front against the PRC there. This would have restored the advantage to the Soviet Union, except that in Asia, the United States showed little inclination to follow up its exit from Vietnam with relinquishing its other Asian bases and commitments. And in Europe, positive moves are being made to create a degree of political coordination and military refurbishment of the Atlantic Alliance that will make it increasingly less likely that the West will see to it that all is quiet on the Soviet Union's western front while she is involved in a major crisis in Asia. If allowed to continue, these developments will lead to a situation where the USSR and the PRC face simultaneous political and military problems on at least two fronts, with the United States and her allies

gradually less vulnerable to similar problems and increasingly more able to manipulate the balance and to control events.

III

The nexus between the Asian strategic confrontation, on the one hand, and political and military developments in Western Europe, on the other, is thus crucial for both communist powers. An instructive example is the Guy Mery episode and the way both Moscow and Peking handled it. In early June 1976 General Guy Mery, chief of staff of the French armed forces, published an article in *Défense Nationale* outlining the notion that French national security was best served through a joint defense of a Europe to be considered a single security zone, with the Warsaw Pact forces its putative enemy. In playing up the fact that the article was published on the eve of General Mery's official visit to the PRC, Radio Moscow surmised that it was the Chinese who put him up to denouncing detente. "Mery's visit," it was charged, "is evidence of a distinctive tendency in the foreign policy of the Maoists . . . to throw together an anti-Soviet alliance of the enemies of international detente . . . alleging that the gigantic battlefield will be the European continent as . . . the threat of invasion by the Soviet Union hangs over Western Europe."⁷ This outburst followed several other denunciations of the general's statements, claiming that the latter amounted to placing the French armed forces in the battleline against the socialist countries. The Chinese communists, on the other hand, severely scored the Soviet tirades against the new French defense posture (evident in the Mery statement) and correctly identified it as the proposition that the defense of France should cover the entire area where her security is threatened and should be subsumed under a joint defense setup for Europe.⁸

The fact that the new doctrine, as well as its explicit Chinese connection, were enunciated by a French official is both more troublesome and ominous to the Soviet leadership than similar expressions from other European or U.S. officials would have been. It was France that had been for some time the driving wedge in Soviet moves toward bilateral arrangements with various West European nations as a way of undermining and reversing the unifying trends in the Atlantic Community. This presumably pre-

⁷ FBIS, *Daily Report* (Soviet Union), June 18, 1976.

⁸ *People's Daily*, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (China), June 17, 1976.

vented the Soviets from openly taking on the real author of the new French defense and strategic posture. General Mery's statement was, after all, only a reflection of the new French doctrine that had been systematically and authoritatively set forth by President Giscard d'Estaing himself in a June 1, 1976 address to the Institute for Advanced Studies in National Defense in Paris in the presence of the premier, cabinet ministers, the chief of staff of the armed forces, the chiefs of staff, the ministerial delegate for armaments, and general officers.⁹ It was, of course, the chief of staff's visit to Peking that underscored the strategic role China is assigned in French thinking.

In his speech, the French president announced a five-year program for reorganizing and building up the French military forces, based on an "appreciably increased" defense budget; suggested that internal security and world and regional stability were national defense goals beyond the mere maintenance of a conventional war-making capacity; declared himself opposed to sole (or pure) reliance on strategic deterrence, maintaining that "diversity in defense means reinforces the credibility of deterrence"; and concluded that since there can be only one zone of defense, there "must be only one military system in this zone."

The Soviet leadership can derive little comfort from explaining this latest French strategic reappraisal as yet another capricious move to go its own way; for in its essential points, it substantially matches official NATO thought on the matter of Europe's political and military relationship to the Soviet Union elsewhere in Europe and especially in the United States. There may be some validity to the view that, despite official rhetoric, the United States has in the past had no real interest in European political unity beyond a certain point and preferred taking primary responsibility for organizing and guaranteeing the common defense — and that the European states were in fact content with that state of affairs. In recent years, however, the United States, if anything, pushed hard in the other direction. (In former President Nixon's official reports on U.S. foreign policy from 1970 to 1973 there are frequent references to ways of presenting European governments with various pressures to compel them to seek greater coordination and assume a greater share of responsibility for joint defense.) Certainly former Secretary of State Kissinger's London speech of June 25, 1976 strongly conveys this interest in a politically and militarily co-

⁹ Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, "France's Defense Policy: Address by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing" (76/73).

ordinated and revitalized Europe as a way of dealing more effectively with the Soviet Union.¹⁰ On the issue of unity, the secretary insisted that "European unity is crucial for Europe, for the West, and for the rest of the world. We strongly support and encourage it." On the question of shared responsibility, he maintained that "it is not healthy for the United States to be the only center of initiative and leadership in the democratic world. . . . American policy can only gain by having a strong partner of parallel moral purpose." With respect to relations with the Soviet Union, Kissinger maintained that "we should not allow the Soviet Union to apply detente selectively within the alliance. Competition among us in our diplomatic or economic policies toward the East risks dissipating Western advantages and opening up Soviet opportunities. We must resist division and maintain the closest coordination."

There is, of course, no explicit tie mentioned to the PRC, but the global context in which Kissinger placed his expectations for Europe makes the connection evident. At any rate, the trend in Western Europe must make it apparent to the Soviet leadership that it cannot necessarily count on a continuation of what (as recently as at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU) was hailed as a favorable shift in the "correlation of forces" worldwide and in Europe and that some hard choices must be made.

IV

The Soviet Union can move in three broad areas to try to retain the momentum of recent successes and to neutralize Western strategic, political and economic power as it girds up for crisis in East Asia: the extension of popular fronts in Western Europe, the maneuvering of the United States into an ambiguous position in southern Africa, and the expansion of strategic weapons deterrent capacity.

In Western Europe, the Soviet Union needs a relationship that will, on the one hand, stabilize and secure its side of the dividing line and, on the other, destabilize the political and military forces on the other side. The former purpose is served by Helsinki and other "settlements" intended to impose on the West an obligation to respect the "realities" of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The latter is served by the various ongoing popular front efforts intended to inhibit an effective and consistent West European policy toward the Soviet Union and a substantial role of the United

¹⁰ *Washington Post*, June 26, 1976.

States in formulating it. It is also served by the maintenance of a military balance — believed by some analysts to portend the acquisition of a conventional war-winning capacity in Europe by the Soviet Union — intended to place the West under the kind of pressure that makes the security of Western Europe, rather than that of the Soviet Union, its principal preoccupation.¹¹

Regarding the conventional war-winning capacity that is thought to be impending, it is not clear whether the Soviet Union has it or will retain it for long, but the existence of the current military force build-up has had two effects. Under recent and current international conditions, this force is not going to be set in motion for an attack on Western Europe, but it has no doubt limited Western freedom of action and has produced a kind of containment of a large portion of U.S. military power, removing it from the global context by confining it to exclusively European security concerns. In some ways, Europe may be said to have assumed a hostage role to the projections of Soviet power into the space from the Persian Gulf to West Africa. In this sense it has been useful to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the systematic, perhaps even exaggerated exposes of the increases in Warsaw Pact force levels have no doubt had an impact on the mobilization of sentiment and policy for a stronger West European defense posture and establishment against the Soviet Union.

At this point, it remains an open question whether the West will further attempt to reverse the relationship by accepting the fact of Soviet intrusion into what was understood to be its "natural sphere" of strategic hegemony in Angola, thus laying a basis for certain kinds of "intrusions" into the Soviet security margin in Eastern Europe. At any rate, given both Soviet doubts about Western intentions to continue securing the USSR's western front and the need to put the United States on the defensive to minimize the potential strategic role it can play in the intensifying struggle for strategic control of China, the reasons for Moscow's strong interest in the movement toward popular fronts in Europe become clear. Equally evident is Peking's opposition, demonstrated *ad nauseam*, to this movement and to forces in the West favoring accommodation to it.

In this context, the Sino-Soviet propaganda war continues. The Chinese accuse the Soviet Union of imperialist designs

¹¹ See John M. Collins and John S. Chwat, *The United States/Soviet Military Balance* (Washington: GPO, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service Study, 1976).

on Western Europe and counsel the West (and East) Europeans to resist them, while the Soviets accuse Peking of sabotaging the spread of socialism and peace. Despite the hyperbole, the conflict reflects a real issue and a real clash of strategic interests. This particular set of recriminations has really gone quite far. The Chinese have long been attributing to the Soviet leadership the worst motivations of both imperialism and fascism in their drive for world hegemony; recently the Soviet Union tried to trump that with the publication of Fedor Burlatsky's book on Mao Tse-tung in which he charges that in the Cultural Revolution (between 1965 and 1969) about 25 million people were annihilated. Prominent reviews of the book, aimed at Western consumption, seek to spread the notion that Mao perceived the strategic necessity of a worldwide bloodbath; therefore, those who want to arm the West against the Soviet Union are only playing Mao's grizzly game of paving the road to Chinese world power with the destruction of both the Soviet Union and the United States.¹² There is no accounting for taste in propaganda; the point here is simply that what the West thinks about them has become important to the two communist antagonists.

Objections will arise both to viewing the reorientation of the political tactics of the West European communist parties as manifestations of a popular front and of tying it to Soviet strategic interests. After all, Eurocommunism is a new term and may just possibly mean that the European communist parties, once in power, may come to define their political visions in European terms and try to minimize Soviet control over them. Alternately, some comfort is sought in the old notion that, regardless of their present intentions, political and economic realities will transform them into Titoists once they have been in power for a while.

To begin with, the Soviet Union has given no indications that it views the communist political resurgence in Western Europe as an instant vehicle for seizing power there. On the contrary, what official statements, political realism and strategic necessity compel is the acquisition, through these parties, of sufficient influence on the political decision-making processes in Western Europe to produce foreign policies generally supportive of, rather than opposed to, Soviet international interests.

Further, the Soviet Union is not exactly a novice at games to obscure its direct interest in benefiting from support to

¹² TASS, January 11, 1976.

natural and indigenous processes. The language employed and sentiments expressed in the emergence of Eurocommunism are not substantially different, for instance, from those attending the birth of polycentrism out of the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943; the head of the Italian Communist Party was then, as now, the principal spokesman and had the tacit, but real, approval of the Soviet leadership. It is best not to dwell on other analogies, such as the relationship of the big push to popular fronts in Europe and Asia in the mid-1930s to the Soviet Union's preparations for war, or the crucial role intended for France as a device to divide and weaken Europe.

The process of defining the new role of the West European communist parties and their relationship to Moscow has its roots in the debate of 1974 over the so-called Zorodov Doctrine and culminated in the East Berlin "summit" of June 28 to 30, 1976. From the beginning, the basic issue was whether each party should make and respond to political opportunities to seize power and rule alone, or whether they should limit themselves to gaining a participatory role in bourgeois governments, through which they might exercise whatever influence political reality permitted. The question was not whether the Soviet Union should have a direct and unconcealed leading role in these efforts; the Soviet line from the beginning was that these were indigenous developments and thus were not to be resisted by the West merely because they objectively benefited the Soviet Union. Now the conclusion is drawn that the Soviet Union backed down to the demands of West and East European parties at the Berlin meeting. Backed down to what demands? There was, at least, a semantic compromise. Neither "proletarian internationalism" nor "independent national trends" were given official blessing, but "international cooperation of equal and independent parties" was agreed upon. Of course, prominent party chiefs demanded national independence and freedom, but freedom to do what? Berlinguer said: "to see solutions of a new type in the transformation of society in the socialist direction." (For "socialist" read "communist," since the fact that socialist governments already exist in much of Europe would make that enterprise redundant.) Georges Marchais wants a "socialism in French colors" to create a democratic socialism of workers.¹³ No heresy there. The Soviet Union has been proclaiming it a democratic workers' socialism for decades. TASS quoted Berlinguer to

¹³ *Washington Post*, July 1, 1976.

have said more appropriately that the "Communist Party's main line is . . . the establishment of a wide alliance of democratic forces and participation of the Communist Party in the government."¹⁴ That fits the popular front line of old. Democratic forces in this context are progressive forces, and progressive forces by definition exclude those who work against the interests of the Soviet Union.

The phraseology serves the purpose of inspiring the Left, of trivializing the impact of communist parties and of obscuring the involvement and interests of the Soviet Union. There are no doubt many in the Western communist parties who want the proclaimed freedom from Moscow to set up their own national brands of socialism; and the potential for a longer term corrosive effect on Soviet control over these parties must not be minimized. These parties, however, are not the loose agglomerations associated with the term "party" in the West, but instead somewhat rigidly managed organizations. Both the parties and Moscow do retain the means to discipline deviants or to change tactics and slogans.

Eurocommunism has other possibilities, but the intent here is not to exhaust them, merely to indicate one area in which the Soviet Union can maneuver to gain the security of her western frontier in order to deal decisively with the China problem. The Soviets may be attempting to capitalize on opportunities to put Western Europe on the defense; I am inclined to think that, in view of the unmistakable shifts in opinion as well as strategy on both sides of the Atlantic, they are trying to reverse an unwelcome trend. In fact, at least two important recent conferences in the Soviet Union have reflected concerns that a search in the United States for new strategic concepts and the open debate on detente may bring a tougher American foreign-military policy. One conference went so far as to advocate that any new military doctrinal and strategic concepts be limited by agreements.¹⁵

A second potential area in which the Soviet Union has a short-term capacity for limiting American strategic freedom of action has arisen out of the conditions created by the establishment of a Soviet presence in Angola and Mozambique. The Soviet Union there appears to have obtained a capacity to judiciously manage conflict situations in other areas of southern Africa, which may confront the United States with extremely ambiguous and

¹⁴ TASS, June 23, 1976.

¹⁵ *Soviet World Outlook* (University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies), May 15, 1976, pp. 1, 5-6.

difficult problems. Noninvolvement on behalf of established governments that are facing intensifying "liberation" struggles risks serious strategic losses, geographic as well as mineral. Involvement on their side, on the other hand, could place the United States in the position of alienating a substantial number of African and other Third World countries and becoming isolated from a considerable number of allies. In the end, significant involvement — even if desirable or unavoidable — may be impossible on domestic grounds, especially since the unwillingness to support a policy of backing "white" governments against black liberators, regardless of the political complexion of the latter, will not be confined to America's black community. A solution involving a partial liquidation of white rule in exchange for African support may be worked out in time, because the Soviet Union itself has to calibrate its pressures carefully to avoid having to make its own debilitating direct commitment. But the Soviets, at any rate, appear to have occupied some very useful strategic high ground in anticipation of confrontations.

A third approach for the Soviet Union to limiting the political effectiveness of American strategic power is the acquisition of additional nuclear deterrent capacity. By that I mean a capacity not only to prevent direct strikes on the Soviet Union by the simple deterrent of mutual assured destruction, but also to effectively restrain the United States from major nonnuclear initiatives by the complex deterrent of an initial-exchange national survivability coupled with surviving second- and third-strike weapons. If the nuclear balance moves in current directions, "By 1977, after a Soviet-initiated counterforce strike against the United States to which the United States responded with a counterforce strike, the Soviet Union would have remaining forces sufficient to destroy Chinese and European NATO nuclear capability, attack U.S. population and conventional military targets, and still have remaining force throw-weight in excess of that of the United States. And after 1977 the Soviet advantage after the assumed attack mounts rapidly."¹⁶ What any American strategic cooperation would be worth to the Chinese communists or, for that matter, to anyone else under such circumstances need not be explained. It is clear that there has been enormous stress in the Soviet Union on a program of nuclear arms acquisition combined with a civil defense

¹⁶ Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente" *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, p. 226.

“survivability” effort.¹⁷ The latter may bespeak an intention to acquire a nuclear war-winning capacity, presumably not to be used to incinerate the globe, but to neutralize much of the power of the noncommunist world.

A U.S.-PRC strategic partnership, in terms of existing nuclear establishments, makes a certain amount of sense. To begin with, Communist China evidently has foregone the development of delivery systems that would make her a theoretical direct nuclear threat against the United States.¹⁸ In addition, the PRC inventory aimed at the Soviet Union is magnified in value when the Soviet leadership has to calculate the possibility that it is covered by the American nuclear umbrella. For the Soviet Union, at any rate, the best remedy would seem to be to concentrate on neutralizing the American arsenal.

If 1977 brings to the Soviet Union the strategic nuclear superiority projected for it, the advantage may be evanescent: technological breakthroughs and a new generation of weapon systems (defensive and otherwise) may well eventually reduce the Soviet build-up of the past decade to little more than a costly and largely unilateral squandering of enormous resources on obsolete weapons. In that event, early 1977 may well offer the Soviet Union the only strategic window in a long time for decisive action on the China issue. In the end, the strategic struggle is not fought in the air, although that space remains a key instrument; the real game is still played on the ground to gain political mastery of geostrategic space.

V

Assuming then that the Soviet Union is ready and may be compelled to act to restore her control over the Chinese communist leadership, what can be done? In the first instance, the USSR will have to demonstrate massive power in a big way. This is going to be neither a palace revolution nor a glorious short war for them, but an extremely tough confrontation that cannot be limited to the low-risk level that has rendered previous Soviet “interventions” ineffective — nor can it be pursued with such abandon that it will lead to all-out war. The whole problem goes considerably deeper than the mere replacement of one ruling clique with

¹⁷ See Leon Gouré, *War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense* (University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976).

¹⁸ For Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham's explanation, see the *New York Times*, February 25, 1976.

another more friendly one. Whether or not a contending group in China decides in favor of renewing cooperation with the Soviet Union will not depend on the whims or idiosyncracies of a few individuals, but on complex calculations of the national interest and on powerful political forces. The task for the Soviet Union will be to apply external pressure not to a military conquest of China, but to an operation that must make the Soviet Union the deciding political factor inside China.

Given the sheer magnitude of the problem, the Soviet Union will not succeed with commando raids or political agents. Instead a massive power presence must be credibly demonstrated — not to give the Chinese communists a choice, but to make sure there is no alternative to going back to Moscow.

Secondly, it will be in the Soviet Union's interest to have a prolonged period of turmoil during which the basic conditions and forces opposed to dependence on Moscow can be eliminated or altered. When a leading and responsible Soviet China specialist told this author that the death of Mao would be followed by about seven years of internal disorder, his prognosis was probably less a prediction than an expression of hope.

Finally — and this goes to the root of the problem — no Chinese leadership, no matter how pro-Soviet it professes to be, can long be relied upon to resist the temptations and indeed the compulsion to pursue the independent course that China's geostrategic size justifies. One necessary step in any Soviet program to reassert its claim to strategic mastery over China will be to reduce the country in size. Stalin had attempted to guarantee China's second-rate status by limiting the amount of capital investment; Khrushchev benefited from the failure of the go-it-alone campaigns. But Brezhnev cannot, with the industrial powers having ended their isolation of China, rely on the perpetual industrial pauperism of that country. At the height of the Soviet encirclement campaign against the Chinese communists in 1969, Comrade Wang Ming gave a hint of long-range Soviet thinking: he challenged any claims China may have to sovereignty over Manchuria, thereby indicating that one part of the solution would be an independent Manchurian People's Republic — as independent, for instance, as the People's Republic of Mongolia. More recently, a TASS report on former PRC General Zunum Taipov conveyed two important ideas: that the Soviets continue to refer to Sinkiang as East Turkestan and that a Sinkiang national-liberation movement

existed,¹⁹ confirming that the idea of detaching Sinkiang from the PRC is still alive and well in the Soviet Union.

Manchuria is what the Soviets must have to be able to project their power directly into East Asia. Its loss, combined with the loss of Sinkiang, might be sufficient to lessen the strategic weight and significance of China so that whose side she is on might matter a good deal less than it does today.

The Soviet Union can and must accomplish the foregoing to regain its influence in China and Asia, but it can do so only if the United States is either indifferent, incapable of acting or hostile to the Chinese communists. The first is unlikely and the last a thing of the past, which leaves the Soviet Union with the task of limiting the ability of the United States to interfere.

VI

To summarize, the Soviet Union cannot put off a confrontation with China now that Mao is dead. A similar opportunity to reestablish strategic hegemony over China may not recur for some time, and the strategic balance may be as favorable to the Soviet Union in late 1976 and early 1977 as it is likely to get for some time to come.

The political forces in Communist China have many reasons to resist Soviet encroachment, few to consider returning to a "normal" relationship with the Russians. Even among circles friendly to the Soviet Union there must be awareness that the USSR can have no interest in helping China become a superpower; on the contrary, the Soviets may think it necessary to reduce Chinese power to a level even lower than it is at present. Chinese resistance to the Soviet Union will require the support of a superpower — or its equivalent in other allies — and for this reason the PRC will remain strategically dependent on the United States in any confrontation.

The USSR, on the other hand, cannot move with the force required to end China's "rebellion" in the socialist camp unless the United States has been placed on the defensive in Europe — and so at a disadvantage in the strategic balance. Whether a Sino-Soviet confrontation actually occurs, then, may largely depend on what the United States does under the circumstances.

¹⁹ TASS, June 22, 1976.

SOVIET GENERAL-PURPOSE FORCES

by William Schneider, Jr.

The comprehensive build-up of Soviet strategic nuclear power since 1969, and the coincident diplomatic focus on limiting nuclear arms through bilateral negotiation (especially SALT), has overshadowed important changes in the complexion of the Soviet Union's general-purpose forces (GPF). In the Soviet-American context, this overshadowing is in some ways understandable, owing to the "once-removed" character of the Soviet GPF threat to the continental United States. This paper will describe Soviet doctrine, organization, weapons inventories, and force deployment and assess the significance of recent developments affecting the Soviet Union's general-purpose forces.

Doctrine

The Soviet armed forces mirror their underlying political-military doctrine more explicitly than do their Western counterparts. The ubiquitous political commissar assigned to every Soviet military unit from company-size to the General Staff symbolizes the importance that the armed forces attach to fidelity of military behavior to state political-military directives. It also reflects the extreme centralization of command and military initiative in the Soviet defense establishment, which has been such an important influence on the evolution of Soviet military doctrine. In this paper, "doctrine" will refer to the body of thought that directs how military forces will be employed in time of war¹; the focus will be on the military dimension of Soviet doctrine as it affects the USSR's general-purpose forces. Soviet GPF doctrine may be divided into two components: doctrine in support of a war on land, which

¹ The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: Department of Defense, September 3, 1974) defines "doctrine" as the "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."

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necessarily involves air elements, and doctrine in support of a war at sea.

War on Land

The Soviet Union has a time-honored tradition as a land power, owing to the accessibility of its long border to hostile armies.² The lessons learned by the Soviet military leadership during World War II, however, provided the most important impetus to the development of modern Soviet military doctrine. Soviet land-warfare doctrine is an adaptation of the German blitzkrieg doctrine, the differences reflecting Soviet assimilation of modern military technology and the more thorough mobility orientation of all Soviet divisions. Soviet forces are organized, trained, equipped and deployed in order to provide what the Soviets describe as "shock" power. The idea is to engage the enemy with high-speed maneuvering forces, supported by massive artillery, missile and air-delivered firepower, in a very brief time period,³ in order to defeat the adversary's forward defenses and paralyze his command apparatus.

Soviet forces are designed for offensive warfare, and their doctrine stresses the importance of taking the initiative⁴ through surprise and preemption. The objective of Soviet military operations on land is to breach the line(s) of defense established by an adversary along narrow fronts. Large armored columns are deployed in echeloned formation and pour through breaches in the enemy defense line opened by Soviet cannon-and-missile artillery and tactical airpower (deployed as a "frontal aviation army"). Under conditions where nuclear and lethal chemical munitions are

² See Tibor Szamuely, *The Russian Tradition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975) for a well-informed discussion of the historical evolution of Russian attitudes toward defense.

³ Steven L. Canby, *The Alliance and Europe: Part IV—Military Doctrine and Technology* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 109, 1975), pp. 9-11, contains a succinct characterization of the role of "shock" in Soviet tactics.

⁴ There has been a substantial quantity of literature describing Soviet tactical doctrine. Among the Soviet volumes most pertinent to GPF operations are Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Military Strategy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975); Col. V.Y. Savkin, *The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics*, Moscow, 1972, trans. by the USAF (Washington: GPO, 1974); Col. A.A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive*, Moscow, 1970, trans. by the USAF (Washington: GPO, 1974); and Col. V.Y. Savkin, "Characteristics of Modern Warfare," *Voennyi Vestnik*, March 1974. Important analyses by Western specialists include John Erickson, *Soviet Military Power* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1971); J.D. Douglass, *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive* (Washington: GPO, 1976); P.H. Vigor and C.N. Donnelly, "Soviet Breakthrough Operations," *RUSI/RMAS Research Centre Bulletin*, March 1975; and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

employed, the goal is to advance 70 km per day, while the rate of advance in a nonnuclear conflict is to be 40 km daily. These rates, though high, are not without precedent: in World War II, Guderian's Second Panzer Group achieved 50 km per day in the early days of the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union; and in 1945 the Soviet Sixth Guards Army gained 85 km per day against Japanese forces in Manchuria.⁵

Several lines of attack are made along the main axes of advance (*glavnoe napravlenie*), across a front 4 to 8 km wide. In the central European case, some six to eight lines of attack would be made. When a breach is made, echeloned reserves from units unable to penetrate enemy defenses are reallocated to reinforce the successful units. Normally, a "front" ("army group" in Western parlance) is assigned to achieve a breakthrough. This front is led by a tank army, composed of several tank divisions plus the tank regiments of attached motorized rifle divisions (MRDs). Generally, the attacking tanks will be accompanied by infantry in armored personnel carriers (APCs) at 100- to 150-m intervals. These tactics are designed to provide a high ratio of attacking to defending forces and to permit continuous contact with the adversary. When prepared defenses cannot be bypassed, company- to regiment-size units are detached, preferably to attack without prior concentration (i.e., "off the march"), although prior assembly is sometimes necessary so that adequate maneuver elements can develop the assault. When tanks are not available to provide direct-fire support to the troops so engaged, the attack is backed up by direct-fire weapons (e.g., the BMP's 76-mm low-pressure gun) mounted on APCs. Successive waves of concentration, breakthrough, penetration, concentration are supported by echeloned reserves moved forward from the western military districts of the Soviet Union until they have achieved their objective.

As with the German blitzkrieg of World War II, the objective of Soviet military doctrine is to paralyze the enemy's command apparatus and to prevent the concentration and build-up of reserves.⁶ The Soviets envisage these tactics as resulting in a

⁵ The Soviets attribute their ability to achieve and maintain high rates of advance to modern technology, which enables their forces to sustain offensive operations day and night under all weather conditions. See Col. I. Kirin, "Raise the Offensive Tempo," *Voennyi Vestnik*, July 1973; also, A.A. Zheltov, T.R. Kondratkov and Ye. A. Khomenko, *Metodologicheskiye Problemy Voennoy Teorii i Praktiki* [Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1969).

⁶ An excellent review of Soviet tactics and capabilities in a NATO-Warsaw Pact context may be found in two papers by John Erickson: *Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels* (Washington: U.S. Strategic Institute, Report no. 76-2, 1976) and "Soviet

brief period of intense combat, during which exceptionally high battlefield losses (both men and equipment) would be sustained. The pace of the advance would be sustained through the advance deployment of paratroops and helicopter-borne forces as well as the complete mechanization of Soviet forces.⁷ As two Soviet tacticians have described it,

armed conflict in theaters of military operations will be characterized by great violence, the mass destruction of troops, and the formation of broad zones with a high level of radio-active contamination.⁸

The employment of large quantities of combat equipment, the conduct of the offensive to a great depth and at high rates, and the strain of the battles will require a *great expenditure of materiel* and the enemy's influence with nuclear and chemical weapons will lead to mass losses of troops and equipment.⁹

This may explain, in part, the single-minded Soviet obsession with massive weapons procurement, compared with the Western emphasis on high-cost manpower and sophisticated weapon systems procured in small quantities.

War at Sea

Widely documented changes in the character of the Soviet navy have lead to considerable speculation among specialists about what these changes portend.¹⁰ Soviet writings on naval developments, the character of Soviet ships and their mode of deployment, and evidence from Soviet maneuvers, when analyzed as a whole, give us sufficient information to develop some plausible hypotheses about Soviet naval doctrine. Soviet shipbuilding concentrates on single-purpose vessels, designed to facilitate sea denial to the

Military Capabilities," *Current History*, October 1976. An exceptionally good summary of developments in Soviet frontal aviation is contained in Colin S. Gray, "Soviet Frontal Aviation in Europe," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1977.

⁷ All 170 Soviet divisions (52 tank, 111 MRDs and 7 airborne) are mechanized except for the airborne divisions. By 1980, the United States will have 5 unmechanized divisions in its order of battle: 3 infantry, 1 airborne and 1 air-assault.

⁸ Sokolovskiy, pp. 291-292.

⁹ Sidorenko, p. 61. (Emphasis added.)

¹⁰ Admiral Sergi Gorshkov's "Navies in War and Peace," *Morskoi Sbornik*, February 1972, published in the United States as *Red Star Rising at Sea*, trans. by T.A. Nelly, Jr. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1974), has been a fertile source of controversy. See, for example, R.G. Weinland et al., "Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace,'" *Survival*, March 1975. In 1976 a translation of Admiral Gorshkov's *Seapower and the State* (Moscow: Military Publishing House) was published and is likely to add to the controversy. For a review of its implications, see David Kassing, "General Purpose Forces: Navy and Marine Corps," in Francis Hoeber and William Schneider, Jr., eds., *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1978* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977).

United States. Soviet naval forces are organized under a command-and-control structure that makes possible a coordinated, massive salvo (employing shore-based aircraft, surface ships and submarines) against U.S. capital ships;¹¹ their primary weapon is the cruise missile. The recent deployment of the 40,000-ton helicopter carrier *Kiev* — the first truly multipurpose platform built by the Soviets — is a useful illustration of the evolution of Soviet doctrine. Its principal target is the U.S. Polaris/Poseidon submarine force (20 to 25 Ka-25B [Hormone B] helicopters are therefore deployed on the *Kiev*). In addition, 15 to 20 vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) Yak-36 Forgers are on board — for reconnaissance, target acquisition and mid-course guidance of the SS-N-12 antiship cruise missile.¹²

Moreover, because Soviet naval vessels are heavily armed (4 to 8 cruise missiles on the average) but have little on-board storage space and cannot be replenished under way, the Soviet navy has been described by some analysts as a “first-strike” navy. Hence, the notion that the Soviet navy is evolving as a mirror image of Western navies is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the doctrine of the (GPF) Soviet navy suggests that it operates primarily in indirect support of Soviet land armies, focusing on denying to the United States the ability to project its naval power ashore. This is not to say that the Soviet navy does not have other missions: demonstration functions such as “showing the flag,” long a part of Western naval activity, receive strong support in *Seapower and the State*. Nevertheless, to date, Soviet naval-warfare doctrine focuses on the sea-denial function and does not include notions of the direct projection of Soviet power ashore. The small naval infantry (marine) complement of 12,000 troops is deployed in the northern USSR for Baltic and northern-flank amphibious operations peripheral to the central role of the Soviet navy or army.

Soviet Weapons Inventories

Soviet military doctrine places heavy emphasis on the tactical significance of massive firepower and high rates of advance against intense defensive fire. As a consequence, the Soviet practice

¹¹ A good review of recent Soviet developments in fleet doctrine is contained in N. Friedman, *U.S. vs. Soviet Style in Fleet Doctrine* (Croton-on-Hudson: Hudson Institute, HI-2238/2-DP, June 2, 1975).

¹² For a discussion of the *Kiev's* capabilities and probable mission, see Jurgen Rohwer, “The Role of the *Kiev* and Her VTOL Fighter Group,” in *Marine-Rundschau*, October 1976; also, “Russia’s Forger VTOL Aircraft — A More Detailed Analysis,” *International Defense Review*, December 1976.

TABLE I
CHANGES IN MAJOR AGGREGATES OF SOVIET
GENERAL-PURPOSE FORCES *

	1966	1976
Divisions	148	170
Divisions on central front	22	31
Division-equivalents, 1970 organization	22	38
MRD strength (troops)	10,500	11,500
Tank division strength (troops)	8,500	9,000
Tanks/MRD	190	266
AAA pieces/division	30	70
Naval surface combatants	190	220
Tactical aircraft (including ground-attack)	4,100	5,600
Ground-attack aircraft	800	1,700
Artillery tubes (excluding AAA)	12,000	19,000
Tanks	32,000	45,000
Helicopters	400	3,800
Military personnel	4,000,000	4,800,000
Armored personnel carriers	35,000	55,000

* MRD = motorized rifle division; AAA = antiaircraft artillery.

Sources: General George S. Brown, *Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States for FY78*, January 20, 1977; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, 1964-1965, 1965-1966, and 1976-1977).

of piling weapon upon weapon now appears less irrational to Western eyes than it has in the past. In any case, Soviet design, training, and maintenance practices require that large numbers of units be procured. Little battlefield maintenance is feasible in the Soviet division structure. Compared with Western armies, a large fraction of the troops assigned to any one division fill combat spaces;¹³ therefore, little personnel "overhead" is available to support extensive, procurement-reducing field maintenance.¹⁴

There has been an impressive build-up in the Soviet major-equipment inventory in virtually every area of GPF capability. The statistics displayed in Table I illustrate the evolution of Soviet military power over the past decade.

Despite popular belief to the contrary, the build-up of Soviet GPF capability has been Europe-oriented, and remains so.

¹³ The Soviets' inability to maintain their large tank force has led them to adopt training substitutes rather than train on operational equipment (the American practice). For the most part, only minimum depot maintenance is done on Soviet GPF equipment.

¹⁴ The Israeli army was able to repair 325 damaged tanks during the course of the 1973 Middle East war; the Egyptian and Syrian forces, modeled after their Soviet supplier, had to throw new vehicles into the breach as their inventory was depleted by even minor battlefield damage.

The Sino-Soviet border area gets second or third call on new equipment; first, the needs of Soviet forces in Europe and the western military districts must be met.¹⁵ All 31 Soviet divisions deployed in Europe are in Category 1 (full-strength), but only one-third of the divisions deployed in those military districts adjacent to China are in Category 1.¹⁶ (Category 2 divisions are maintained at 50 per cent of full strength; Category 3 divisions are held at 25 to 33 per cent of wartime strength.) Divisions in Category 2 or 3 are normally deployed in the central, southern and eastern sectors of the USSR.

Since 1965, the Soviets have supported a military manpower increase (800,000) almost as large as the entire U.S. Army (890,000). This increase in manpower has been supported by changes in force structure (larger and more heavily equipped divisions) and by an upgrading of Soviet military forces with higher-quality weapons. Rather than phase out the older models, these are simply transferred to units designated for second-echelon attack, and the division structure is enlarged to accommodate them. This is emphasized by the manpower increase in both the MRDs and the tank divisions. The greater numbers of tanks and AAA pieces (antiaircraft artillery) per division, together with the increase in the number of artillery tubes in the Soviet armed forces, necessitate greater manpower levels as well as extraordinarily high levels of procurement.

Similar trends exist in the Soviet navy and tactical air force. For two decades, Soviet "frontal aviation" emphasized the air-defense mission, but with the advent of new technology (electronics and high-efficiency jet engines), the Soviets became better able to conduct ground attacks by penetrating Western air defenses rather than relying heavily on artillery fire. In addition, the growth of organic division-level air defense (an increase from 30 to 70 AAA pieces per division between 1965 and 1976) has reduced the requirement for the air-defense mission. Soviet accumulation of tactical aircraft has not slowed, however; there has only been a change in emphasis. Ground-attack aircraft (with range-payload capabilities approaching those of the U.S. F-4) have been

¹⁵ The high-priority military districts in the western USSR (58 divisions), opposite NATO's Central Region, include Leningrad and the Baltic, Byelorussian and Carpathian districts. In Europe, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Northern Group of Forces (Poland), the Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia), and the Southern Group of Forces (Hungary) are invariably the first to be reequipped and strengthened. They are always kept at full strength.

¹⁶ The military districts adjacent to the Chinese border are the Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikal and Far Eastern districts.

emphasized as have theater-level surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear, chemical and high-explosive payloads.¹⁷

The qualitative change that has taken place in the Soviet navy has resulted in the replacement of virtually all the small coastal-defense vessels with larger, more capable and more numerous "blue water" surface ships to support the new Soviet objective of sea denial. Except for the GPF submarines, where the small diesel-powered coastal-defense submarines have been replaced with fewer but larger diesel- and nuclear-powered craft (36 of 188 Soviet GPF torpedo submarines are nuclear-powered), the size of the Soviet "blue water" naval force has increased significantly in all categories.

Implications of Recent Changes in the Soviet GPF Posture

The Soviet GPF posture has been undergoing important changes for more than a decade. In the words of one prominent specialist, "From strategic missiles to chemical weapons there seems to be an unrelieved prospect of numerical expansion, modernization, and technical improvement."¹⁸ It is nevertheless possible to identify and classify some of the changes that bear most directly on the effectiveness of Soviet general-purpose forces.

(1) Measures That Reduce Tactical Warning of an Attack

Historically the Soviet general-purpose forces (particularly their ground and air elements) have suffered from an inadequate logistical system. Their forward-deployed forces were short on ammunition, POL (petroleum-oil lubricants) and critical spare parts; thus, they could sustain only a few days of intense conflict. Moreover, Soviet conservatism (i.e., concern about possible preemption and destruction of inventories) resulted in a general tendency to avoid large-scale forward deployment of ammunition and POL. Very large quantities of both are required during the breakthrough phase—the central feature of Soviet land-warfare doctrine.¹⁹ Improvements in divisional logistics, including heavier

¹⁷ These forces include the SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range (1,050 nm) and intermediate-range (2,200 nm) missiles, the variable-range SS-11 (colocated with intercontinental SS-11 launchers), the new mobile SS-X-20 IRBM, the SS-12 (Scaleboard) short-range ballistic missile (500 nm), the guided Scud (85-160 nm), and the Frog-series free rockets (particularly the Frog-7).

¹⁸ Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities," p. 98.

¹⁹ Sokolovskiy estimates that 25,000 tons of ammunition per front daily would be required. The East German *Militär Technik* for July 1970 estimates that 300,000 metric tons of POL would be required to support an army front and its associated frontal aviation elements.

trucks, greater bridging capability and more efficient field delivery of POL, have made it possible for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (10 tank divisions and 10 MRDs) to maintain thirty-seven days of ammunition and sixteen days of POL, all without depleting East German stocks.²⁰ In the past, the movement of a vast quantity of ammunition and POL would have provided advance warning of an attack; today, this warning time has been diminished substantially.

Forward deployment with the GSFG of new equipment for bridging water barriers further reduces warning of a Soviet attack. The mobilization of such equipment would normally be one of the signals warning of an armed force's imminent advance. But with 16 bridging regiments (600-m capability) and six river-crossing battalions (30 K-61 and 20 PTS-M heavy amphibious vehicles; 24 GSP ferries) already forward-deployed, NATO forces will have to depend on other (perhaps less reliable) indicators of Soviet/Warsaw Pact mobilization.²¹ In addition, the Soviets have deployed the revolutionary PMP bridge, which can cross a body of water as large as the Rhine in only a half-hour.

(2) Increases in the Combat Power of Soviet Army Divisions

Soviet motorized rifle divisions have had their armored complement strengthened by at least one battalion. Total MRD tank allotments have increased by 60 to 80 tanks over the past few years,²² and division manpower has been increased by 15 to 20 per cent.

The long-standing Soviet dependence on towed artillery has given way to the use of self-propelled artillery. Because the latter can keep pace with advancing tanks, it can improve the Soviet tanks' chances of survival against the infantry-oriented antitank missiles that are proliferating in NATO (and in the PRC). In addition, self-propelled artillery will permit added artillery-crew protection and rapid redeployment in order to concentrate fire and inhibit adversary target acquisition for counterbattery fire. These new artillery pieces include the 122-mm D-74, mounted on a modified PT-76 light-tank chassis, and a 152-mm piece mounted on a modi-

²⁰ Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities," p. 128. See also Graham Turbiville, "Soviet Logistic Support for Ground Operations," *RUSI Quarterly*, September 1975.

²¹ The implications of this sharp reduction in warning time are noted with concern by Senators Dewey Bartlett and Sam Nunn in a report on their November 1976 visit to NATO forces in Europe. See "NATO and the New Soviet Threat," *Congressional Record*, January 25, 1977, pp. S1411-S1417.

²² *Ibid.*, p. S1412.

fied SA-4 anti-aircraft-missile transporter chassis. Since 1968, the numbers of artillery of all types have doubled. New, high-performance, saturation-fire multiple rocket launchers (115-mm), now coming back into fashion in Western R&D establishments after a thirty-year hiatus, are deployed in considerable numbers with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The latter deployment is consistent with the massive-fire principle of Soviet tactical warfare doctrine.

The combat power of each Soviet division is further strengthened with the deployment of the new BMP-60 armored personnel carrier. This vehicle is designed so that the troops it carries may engage enemy forces with small-arms fire without dismounting. It also carries a 76-mm low-pressure gun, which can be employed against prepared defenses (e.g., bunkers) if direct fire from tanks is not available. Moreover, a wire-guided antitank missile permits the BMP-60 to engage tanks in battle.

The value of the BMP-60 (and that of its counterpart for Soviet airborne divisions, the BMD) is enhanced by the deployment of the new T-72 tank (also known as the T-64 and M1970 in its R&D configuration). Equipped with a 122-mm smooth-bore gun, a laser range finder and fire-control computer, an automatic loader and an improved suspension system for better off-road performance, and manned by a three-man crew, the T-72 is now being deployed in significant numbers with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

(3) Reorientation of Soviet Frontal Aviation and Naval Forces

Evolutionary changes seen recently in Soviet frontal aviation have begun to have a major impact on the character of Soviet forces, particularly in Europe. The traditional Soviet emphasis has been on short-range, low-payload, highly maneuverable air-defense aircraft. Until the late 1960s, Soviet tactical aircraft based in East Germany could not operate outside of that country from their existing base structure. This situation has been changed significantly by the introduction of several new aircraft: the SU-17 (Fitter C), a variable-geometry modification of the obsolescent SU-7; the MiG-23 (Flogger); and the SU-19 (Fencer), the Soviets' most advanced tactical ground-attack aircraft (similar to the U.S. F-111). These aircraft (along with the Backfire bomber normally assigned to "long-range aviation" [*Dalniya Aviatsiya*] but employed in theater-level as well as intercontinental missions) have range-payload properties that enhance the Soviet ability to threaten

Western Europe without resort to nuclear-armed MRBMs and IRBMs already deployed. The shift in emphasis from air defense alone to air defense plus interdiction exposes important vulnerabilities in Western (particularly NATO) field air defense. The minimal ground-attack and interdiction threat posed by Soviet frontal aviation in the past made it possible for NATO to rely on fifteen- to twenty-year-old Nike-Hercules and Hawk air defense systems. Today, the penetration capability implied by new Soviet ground-attack aircraft makes air defense in Western Europe a far more serious problem.²³

The Kiev helicopter carrier reflects an emerging Soviet interest in multipurpose surface ships. Such a trend would imply fewer but larger ships with greater displacement (to permit more storage below decks), but if most ships were to have an antisubmarine as well as anti-surface ship role, this would enhance the Soviet sea-denial capability. The construction of large underway-replenishment ships may signify an intention on the part of the Soviets to increase the ability of their naval forces to remain on station for extended periods, rather than engage in hit-and-run tactics as they would now have to do.²⁴

(4) Miscellaneous Changes

There has been a substantial increase in Soviet electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. In recent years, many new EW facilities have been established which threaten the security of U.S. tactical communication and thus the success of U.S. and allied military operations. According to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "EW must be considered a weapon system and must be employed as a weapon."²⁵ This change reflects increasing Soviet sophistication with modern computers and electronic surveillance technology.

Soviet airlift potential has also been increased significantly, thus permitting rapid and inconspicuous troop movement. The new wide-bodied IL-86 has been shown in the Soviet Union and thus far is being deployed only in a civilian version; however, it may be easily modified for in-flight refueling and other military missions.

²³ See "The Soviet Air Forces: An Offensive Posture and Expanding Capability," *Air International*, June 1976, for a discussion of Soviet tactical airpower. For a thoughtful essay on the interaction between Western and Soviet tactical airpower doctrine, see Steven L. Canby, *Tactical Airpower in Europe: Airing the European View* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Technology Service Corp., July 19, 1976).

²⁴ General George S. Brown, *Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States for FY78*, January 20, 1977, p. 70.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

General-Purpose Forces and the Projection of Soviet Influence

Soviet general-purpose forces have undergone significant evolutionary changes over the past decade, and these changes have assumed serious military importance in the past two years as new manpower, equipment and shifts in the deployment of critical units affected virtually every Soviet division in Eastern Europe. The improvement in the Soviet GPF posture is noteworthy for its comprehensiveness — encompassing every element of Soviet theater-warfare capability. The greatest improvement has occurred in the European theater, long the centerpiece of Soviet diplomacy, but the capabilities being built in to the Soviet general-purpose forces imply a growing worldwide capacity to project influence through regional military preponderance.

THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS

by Donald G. Brennan

For at least the past decade, the Soviet government has been systematically increasing its military capabilities. There is no informed dispute about this point, although there is some debate on how the increasing Soviet military capability should be measured, how it compares with American capabilities, and how great a burden it places on the Soviet economy.

A careful discussion of the methodology and results from several perspectives has been given by Andrew Marshall, who estimates that "the resources devoted to defence activities in the Soviet Union are much more likely to account for 10 to 20 per cent of Soviet GNP than the 6 to 8 per cent indicated by past official analyses."¹ On the basis of a number of considerations, I am inclined to the view that the total defense burden on the Soviet economy is much more reasonably estimated as 20 per cent — if not more — than as 10 per cent. During the year preceding the writing of this paper, the Central Intelligence Agency has published two unclassified reports relating to the Soviet defense effort — one providing a dollar comparison of Soviet and American defense activities in the preceding decade,² the other giving an estimate of the Soviet defense burden as seen from the perspective of the Soviet economy.³ The latter report estimates the share of Soviet GNP devoted to defense as 11 to 13 per cent, which would be approximately twice the fraction of the American GNP devoted to

¹ Andrew W. Marshall, "Estimating Soviet Defence Spending," *Survival*, March-April 1976, p. 75.

² Central Intelligence Agency, *A Dollar Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1965-75*, CIA Report SR 76-10053, February 1976.

³ Central Intelligence Agency, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970-1975*, CIA Report SR 76-10121U, May 1976.

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defense, and this report notes that "at present, Soviet defense is absorbing almost 20 per cent of the output of Soviet industry. . . . It takes about one-third the output of the machine-building and metalworking sector — the sector that produces investment goods as well as military weapons and equipment." In addition, a rather detailed, unclassified comparison of Soviet and American military capabilities has been published in a congressional study.⁴

For the purpose of comparing the Soviet and American defense efforts, in some overall sense, a comparison in dollar terms is useful. The CIA dollar estimates for the Soviet Union are estimates of what the Soviet forces and programs would cost if developed, purchased and operated in the United States. For example, it can be estimated that a certain model of a Soviet tank would cost a certain amount of money in dollars if produced in quantity by, say, General Motors. Knowledge of how many tanks of this kind the Soviets have produced therefore leads to an estimate of the total dollar cost of that particular tank force; furthermore, if we know how many men are needed to operate and maintain that force, we can estimate accordingly the total cost of that particular tank force, including its manpower costs for operation and maintenance. By repeating this procedure for all the elements of the Soviet defense establishment, and adding up all the component costs as estimated in dollars, we can obtain an overall estimate of what it would cost the United States to maintain the Soviet defense establishment.


On the basis of this methodology, Soviet and American expenditures for the period 1965-1975 are compared in Figure 1. It should be noted that the comparisons are in terms of fixed 1974 dollars; hence, inflation is not a significant factor in the trends shown. The American costs shown in Figure 1 increase substantially from 1965 through 1968 and then taper off again through 1971 or 1972, reflecting our involvement in Vietnam and our added expenses for that intervention. I shall refer to the hump in our defense costs for that period as the "Vietnam bulge."

It is clear from Figure 1 that the Soviets have been steadily increasing their defense capability in real terms. Although one can argue about the total impact of the Soviet defense establishment on the Soviet economy, it is not possible to argue that the Soviet *trend* shown in Figure 1 is unreal. There has been a continued growth in the Soviet defense establishment of perhaps

⁴ *United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of Reference for Congress*, a study by the Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, January 1976.

THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SALT

FIGURE 1
U.S. EXPENDITURES AND ESTIMATED DOLLAR COSTS OF SOVIET
DEFENSE PROGRAMS*




* Dollar costs above the dark, horizontal line are for operational forces; those below the line are for RDT&E (research, development, test and evaluation).

4 or 5 per cent per year in real terms. Figure 1 likewise shows a growth (compared with the American effort) in Soviet expenditures for research, development, test and evaluation, or RDT&E. The total Soviet defense effort in 1975 (see Figure 1) is approximately 50 per cent greater than the American defense effort. Of course, this does not take into consideration such important characteristics as technological quality and effectiveness.

A true, overall net comparison of Soviet and American defense capabilities would of course not rely on such aggregate figures. Detailed comparison of Soviet and American forces would entail a detailed comparison of the various force components. One important component is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows Soviet and American active military manpower. The American manpower figure again shows the Vietnam bulge mentioned above. For Soviet manpower, there is no such bulge, but rather a steady upward trend similar to the defense budget trend. The Soviet manpower series includes military troops used as border guards and internal security troops, for which the American armed forces have no counterparts; however, the total Soviet edge in military

FIGURE 2
U.S. AND ESTIMATED SOVIET ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER*



* The manpower series for the USSR includes border guards, internal security troops and construction troops, for which the U.S. armed forces have no counterparts.

manpower is more than sufficient to offset such factors. For example, in the congressional study mentioned earlier, the *army* strength of the Soviet Union is given as 2.5 million men, while the American army strength is slightly under 800,000. Thus, the Soviet army alone has approximately three times as many men as does the American army.⁵

Several aggregated cost comparisons are illustrated in Figure 3 on the basis of dollar estimates of Soviet defense costs. One of these, identified as "Total Defense Cost," provides substantially the same information as that given in Figure 1, but with a slightly different look; the Vietnam bulge is equally visible in the "Total Defense Cost" graph, but it is "turned around" as a consequence of the method of presentation. The Vietnam bulge is also visible in the comparison curves for general-purpose forces, investment costs and operating costs. These are all drawn from the CIA report on dollar comparisons.⁶


It is especially instructive to note the graph in Figure 3 identified as "Intercontinental Attack." There is of course no Vietnam bulge associated with American intercontinental-attack forces — that is, long-range strategic nuclear forces such as the Polaris, Poseidon, Minuteman and B-52 systems. Over the past decade (see Figure 3), the Soviets have on the average outspent us in such forces by more than 50 per cent, and in the recent past (1975) the Soviets were spending twice as much on such forces as was the United States. This effort was devoted to, among other things, the development of several new Soviet ICBMs. The "Intercontinental Attack" graph is especially interesting for the purposes of this paper because these strategic forces were the ones most expected to

⁵ See fig. 8, *ibid.*, p. 25.

⁶ See fn. 2, above.

THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SALT

FIGURE 3
DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET PROGRAMS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF U.S. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES*



* Values are in 1974 dollars. Note that the scale for the "Strategic Defense" graph is significantly different from that of the other graphs in this figure. Department of Defense "total obligational authority" data have been adjusted for comparability with Soviet data.

be stabilized by the agreements signed in May 1972 at SALT I. It should be noted that the American expenditures on intercontinental-attack forces have been rather stable in recent years, and therefore the sharp increase in relative Soviet expenditures is in fact an in-

crease in absolute Soviet expenditures. This is in contrast to the curve of relative Soviet expenditures on strategic defense, where the sharp increase shown since 1971 results in part from a declining American budget for strategic-defense forces.

The published CIA reports did not include estimates on the Soviet civil defense effort. There is, however, no doubt that this effort is substantial and could dramatically reduce the consequences to the Soviets of a major nuclear war. Gouré has estimated⁷ that the Soviet civil defense budget is on the order of \$1 billion or more per year. The Soviets themselves have estimated⁸ that the losses in a large-scale nuclear war could be reduced to between 5 and 8 per cent of the *urban* population, which would be a total loss of some 10 to 20 million people, less than they lost in World War II. Many American studies indicate that the Soviet civil defense program could indeed prove to be highly effective. During the period when he was chief of intelligence for the U.S. Air Force, Major General George Keegan directed an important study of Soviet civil defense. He found that the Soviet effort was very much greater than had, until recently, been appreciated.⁹ T. K. Jones, of Boeing, has conducted studies recently on cheap and simple protection against nuclear attack for certain kinds of industrial capacity and has shown that application of these methods can make an important difference.¹⁰ While there is some controversy concerning the significance of the Soviet civil defense program — and determining the effectiveness of the program with precision would involve many factors, such as just how the war came about and how well the Soviets were able to put their programs into effect — there is no doubt that civil defense programs can be very effective indeed, and there is no doubt that the Soviets are very deeply engaged in a CD program.¹¹

There has never been a CD program in the United States even remotely comparable to that of the Soviet Union. The American civil defense program was funded at the level of \$83 million for

⁷ Leon Gouré, *War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense* (Washington: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976), esp. p. 76.

⁸ *Grazhdanskaya Oborona* [Civil Defense], Moscow, 1969.

⁹ See David Binder, "Air Force's Ex-Intelligence Chief Fears Soviet Has Military Edge," *New York Times*, January 3, 1977.

¹⁰ The Boeing Aerospace Company, *Industrial Survival and Recovery After Nuclear Attack*, a report to the Joint Committee on Defense Production of the U.S. Congress, Report D180-20236-1, November 18, 1976.

¹¹ See Deborah Shapley, "Soviet Civil Defense: Insiders Argue Whether Strategic Balance Is Shaken," *Science*, December 10, 1976, pp. 1141-1145.

FY 1977, and the (Rumsfeld) budget request for FY 1978 was \$91 million.¹²

Large-scale Soviet efforts in such areas as intercontinental-attack forces and civil defense would be less cause for concern if the Soviets viewed such forces as "unusable," as they are often seen in the West. But there is no question that the Soviets do not have such a view of strategic nuclear forces. Many Soviet spokesmen and writers have made this clear on many occasions; a single quotation serves to illustrate the general tone:

The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons lead war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy, and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically reactionary. . . . The description of the correlation between war and policy is fully valid for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Far from leading to a lessening of the role of policy in waging war, the tremendous might of the means of destruction leads to the raising of that role. After all, immeasurably more effective means of struggle are now at the direct disposal of state power.¹³

It should be noted that the journal from which this quotation was taken is an official government journal providing ideological guidance to the armed forces. It is in no way to be understood as the private expression of some (possibly isolated) personal view. Few, if any, Western spokesmen espouse such a view of large-scale nuclear war.


Of course, it is not only in specifically nuclear forces and capabilities that the Soviets have been increasing their efforts. Figure 4 illustrates the trends in four items of military equipment used by general-purpose forces.¹⁴ Note that Soviet tanks exceed ours by more than four to one, and their artillery inventories are almost three times as great as ours. In both cases, recent Soviet technology is as good as or better than that available in the West. It is no longer true that Soviet military technology is, across the board, inferior to that of the West. In the realm of artillery, for example, the Soviet 130-mm gun has almost twice the maximum range of our 155-mm gun. In tactical aircraft (see Figure 4), the

¹² See table 1, appendix A, in Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978*, January 17, 1977.

¹³ From *Communist of the Armed Forces*, November 1975; trans. in *Soviet World Outlook*, February 13, 1976, p. 7.

¹⁴ Adapted from Donald H. Rumsfeld, *FY 77 U.S. Defense Budget Perspectives*, March 8, 1976, p. 14.

FIGURE 4
CHANGES IN QUANTITIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT—U.S./USSR



Soviets have recently surpassed our inventories, but this is one area in which American technology is still believed to be distinctly and usefully superior. As shown in Figure 4, the United States still retains a substantial inventory advantage in helicopters; however, the Soviets are now building helicopters in quantity, and they are reported to be of very high quality.

The question is sometimes raised whether the Soviets are not engaging in this sustained and substantial arms build-up chiefly because of apprehension over China. Apart from the inherent implausibility of this notion (it is useful to bear in mind that the Chinese GNP is comparable to the Soviet defense budget), the Soviets have been putting the bulk of their improved capabilities into their forces deployed in eastern and central Europe and the western USSR. The forces deployed in European satellite states are, of course, greatly in excess of what is needed simply to maintain political control of the satellites.

The Soviets themselves have been very clear about the

fact that a major purpose of their military build-up has been to achieve increased political influence. Many Soviet writers have been quite frank about this, but perhaps the most official statement of this point was given not long ago by the Soviet foreign minister:

The predominance of the forces of peace and progress — a predominance which has now grown appreciably — gives them the opportunity to determine the channel followed by international politics.

.....
As a whole the activity of the Warsaw Pact organization exerts a great positive influence on the shaping of the situation not only in Europe but far beyond its borders.¹⁵

It should be noted, in virtue of both the source of this statement (Foreign Minister Gromyko) and the setting in which it appeared (the chief theoretical journal of the CPSU), that this is a coordinated policy statement of the Politburo; it could not possibly be merely an idiosyncratic view of the foreign minister speaking personally. Apart from such official statements, Soviet writers in recent years have discussed what they call the "correlation of forces" between East and West, by which they mean not only the relationship of military forces but also of such factors as the economies and political morale of the opposing blocs. These writers have observed that this "correlation of forces" increasingly favors the Soviet Union, giving Moscow more and more political influence outside the borders of the Soviet bloc. This is not to say that they have not suffered reverses, perhaps most notably in the Middle East, but there is no doubt that the morale of the Soviet leadership is high and growing, in large part because of their improving military situation.

In contrast, at least some important Western spokesmen clearly suffer from declining morale. The most important case of this syndrome is almost surely that of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Private remarks attributed to Kissinger by Elmo Zumwalt and others provide evidence of low morale, but Mr. Kissinger has disputed some of these accounts. It is possible, however, to find illustrations in contexts that have not been, indeed cannot be, disputed.

One of the two agreements on strategic arms limitations signed in Moscow in May 1972 was the Interim Offensive Force Agreement, which provided ceilings on ICBMs and SLBMs. These ceilings allowed substantially greater capabilities for the Soviets than for the United States. For instance, the Soviets were allowed

¹⁵ Andrei Gromyko, *Kommunist*, September 1975; trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, October 22, 1975, p. R16.

approximately 1,600 ICBMs (they never have told us how many they had), while the United States was allowed 1,054; and more than 300 of the Soviet ICBMs were very much larger than anything permitted the United States. The Soviets were allowed to build up to sixty-two missile-launching submarines (in which case they could not retain all 1,600 ICBMs), and the United States was allowed to build up to forty-five such submarines.

In the course of a press conference in Moscow (May 27) discussing the Interim Offensive Force Agreement, Mr. Kissinger (at that time the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, not yet secretary of state) was pressed by some of the journalists present as to why the United States had signed an agreement with the Soviets in which limitations within the agreement itself (i.e., without regard to forces or characteristics not mentioned in the agreement) unequivocally allowed the Soviets substantially greater capabilities than were allowed to the United States. Kissinger repeatedly justified the agreement by arguing to the effect that the Soviets were then engaged in a program of building up such forces while the United States was not, and that, without such an agreement, the Soviet margins would have been even greater. Hence, he argued, it was reasonable to allow the Soviets these added capabilities, because the United States would have been even worse off without the agreement.

According to the official White House transcript of the press conference, the accuracy of which has not been controverted, Mr. Kissinger said at one point:

Therefore, any time over the next five years we were confronting a numerical margin that was growing, and a margin, moreover, which we could do nothing to reverse in that five-year period. Therefore, the question of whether the freeze perpetuates a Soviet numerical superiority is beside the point.

The question is: What would this margin have been without the freeze? That is the justification for the margin. . . .

Basically, the Soviet submarines are frozen at the level they now have. Beyond that, however, *since they had an ongoing program of eight submarines a year*, they are permitted to trade in old missiles and old submarines for new submarines up to a total level of either 62 submarines or 950 missiles. [Emphasis added.]

The first point to be noted is the sentence in which Kissinger spoke of the growing Soviet margin of superiority as something "which we could do nothing to reverse in that five-year period" (i.e., of the interim agreement). This is, of course, simply untrue; there were many things the United States *could* have done within five years to

reverse that trend. What Kissinger perhaps had in mind was that the only American strategic-nuclear-weapon programs then in advanced development (the Trident missile-launching submarine and the B-1) were not scheduled for deployment within the five-year lifetime of the interim agreement. But surely the American production base and American technology would have been capable of producing many “quick fixes” to the strategic balance, *had the government chosen to do so*. Mr. Kissinger, in this phrase, is — perhaps inadvertently — confusing the resolve of the U.S. government of the time with U.S. capabilities.

Later in the passage quoted, Mr. Kissinger explained that the Soviets were permitted up to sixty-two submarines as a consequence of the momentum of the Soviet program — namely, that they had “an ongoing program of eight submarines a year.” One could not find a clearer illustration of the political impact of the Soviet military build-up. The president’s special assistant for national security affairs explained, on the record, that because of the scale of activity of the Soviet program, the United States felt obliged to concede to the Soviets the right to have more capability in the areas governed by the agreement than was allowed to the United States. Later in the press conference, Kissinger reinforced the point:

The United States was in a rather complex position to recommend a submarine deal since we were not building any and the Soviets were building eight or nine a year, which isn’t the most brilliant bargaining position I would recommend people to find themselves in. . . .

I do not deny that the initial reaction of some people will be to look at the gap in numbers. But once they understand the consideration I put before you, that is to say what the gap would be without this agreement . . . I believe that many of those who express some hesitation will come around.

At the time, the best justification for the interim agreement that could be found within the government was that it was only a temporary freeze and that, later, we could come back to work out a more equitable agreement. This perception, and the difficulty it encountered, were both described by the most widely respected American strategist who actually participated in the strategic arms limitation talks as one of our negotiators, Paul Nitze:

The SALT negotiations got under way in late 1969. As a participant in those talks from then until mid-1974, I have described elsewhere some of the difficulties that attended the U.S. side. . . .

After the May 1972 signing of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, it turned out that the two sides had quite different views as

to how the negotiating situation had been left. On the U.S. side, we told the Congress that the Interim Agreement was intended to be merely a short-term freeze on new missile-launcher starts, and that this, together with the ABM Treaty, should create favorable conditions for the prompt negotiation of a more complete and balanced long-term agreement on offensive strategic arms. . . . We thought such a replacement agreement should be based, as was the ABM Treaty, on the principles of equality in capabilities. . . .

However, the Soviet Union had a quite different view. Its negotiators held that in accepting the Interim Agreement we had conceded that the Soviet Union was entitled to an advantage for an indefinite time of some 40 percent in the number of missile launchers and something better than double the average effective size, or throw-weight, of their missiles over ours.¹⁶

The Soviet view mentioned by Nitze actually prevailed in later negotiations and was enshrined in the Vladivostok Accord signed by President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev in November 1974. This accord, which is supposed to govern any agreement subsequently negotiated at SALT II, continues the asymmetric ICBM sublimits of the Interim Offensive Force Agreement by providing that the first two articles of that agreement should be incorporated in the next agreement on offensive forces. As widely advertised, the Vladivostok guidelines provide an overall total ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles of 2,400 for each side, with a maximum of 1,320 missiles to be equipped with MIRV; however, the fact that the Soviets are, according to these articles, allowed up to approximately 1,600 ICBMs, while the United States may have no more than 1,054 (of which none may match the Soviet "heavy" ICBMs), has generally been swept under the rug. According to these Vladivostok guidelines, the Soviet Union is allowed any capabilities that would be allowed to the United States, but the reverse is not true.

While the military consequences of this asymmetry in allowed forces are unlikely to be great, I am inclined to the view that it is a fundamental political mistake to allow such an asymmetry. Among other things, it does not seem to me to be compatible with the amendment introduced by Senator Henry Jackson to the joint resolution approving the Interim Offensive Force Agreement. This amendment provided, in part, that "the Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, *inter alia*, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces

¹⁶ Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, pp. 217-218.

inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." It is surprising, and in some degree disappointing, that (at this writing) there appears to be little opposition within the American government to this aspect of the Vladivostok guidelines, not even within conservative military quarters. This fact seems to be part of a general decline of morale in elite circles, a decline that appears to be in no way related to prevailing attitudes of the American public in general. Such asymmetric sublimits favoring the Soviet Union would have been absolutely unthinkable in the U.S. government a mere decade ago.

What does all this mean for further negotiations in the strategic arms limitation talks? It appears to me that the Soviets have done much too well on their own in matching American military power — and, consequently, in eroding American political influence and enhancing their own. It is not necessary to reach an overall judgment on the question of whether or not the Soviets have already surpassed the United States, are now in the process of surpassing us, or will at some time in the near future surpass us. The nature of the trend is quite clear, and it must be halted if not actually reversed. This means, in particular, that the Soviets must be given no more asymmetric advantages in subsequent arms limitation agreements. For myself, I should judge even the ICBM sublimits of the Vladivostok Accord to be unacceptable; still less reasonable would be any further unilateral advantages the USSR might achieve through negotiations.

The United States has perhaps twice the GNP of the Soviet Union and significantly more advanced technology. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of our population unambiguously and strongly supports the American system of government. There is therefore utterly no reason why our political leaders should suffer from low morale in negotiating with the Soviets on arms limitations.

If the negotiations would result in genuinely reducing the likelihood of a war, or in reducing the scope and violence of a war should one occur, then one might argue that our incentive in pursuing the negotiations should outweigh "relatively minor" disadvantages that could accrue to us in our relations with the Soviets. However, it is abundantly clear that the Soviets themselves do not have any high incentive to pursue the negotiations from that perspective, and there is every evidence that they exploit these negotiations in order to improve their differential advantage relative to the United States. It is not at all difficult to see that this process, if

continued, is at least as likely to *increase* the likelihood of war as to reduce it. It follows that, in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war as well as that of maintaining American power and influence, we have good reason to ensure that American negotiating positions in the strategic arms limitation talks do not in any way shortchange American national security.

As one of the early American writers on nuclear arms control, I have long urged that the United States and the Soviet Union should exploit their common interest in preventing nuclear war, and limit to the maximum extent feasible the risk inherent in maintaining our enormous nuclear arsenals. However, it is becoming clearer every day that the Soviets are not playing the game from this perspective. It is therefore becoming increasingly clear to me that the United States must take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the Soviets are suitably motivated to participate constructively in the negotiations and to see that they do not, in the meantime, make potentially lethal misjudgments of the basic will and resolve held by the American body politic.

THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST*

by Fred A. Sondermann

I have chosen to examine the concept of the national interest because it has interested and baffled students of international relations for many years. Those of us who try to understand and teach about the realities of foreign policy and international relations have been variously attracted to, and puzzled, or even repelled by, the concept. But like the moth and the flame, few of us have managed to stay entirely away from it.

Many doubts and reservations attach to the concept and its use. For all of these, it deserves continuing examination. There is a continuing need to sharpen one's analytic tools and reformulate the concept in light of deeper understanding and changing conditions.¹ The term has clearly retained currency among practitioners of foreign policy. It continues to exercise a hold on attentive publics, here and elsewhere. This means that at the very least it is a datum, or a set of data, for the student of foreign policy and international relations. It may be more.

We shall proceed as follows: First, we will speak of the development of the concept of the national interest and the content attached to the phrase by various students of the subject. Second, we will present and discuss some of the criticisms of the concept that have been advanced. These criticisms deserve to be taken seriously, as they account for the relatively limited use now made of the concept in scholarly work. Third and finally, we will attempt to determine whether, in spite of the criticisms, the concept may still retain (or be given) utility—both to the men and women responsible for the conduct of their nations' foreign policies, and to those of us who attempt to understand that conduct and to share our understanding with others.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the National War College in August 1976.

¹ J. Martin Rochester, "The 'National Interest' in the Context of Contemporary World Politics: Shifting Conceptions and Perceptions," paper prepared for the National Security Education Seminar, Colorado College, July 1975, p. 1.

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II

It is difficult to know where and when it all began. The term "national interest" is of relatively recent vintage. It was and remains an effort to describe the underlying rationale for the behavior of states and statesmen in a threatening international environment. But the idea of separateness, of differentness from others, and the consequent idea of preserving and protecting one's values against others, goes back into antiquity. The word "interest" derives from the Latin, meaning "it concerns, it makes a difference to, it is important with reference to some person or thing."²

We have the example of the early Israelites' continuing efforts to assert and maintain their characteristics and their values. We know of the Greeks' devotion to their city-states — Pericles' Funeral Oration is a statement to which we still respond. We know of the Romans' pride in their empire and the status of their citizenship within it. These feelings, and the behaviors that followed from them, may have been confined to relatively small groups at the top; the popularization and democratization of foreign policy would come much later. But for those who formulated and executed their tribe's, their city's, their kingdom's, their empire's policy vis-a-vis the outside world, the idea, if not the term, was always there.

Charles Beard, whose book on national interest was written in the early 1930s, traced the evolution of the concept in the more modern period through several stages. In the first of these the relevant concept was the "dynastic" interest — the desire of each monarch to maintain and, if possible, extend his domain and his control over land and people. As more and more groups within the domain came to attach their specific interests to those of the monarch, the dynastic phase gave way to the concept of *raison d'état*, which became, in turn, intermingled with the idea of national honor. Beard argued that the idea of national honor was weakened as economic issues gained an ever greater share of attention. Honor and profit do not always go hand in hand, it seems. He suggested that "with the emergence of the national state system, the increase in influence of popular political control, and the great expansion of economic relations, the lines of [the] new formula — national interest — were being laid down."³ Links with the past remained strong, however. The characteristic

² Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

of unity associated with the dynastic phase remained; so did the element of "compelling absolutism," making national interest "no less sovereign and inexorable than the 'will of the prince' had been."⁴

To understand the impact of the concept of the national interest on a generation of scholars of foreign policy, a brief detour into intellectual history is appropriate. The interwar period was characterized by a high level of academic attention to, reliance upon, and value placed in the processes of international law, international organization and international trade. The hope was that reliance on these could reduce the harshness of "realpolitik" which had culminated in a disastrous world war. These hopes were disappointed, and in the post-World War II period a new school of thinkers and writers promoted a "realist" stance on issues of foreign policy and international politics. Charles Beard, having written on national interest in the early 1930s, had in a sense been outside the mainstream of scholarly thought at that time, a situation to which he was accustomed and which he seemed to relish. E.H. Carr weighed in at the end of the decade with his important book *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939*. By then, World War II was upon us, and it remained for writers like George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and above all Hans Morgenthau to make the postwar case for the relevance — indeed, the centrality — of the national interest as a focus around which the complex and diverse issues of foreign policy could be organized; as a concept by which the behaviors of states and their governments could be understood.

The crux of the concept, as advanced in the postwar years, was that in a world in which states are "the major units of political life, which command the supreme loyalty and affection of the great mass of individuals,"⁵ statesmen who are responsible for and to their separate publics, and who operate in an uncertain and threatening milieu, have little choice but to put the interests of their own entity above those of others or those of the international system. National interest, thus, became a synonym for national egoism. One could not rely on others, nor could one rely on international institutions and processes to protect one's key values. These values were thought to be national in scope. Their protection was the concern and responsibility of those who governed each separate entity. Osgood put it as follows: "National interest is under-

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 10.

stood to mean a state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nation. The motive of national egoism, which leads men to seek this end, is marked by the disposition to concern oneself with the welfare of one's own nation; it is self-love transferred to the national group."⁶

It must by now be clear that when we speak of national interest, we speak of values: values held by some, many, perhaps even all of the members of a given society. Whether it be some, many or all is a separate question that will be addressed in the next part of this paper. But the more immediate question is, How can these values be defined? Surely, not everything anyone desires is automatically transformed into an interest, let alone a national one. Hopes, wishes, aspirations and dreams are not the same as practical and concrete interests. They are not always, or even often, reflected in the policies of states and their governments.

The problem of definition, or more accurately of description, has been approached in two ways. Some observers have tried to define the national interest of a given state by looking at the state's actual policy output and, finding repetitive behavior patterns, have deduced from these what the national interest must have been. For instance, John Chase suggested four "aspects of the American national interest which . . . actually guided and motivated the development of our foreign policy": (1) to deprive potential aggressors of bases from which they might launch attacks against the United States; (2) to support self-government and democracy abroad; (3) to protect and advance commerce; and (4) to help establish and maintain a favorable world balance of power.⁷ Beard stressed the economic/commercial element in American statecraft throughout the Federalist-Whig-Republican succession.⁸ He attached the development and maintenance of a superior navy⁹ to this basic goal, and leaned heavily on the writings of Admiral Mahan, who expanded the reasons for needing a superior navy from mere defense of territory to "defense of our just national interests, whatever they be and wherever they are."¹⁰ Mahan included among those interests the defense of national territory, the extension of maritime commerce, acquisition of territorial positions that would contribute to command of the

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁷ John L. Chase, "Defining the National Interest of the United States," *Journal of Politics*, November 1956, pp. 720-724.

⁸ Beard, p. 95.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

¹⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 339.

seas ("when it can be done righteously"), maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, hegemony in the Caribbean, and active promotion of the China trade. Modern revisionist writers on American foreign policy could hardly express their case more clearly and succinctly.

Other scholars went at the task of defining the national interest in a different manner, basing their analysis on logical reasoning and induction; framing their conclusions in less tangible, more conceptual terms. Thus, Robert Osgood along with many others put national survival or self-preservation at the head of the list, because everything else would clearly depend on the achievement of this goal. He defined survival or self-preservation in terms of territorial integrity, political independence, and maintenance of fundamental governmental institutions.¹¹

Osgood proceeded to other categories of national interest: self-sufficiency, prestige, aggrandizement.¹² Beard, on his part, talked about territory and commerce as two of its fundamental aspects.¹³ George and Keohane, in a major recent effort to imbue the term with specific meaning, wrote about three "irreducible" national interests: physical survival — by which they meant the survival of people, not necessarily the preservation of territory or sovereignty; liberty — by which they meant the ability of inhabitants of a country to choose their form of government and to exercise a set of individual rights defined by law and protected by the state; and economic subsistence — the maximization of economic welfare.¹⁴

Finally, since he is clearly the contemporary scholar most closely connected with the concept of national interest, let us consider Hans Morgenthau's work. He defined the "survival of a political unit . . . in its identity" as the irreducible minimum of a state's interest vis-a-vis other units, encompassing in this the integrity of a state's territory, its political institutions, and its culture.¹⁵ He asserted that it had been the perennial national interest of the United States to remain the predominant power in the Western Hemisphere — leading it to support the European balance-of-power system whose breakdown alone could threaten our hegemony in the Americas. With respect to Asia, he stipulated that maintenance

¹¹ Osgood, p. 5.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

¹³ Beard, p. 26.

¹⁴ Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of National Interest: Uses and Limitations," in *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Appendices*, vol. 2, pp. 67-68.

¹⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," *The American Political Science Review*, December 1952, p. 973.

of the balance of power there had been the consistent ingredient of American statecraft, hence part of our perennial national interest.¹⁶

Although there are some variances in all of this, one detects a high degree of convergence of definitions and descriptions. Certain terms and ideas recur frequently. Most of them relate to tangible things—to concrete conditions or advantages, concretely experienced. But a few (culture, liberty, prestige) refer to intangibles—to how a society feels about itself, how it maintains and strengthens its morale, its elan.

III

Yet the picture is clouded. Difficulties and complexities have caused many analysts of the foreign policy process to turn away from the concept altogether, in spite of the fact that the term clearly remains a part of the rhetoric of foreign policy. Its use for analytic purposes has declined from the high point reached in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Some students of the subject suggest that it will not be used much in the future.

One way of explaining this state of affairs is to speculate that in the late 1940s and early 1950s the concept's function differed from the one for which scholars in the field now strive. The idea of the national interest was useful to Morgenthau and others in the then-current debate between "realists" and "idealists." In my judgment, this debate was won by the realists. But the victory was transient. The study of international relations, having conquered that particular piece of intellectual territory, proceeded in directions different from, and in fact somewhat irrelevant to, those staked out by the realists.

Of the many areas of doubt about, and criticisms of, the concept of the national interest, we present five as concisely as the subject matter permits.¹⁷

The first criticism is, simply, that the concept is too broad, too general, too vague, too all-inclusive to perform useful

¹⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions," *ibid.*, December 1950, pp. 834-835. With great intellectual assurance, Morgenthau compared scholars who had reservations about the balance-of-power concept to scientists who didn't believe in the law of gravity.

¹⁷ One area of criticism omitted is the moral/ethical one—not because it is unimportant, but because the debate is based on assumptions that would require a separate paper to do them full justice. In the final section of this article, we will briefly refer to some considerations pertaining to the moral/ethical dimension of the subject.

analytic functions, to serve as guideline for policymakers, as organizing concept for scholars, or as a criterion of judgment and evaluation for the citizen. Arnold Wolfers expressed this concern many years ago: "When political formulas such as 'national interest' . . . gain popularity, they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name."¹⁸

Others have said much the same thing. Thus, George and Keohane admitted that "in practice . . . national interest has become so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is problematical and controversial."¹⁹ Frankel referred to it as "a singularly vague" concept and noted that there was no entry under this heading in the Oxford dictionaries, the first edition of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, or the *Dictionary of Social Sciences*.²⁰

Morgenthau, of course, tried to give the concept a specific meaning — namely, that national interest could be ascertained as well as advanced by the possession of power. The difficulty with this formulation is that it merely pushes the analytic task back a step: now one has to determine what "power" means, what it consists of, and how it can be measured. This task, far from becoming easier, has become ever more complex.²¹

But what is true regarding power is also true of other formulations of the content and meaning of the national interest. Such terms as survival, self-preservation, independence, sovereignty — usually said to constitute the rock-bottom purposes of the foreign policies of states — will be found, upon closer inspection, to hide a host of ambiguities.

¹⁸ Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1952, p. 481.

¹⁹ George and Keohane, p. 64.

²⁰ Joseph Frankel, *National Interest* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 15. However, an essay by James Rosenau on the concept of the national interest appears in the more recent edition of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

²¹ Cf. James Rosenau, "National Interest," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1968), vol. 11, p. 35. See also Vernon Van Dyke, "Values and Interests," *The American Political Science Review*, September 1962, p. 573. Van Dyke quotes Morgenthau as admitting that "the goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue." (*Politics Among Nations*, 3rd ed. [New York: Knopf, 1960], p. 9.) The point may be accurate, but it is not very helpful in limiting and defining the issue.

In short, there is concern that the “great generality” of the phrase “national interest” obscures from the view of policy-makers, analysts and the public the fact that foreign policies are designed to achieve specific goals, often short-term in nature; and that the study of these specific goals is likely to provide a better basis for the understanding of a country’s political behavior in the external realm than reference to a general, vague, ambiguous term such as the national interest.

A second major problem is that of distinguishing between ends and means in foreign policy. The question the national interest concept is meant to answer relates to the ends, the goals, the purposes of foreign policy. This is an area of inquiry that, in my judgment, has not been satisfactorily addressed in the literature of international relations.²² It appears that, having tried to find the explanation for foreign policies in the external realm — in the behaviors and actions of other states — and having failed at this task, observers have more recently turned inward, and now seek to find that explanation mainly within the motivations and operations of domestic bureaucracies. One may be forgiven for doubting whether this approach, by itself, will provide the desired key to understanding.

In any case, on closer inspection ends tend to become means toward some other ends; and conversely means — because they are desired, because they are thought to be useful — tend to become, at least in the short run, ends. Van Dyke put it this way: “When we use the language of means and ends, we say that means can themselves be ends and that ends can be means.”²³ (Unfortunately, however, neither the distinction between, nor the merging of, the concepts is always as clear as it might be.)

This problem was obscured by Morgenthau’s formulation that stipulated power as the yardstick by which achievement of the national interest could be measured, thereby making power a goal of foreign policy behavior. But is it? Many would, no doubt, agree with George and Keohane, who suggested that “power is . . . only one subgoal of national interest, and an instrumental goal at that, rather than a fundamental value in and of itself.”²⁴ Furthermore, even if one could use power in the way Morgenthau

²² The best overall treatment of the subject is still the essay by Arnold Wolfers, “The Goals of Foreign Policy,” in *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 67-80.

²³ Van Dyke, p. 568.

²⁴ George and Keohane, p. 65.

intended to have it used, the issue would by no means be resolved, because in many ways power is as "elusive and ambiguous" a concept as is national interest itself.²⁵ How many efforts to specify the components of power, to weigh them accurately, to aggregate them suitably, and to utilize them appropriately have come even close to success?

To sum up this set of criticisms, let us consider two perspectives: that of the policymaker and that of the outside observer. Charles Burton Marshall spoke to the former perspective. Admitting that the concept of national interest had a certain value in weighing the requirements of foreign policy against the claims of a particular domestic interest, he proceeded to caution that "in instances in which the issue lies simply between different lines of action in the foreign field, I know of no case . . . in which the settlement of an issue of our national policy . . . would have been facilitated by injecting the question: Shall we or shall we not try to serve the national interest? . . . The question is not whether, but how, to serve [it]."²⁶

From the outside observer/analyst's perspective, the issue has two dimensions: (1) one has to construct hierarchies of interests, and (2) one has to understand—and then be able to act on that understanding—that "values and interests do not all fit on the same means-ends chain. Rather, different sorts of values belong on different chains, some of which are likely to intersect. Sometimes pursuit of values in one series may interfere with pursuit of values in another series, e.g., a government that seeks both higher scales of living and greater military power may have to make a choice, at least of emphasis."²⁷

Thirdly, any student or user of the concept of the national interest must face perplexing questions: Whose interests? How determined? By whom?

One can argue that the national interest is the culmination, the aggregation, of all the specific interests contained in the society. But this is a difficult argument to sustain or to act upon. A modern society, by definition, contains a multitude of interests—personal, ethnic, religious, racial, economic, regional, occupational/professional, ideological, to name some. It is one of the tasks of government to satisfy the largest possible number of

²⁵ Rosenau, p. 37.

²⁶ C. B. Marshall, "National Interests and National Responsibility," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1952, pp. 84-85.

²⁷ Van Dyke, p. 568.

these interests, or at least to keep dissatisfaction to a level low enough to avoid instability and upheaval. But it is also in the nature of politics that not every interest can be equally satisfied; some cannot be satisfied at all; and painful choices and tradeoffs are the order of the day. Some interests will gain while others lose — sometimes absolutely, always relatively — from any political act.

This is harsh doctrine, difficult to accept. It has become more difficult as the “revolution of rising expectations” we used to attribute to the developing countries has spread to the developed ones as well and has, in the words of Daniel Bell, led to a “revolution of rising entitlements.”²⁸ Each subgroup in a modern society, including governmental bureaucracies, seems to feel entitled to make claims for the satisfaction of its wants and desires, if need be at the expense of other subgroups.²⁹ Nor is this new. More than forty years ago, Beard put the case as clearly as anyone could:

The conception of national interest revealed in the state papers is an aggregation of particularities assembled like eggs in a basket. Markets for agricultural produce were in the national interest; markets for industrial commodities were in the national interest; naval bases, territorial acquisitions for commercial support, an enlarged consular and diplomatic service, an increased navy and merchant marine, and occasional wars were all in the national interest. These contentions were not proved; they were asserted as axioms, apparently regarded as so obvious as to call for no demonstration.³⁰

The problem is accentuated by the fact that the national interest is, according to George and Keohane, a “nonoperational” goal, meant to provide an overarching concept within which specific goals can be arranged. But there is always the danger that a specific goal might be excluded, and this encourages identification of parochial subgoals of groups, sections and agencies with the national interest — an identification that is likely to be spurious, but that cannot be easily refuted by the use of the concept itself. Schilling, in an early essay, spoke of “the ease with which the flag

²⁸ Daniel Bell, “The Revolution of Rising Entitlements,” *Fortune*, April 1975, p. 98 ff.

²⁹ The author can testify to the strength of these claims from his experience as a member of a city council. Each group, each section, each neighborhood looked after itself. It was relatively easy to achieve general agreement on such issues as the need for better thoroughfares or for social service agencies, as long as these were located in another part of the community. It was often difficult to perceive what the general interest was, or how many people cared enough about it to be willing to make some sacrifices for it. To serve the general interest, however defined, without injuring some individual or group was impossible.

³⁰ Beard, p. 167.

of 'the national interest' can be hoisted over what seem to be, in the final analysis, only personal preferences."³¹

Various subinterests are likely to be at cross-purposes with one another. Given a limited pie to be distributed, the claims of one group are apt to run counter to those of another; the aspirations of the military for additional appropriations, claimed to be in the national interest, run counter to the pleas of cities for additional resources for urban services, equally claimed to be in the national interest. How does one ascertain the truth of the matter? How does one determine priorities? The only possible answer is that it is done through acts of political choice, which are likely to be outside the realm of the national interest concept.

Within any society, including ours, some subinterests are less successfully represented in the policy process than are others. But let us assume, unrealistically, the best of all possible societies: one in which all interests have an equal opportunity to make themselves effectively heard; one in which there is a minimum (there can never be an absence) of conflict among various claims and expectations. We would still have to decide whether these various claims and expectations, these values and interests, could be aggregated, and if so, whether the aggregate could be said to represent the national interest. Both parts of this problem are extremely complex. Aggregation is particularly difficult because the depth and intensity of separate goals can never really be known. But the second question — whether such an aggregation, if it could be performed, would constitute something to be known as national interest — is more difficult still.

Is the national interest merely the aggregation of specific interests? Or, assuming that there is such a thing as a national interest, could it be larger than, perhaps even different from, such an aggregation? Is a "general will" à la Rousseau, or a "public philosophy" à la Lippmann something real, reflecting values that transcend the accumulation of specific interests? This is not an easy question to answer with confidence, especially within the framework of a society in which government is said to serve the citizens, rather than the other way around. But however one responds, the question is of surpassing importance.

The third subquestion is, Who specifies what the national interest is? Since that can be debated endlessly, let us be brief. After much agonizing, analyzing and debating; after bravely

³¹ Warner Schilling, "The Clarification of Ends, Or, Which Interest is the National?," *World Politics*, July 1956, pp. 567-568. See also George and Keohane, p. 69.

marching up the sides of hills only to march down the other side, the end result is that most of us, most of the time, accept the definition of the national interest provided by a nation's high officials and policymakers.

There is hardly an alternative to this practice. The term national interest is political in nature. Public disputes arise over its meaning in concrete situations. Policymakers have the penultimate word in such disputes; the ultimate word is spoken by the process by which those policymakers can be replaced if their judgments have been faulty. What seems less clear is whether those of us who try to understand or predict a nation's policy are entitled to build our structure of understanding and prediction on the words and acts of the policymakers, imbuing these with a sense of purpose and rationality that may not be justified. This brings us to the fourth major area of criticism of the national interest concept.

We all know how self-serving statements of policymakers are apt to be. We know that a given policy may lend itself to quite different interpretations of its basic purposes, and that much of foreign-policy-making is accidental, *ad hoc*, fortuitous. The incremental nature of decision-making is known to us. The input of bureaucracies, both in the early stages of decision-making and in the implementation of decisions made at higher levels, has been the subject of a large recent literature. Thus, while we may have no options but to accept the official definition of the national interest, or to infer interest from behavior, utmost caution is indicated in doing so. The case may well be that by holding on to the only thing we have we may go seriously astray.

For all its shortcomings, the best and perhaps the only available procedure may be to take the official definition and the policy output as the basis for our understanding. If one focuses on such official definitions, on the rhetoric that surrounds the policy output, he must make allowance for the fact that in such rhetoric the term national interest can easily serve to justify actions, hide mistakes, rationalize policies, disarm the opposition. Sometimes one suspects that it may be little more than a debater's point: if your side gets to use the term before the other side comes to it, you win the argument.

Compared to previous eras of statecraft, there is now a much greater need for policymakers to justify their choices to broader publics. In fact, a great deal of discussion in recent years has revolved around the idea of government officials' accountabil-

ity for their conduct in office. But as everyone knows, public justification is an invitation to the use of the rhetorical arts. And within the rhetorical arsenal, few concepts are more effective than that of the national interest. Some students of foreign policy have suggested that the same ingredients that make the term so difficult to use for analytic purposes make it easy, inviting, tempting to use in political discourse.³²

Of the concerns surrounding the concept of the national interest, we have spoken thus far of its ambiguity; of the complexity of defining ends and means in foreign policy; of the problem of aggregating special interests into a national interest; of the risk that national interest is retroactively read into public policies in the formulation of which it may have played no, or at best only a marginal, role; and of the problem of attempting to use a phrase so serviceable in public rhetoric as a concept in scholarly inquiry which is supposed to rise above debaters' ploys. There is one other issue.

Professor Rochester framed this final issue as follows: "The two-fold assumption which appears to be embedded in the concept of national interest is that (1) there exists an objectively determinable collective interest which all individual members within a given society share equally; and (2) *this collective interest transcends any interests that a particular subset of those individuals may share with individuals in other societies.*" The traditional critiques of the concept have focused on the first of these assumptions. But what about the second? Rochester argued that it "runs squarely up against what a number of observers believe to be major new forces in world politics."³³

Much has been written on the old versus the new, the "classical" vs. the "modernist" paradigms of international relations.³⁴ One has no wish to add to the volume of literature on this subject. Clearly, not everything has changed, not everything is different than it was before. But equally clearly, there have been changes, because there will always be changes in an environment of great variety and complexity. There are new actors, such as multinational corporations, functional organizations, terrorist groups. There are new goals of foreign policy that de-emphasize

³² Werner Levi, Review of Joseph Frankel, "National Interest," *The American Political Science Review*, September 1971, pp. 587-588. See also Rosenau, p. 34.

³³ Rochester, pp. 3 and 4. (Emphasis added.)

³⁴ Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly*, March 1974, pp. 41-70; Stanley Hoffmann, "Choices," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1973, pp. 3-42.

physical conquest and occupation, and stress instead economic and ideological influence. There are certain disintegrative trends within at least some societies, and some integrative trends within the international system. There are new developments in the means used to affect events in other countries. Power has become more diffused; new interdependencies have arisen, though not evenly across the board. There are new problems, new issue-areas to which some of the devices and categories of traditional statecraft are only marginally relevant: the protection of the environment, the allocation of dwindling resources; problems of food supply and of population increases.

Let us leave the relevance of the concept of national interest to such developments as a question, not presuming to be able to answer it fully. No one would suggest that the classical paradigm of international politics is no longer useful. All that is suggested is that the world is changing; that those of us who find ourselves in the midst of these changes are probably not clearly aware of them and cannot know their eventual outcome; and that in such a situation, a healthy skepticism is most suitable for the policymaker, the observer and the public alike: skepticism about the continuing validity of one's accustomed conceptual and operational equipment.

IV

After all of this, where do we go from here?

One alternative would be to give up on the concept of the national interest altogether; to consign it to the scrap heap of history where the divine right of kings now reposes. When a highly respected scholar such as Werner Levi can write of Joseph Frankel's serious effort to bring order and meaning to the concept that "the book . . . brings confusion into chaos" and that "those who look for clarification of the concept will not find it [here] — mostly because . . . it cannot be found anywhere";³⁵ when Professor Frankel himself, in an essay entitled "National Interest: A Vindication" calls the concept "sterile,"³⁶ one should be aware of the risk of proceeding much further.

Still, there is more to the issue than that. As Charles Burton Marshall, vigorous critic of the concept, said: "Nations do

³⁵ Levi, p. 588.

³⁶ Joseph Frankel, "National Interest: A Vindication," *International Journal*, Autumn 1969, p. 717 ff.

have interests. In some instances their interests coincide with the interests of other nations. Sometimes interests of different nations harmonize without coinciding. Sometimes they differ, but not incompatibly. Sometimes they are mutually exclusive. Out of these variations comes the real nature of international life."³⁷ If there is risk in proceeding, there is also risk in overlooking the basic point Marshall calls to our attention. On balance, this strikes me as the greater risk.

Policymakers will almost surely continue to use the concept in one of two ways. They are bound to continue it in their effort to justify and explain their policies. In all probability, they will also continue to use it as part of the perceptual equipment they bring to the task of structuring situations and making decisions. Thus, for the student of foreign policy to disregard it altogether would be inappropriate. One must admit—one cannot avoid—the fact that the concept is difficult, but so are all the other concepts with which we work.

For reasons already given, it appears inappropriate to take the policymaker's definition and accept it at face value, though research into such definitions may be quite important and revealing. Two of the tasks of the observer and the citizen are to judge the appropriateness of actions taken and the accuracy of explanations given for those actions. Neither can be performed well if one simply accepts the official explanation.

We search, then, for a tenable intermediate position between abandonment and blind acceptance. One cannot foretell where that search will come to rest, but one can offer some suggestions on how to proceed. These suggestions are based on the belief that general terms and concepts such as national interest—while imprecise and lacking in clarity—still do, or may, have meanings. They have meanings to those who make and execute policies, and they have meanings to those on whose behalf policies are being made and pursued.

If that is indeed the case, the uses of these terms are significant data for students of foreign policy. How can they address and use those data?

They can carefully examine memoirs, biographies of leading actors to ascertain their usage of the concept.

They can interview contemporary foreign policy actors, diplomatic and military, to determine whether these concepts have meanings to them; and if so, what those meanings are.

³⁷ Marshall, p. 84.

They can engage in and survey existing case studies of foreign-policy-making situations, both of the crisis and noncrisis kind, to ascertain whether, when and in what manner these concepts entered into the decisional process.³⁸

Moreover, they can engage in survey research of attentive (and other) publics to determine whether there is a structure to their images of, receptivity to, and use of these concepts; and if so, what these structures are.

They can try to be specific about whether, as Frankel said, the concept is used in "aspirational," "operational," or "explanatory/polemical" terms.³⁹

No one can predict what such research would reveal. But it is interesting that rather little of it has been done. Perhaps the community of foreign policy scholars has sensed accurately that the effort would not pay off. Perhaps the opportunity costs are too high. But perhaps, on the other hand, the scholarly community has prematurely arrived at conclusions not warranted by data that are (potentially) available.

In addition, as citizens, observers, participants in the process, all of us can insist on the "need for establishing a rational order among the values which make up the national interests, and among the resources . . . committed to them," realizing that no nation can ever achieve everything it would like to have. This was one of Morgenthau's considerable insights.⁴⁰ We might go further and attempt to set out some decision-rules, guidelines for the pursuit of policy; rules that are different when truly vital, irreducible interests are at stake than they are when the interests are of lesser salience. George and Keohane, in their recent work, made some suggestions along these lines. They proposed, for instance, that in the case of vital and irreducible interests, top decision-makers need to have a completely free hand, whereas in other situations there is time and need for inhibitions on their actions.⁴¹

V

Whatever our search for a more specific and adequate conceptualization of the national interest may reveal; and wherever that search may take us, it seems appropriate to suggest, in conclusion, that in the long run a system based solely on the self-centered pursuit of goals by its individual members can give

³⁸ The foregoing suggestions overlap with Rosenau's conclusions (p. 39).

³⁹ Frankel, *National Interest*, p. 31 ff.

⁴⁰ Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate' . . . ," pp. 976-977.

⁴¹ George and Keohane, p. 69.

no assurance of stability or safety, to say nothing of justice and equity, or of peace.

To make this point clearer, let us counterpose the two great events of the year 1776: the publication in Great Britain of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and the signing in Philadelphia of the American Declaration of Independence.

Smith held, among many other things not so well remembered, that if each individual were left free to pursue his own self-interests, in the long run — by the operation of an "invisible hand" — he would thereby contribute to the well-being of the entire community. The Declaration also stressed individual rights, including the right to pursue personal happiness. But it clearly sought the ultimate expression of those rights in an act of union, of contract, of "decent respect" for the opinions, judgments and (one can reasonably infer) interests of others.

Both sets of ideas have been influential in the history of the last two hundred years. Both have endured. But the second has worn rather better than the first. Men and women around the globe still believe in the principles of the Declaration, even when they are not being practiced. But how many really still believe in the "invisible hand" that encourages the untrammelled pursuit of self-interest? How many still believe that others, and the community at large, cannot be grievously injured by such pursuit? Some do, no doubt; but most of us feel that there must be limits, there must be restraints on the exercise of the pursuit. Most of us understand that some of us, pursuing purely our own interests, can do great damage to all of us; and that this damage must somehow be restrained and limited.

If this is true within a city, a state, a nation, then it must also be true within an international environment — especially one that has changed and continues to change. The requirements of the situation therefore argue for a possible redefinition of the national interest, one that explicitly takes account of the interests of others. Addressing themselves to the "intensity problem," Kendall and Carey in an important essay some years ago noted that stability is important to an entire community, especially to those of its members who — temporarily or otherwise — are in a majority. They concluded that it was inadvisable to force one's interests on others unless the issue at stake was absolutely vital. What this conclusion amounts to is a counsel to practice restraint, not only out of generosity or other appealing human traits, but as a

matter of enduring self-interest, albeit more broadly defined than is usually the case.⁴² It seems that a similar case can be made for those who operate within the international system.

Given the international context, given the continuing need to conduct foreign policy, to frame goals and to seek to achieve them, three qualities — modesty, restraint, and openness to change — should be cultivated by decision-makers, observers and citizens alike:

modesty in assuming that one can know what is best for others—indeed, sometimes what is best for oneself;

restraint in the assertion of one's own interests (personal, organizational, group or national) as against those of others. In fact, one might make a conscious effort to frame his interests and goals so as to include those of others as much as possible. Morgenthau, much more sophisticated than some of his followers were or than some of his critics gave him credit for being, said it well: “. . . the national interest of a nation . . . must be defined in terms compatible with [the interests of other nations].”⁴³ More recently, George and Keohane questioned the tendency to use the concept of national interest in only one context—which they call “self-regarding,” excluding “other-regarding” and “collective” interests. They point out that this limited usage may be appropriate in periods of great danger, but that such periods occur only rarely, and that “to argue *a priori* that self-regarding interests must always be given priority over other interests is not morally tenable.”⁴⁴

openness can mean two things: (1) a willingness to accept national self-interest as a fact without accepting it as a norm, which was Reinhold Niebuhr's position,⁴⁵ and (2) a willingness to entertain alternative forms of the national interest and national policy.

One should try not to close off alternatives, but to leave the future open. Given the world in which we find ourselves — and, let us face it, which we helped make — that may be the best we can do, until such time as others can do better.

⁴² Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, “The ‘Intensity’ Problem and Democratic Theory,” *The American Political Science Review*, March 1968, pp. 5-24.

⁴³ Morgenthau, “Another ‘Great Debate’ . . .,” p. 977.

⁴⁴ George and Keohane, p. 66.

⁴⁵ Robert C. Good, “The National Interest and Political Realism: Niebuhr's ‘Debate’ with Morgenthau and Kennan,” *Journal of Politics*, November 1960, pp. 598-599.

A PROGRAM FOR AMERICA: FREEDOM AND FOREIGN POLICY*

by William R. Kintner

In his inaugural address, President Carter stated: "Our nation can be strong abroad only if it is strong at home, and we know that the best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation." Six months earlier — in his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, on July 15, 1976 — Carter had called for "a more stable and more just world order." This is an admirable goal. To be sure, we are not now and never were in a position to impose our solutions on the world at large. Nevertheless, what we do or fail to do will still influence stability and justice in the world of the future. Moreover, in many specific cases we will find that our notions of stability and justice may be incompatible.

Two world wars have already been fought by the United States to preserve the American concept of liberty. Yet American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War has been constantly criticized for its negative direction: it is easy to know what we oppose but impossible to know what we advocate. In part, this charge is justified. We all know that the United States opposes "selective" detente, higher oil prices, nuclear proliferation, the use of force to settle disputes in Africa and the Middle East, Castro's export of revolution in the Caribbean, and Soviet restrictions against Jewish emigration. In recent years, moreover, perhaps because of the Vietnam tribulation and domestic dissatisfaction, we have tended to downplay our long-cherished vision of freedom. We have focused primarily on what we are against. The negative list is a long one, and this negativism must be counterbalanced by a positive vision worthy of world emulation. Lacking such a vision, we appear to be merely a status quo power — willing to fight for

* This article will comprise the first chapter of a book, *Beyond Detente*, by William R. Kintner.

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what we have or want, but opposed to the legitimate demands of others.

Our position has been confused, also, because for strategic reasons we have sometimes supported authoritarian regimes of the Right, such as Franco's, as well as some of the Left, such as Tito's. In today's perverse world, however, support of repressive leftist authoritarian regimes is offensive. Rightist regimes that suppress human rights, such as South Korea's, are pilloried, whereas greater repression and even mass murder in one-party collectivist countries such as Cambodia or Vietnam are rarely criticized.

In a world where the democratic approach toward ensuring individual choice appears to be declining, the United States should promote freedom and diversity. The comity of nations is still divided between those that see individual liberty and civil rights as the key to a more humane society and those that deny these rights in the name of some higher, preordained social organization. Paradoxically, such Marxist-Leninist states as the Soviet Union feel compelled to declare themselves "People's Democracies," even though the people are not able to change the leading role of the Communist Party or the control of the state.

The history of the United States' involvement in the world has been one of promoting freedom and independence, both within and between nations. The dual form of autonomy, for the nation and the individual, has not been easily pursued, and the United States has been manifestly more successful in promoting the independence of nations, often to the detriment of the American national interest narrowly defined. In the long run, however, this two-pronged quest has proven its worth, and is deserving of continued support. The emerging dilemma for American foreign policy is the difficulty of implementing the abstract principles of individual liberty around the world, particularly at a time when it would be far easier to let those principles be subordinated to power calculations.

In a quest for policy resting on principle we must return to our origins — the transcendent claim of the Declaration of Independence that legitimate government must rest upon the consent of the governed. With Madison, we must commend the essence of our kind of government to "the esteem and adoption of mankind" (Federalist Paper 10). The goal of human freedom can offer universal appeal for a world locked in conflict, a world in which most people live under varying degrees of despotism. In short, we need to reassert freedom as well as peace with justice as

the guiding principles of our foreign policy. Our task will be to relate practical programs for the immensely varied countries of the world to the underlying philosophy of democratic freedom. In doing so, we shall confront serious obstacles in many countries around the globe — some arising from their domestic difficulties, others from American ambivalence toward international relations. The most important obstacles appear to be the following:

(1) The Soviet Union, the most powerful opponent of human rights and political freedom as we conceive them, is also promoting a new world order, albeit one largely made in Moscow and imposed by the political influence issuing from Soviet military power, rather than one created by consent of individual countries and peoples.

(2) Soviet aspirations have been reinforced by the coming to power in many countries of leaders who reject democratic procedures. Politically, the Soviet Union has benefited from the widespread anti-Western and anti-American bias that has come to characterize much of the Third World, particularly in Africa and Latin America. (The eighty-six nations attending the 1976 nonalignment conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, passed thirty-six resolutions, almost all critical of the United States.)

(3) In the past, the ideals of the American Revolution inspired the extension of freedom and democracy in Europe as well as the colonial liberation movement throughout the world. But in the present era the Western democratic model has frequently failed to meet the social and economic needs of the developing nations. The American concept of individual liberty and free-market economy seems to be out of reach for most Third World nations. To them, some form of authoritarian polity and planned economy seems more relevant.

(4) The perennial theme among Western intellectuals — the decline of the West — has been accompanied by fear for the survival of individual freedom and democracy itself. The proliferation of technology, increased governmental intervention in many spheres of social activity, and the spread of egalitarian ideologies are undoubtedly modifying the scope and nature of liberty. Certainly, if we examine the democratic prospect from an international perspective, there is considerable cause for worry. According to one survey of political institutions, "Human rights rooted in a legal order of free institutions hardly exist at present for almost four-fifths of the people of the world. The most painful fact is the

growing number of Marxist regimes, now more than two dozen strong."¹

(5) Democracies in general have a well-known record of apathy with respect to foreign relations. Once roused to crusading pitch, however, public opinion is difficult to control. The politics of democracy, the advocacy of freedom abroad, and the pragmatic requirements of foreign policy have proved to be a volatile combination for the United States. The Wilson experiment, the isolationist strain, and such misfortunes as McCarthyism and the Vietnam war have all been imbalances that eventually disfigured and discredited American foreign policy.²

The First Step: Confidence and Clarity of Vision

The frontiers of freedom contracted and expanded during the Nazi challenge and there is no reason why they cannot advance once again. The idea of freedom has universal appeal; no one enjoys arbitrary control over his life by another. But unless those societies that enjoy freedom are confident of its value, and are willing to defend it, no one else will do so. The first step is therefore a renewal of confidence, particularly in the United States.

Despite redoubtable problems, the United States still offers the broadest scope for individual liberty of any nation in the world. And our example should not be lightly dismissed. It is the view of one French observer that "the revolution of the twentieth century will take place in the United States. It is only there that it can happen. And it has already begun. Whether or not that revolution spreads to the rest of the world depends on whether or not it succeeds first in America."³

The essence of the American Revolution is freedom via an effective democratic process. Democratic concepts can revitalize our diplomacy only if we first understand that "what is necessary . . . is one thing and one thing only — that the issue of democracy be made precise and clear."⁴

James Bryce described the essence of democracy: "Rule belongs to the majority, as no other method has been found for

¹ Theodore A. Sumberg, "An 'Aggressive' Détente," *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1977, p. 29.

² Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960) provides a classic statement of this problem.

³ Jean-François Revel, *Without Marx or Jesus: The New American Revolution Has Begun* (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 1.

⁴ Archibald MacLeish, *The American Cause* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941), p. 28.

determining peaceably and legally what is to be deemed the will of a community which is not unanimous.”⁵

Governments chosen through the democratic process can take many forms, and the form of government that best fits the needs of one nation may not be best for another. What is desirable for a people at one stage of their development may not be appropriate at another.

Communist leaders talk of “positive rights” — for example, the rights to food, education, health care and recreation — and argue that these should have priority over majority rule. Paradoxically, however, countries that place political freedom first among their priorities frequently provide more “positive rights” and economic benefits than do those that postulate egalitarianism as a precondition of political freedom.

What we stand for as a nation is the maximum political freedom possible, obtained through a democratic process which periodically selects and changes government leadership, and which holds that leadership accountable to the law. Such political freedom allows every person to develop in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience — within the framework of law. These political concepts embedded in our basic political documents may have universal appeal, but can they also provide conceptual rules for the conduct of our diplomacy?

Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

It has been said that “Americans must learn the inescapable need to relate our moral aims — which of necessity are stated in universal terms — to the imperative choices imposed upon us by competing goals and finite resources.”⁶ To relate our moral principles to our concept of the national interest requires an explicit statement of what we seek in the world — a statement that the American people can agree on.

On the one hand, we are told that the goal of U.S. policy is to maintain maximum U.S. influence in every country in order to disseminate stability and prosperity. From that perspective, we naturally focus on Europe and Northeast Asia. On the other hand, we are advised to preserve the territorial nation as it currently exists — that anything beyond this would be “overextension.” The Western

⁵ James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York: Macmillan, 1921) vol. 1, p. 20.

⁶ Henry A. Kissinger, “America and the World: Principle and Pragmatism,” *Time*, December 27, 1976, p. 43.

Hemisphere is frequently considered by the United States as a natural concern of this minimal area of national interest.

In a world of interdependence, can the United States express its national interests solely in geographic terms? In Angola we experienced our inability to cope with adverse developments in a continent we had placed low on our scale of national interests. Even if we do not intervene in southern Africa, for example, can we escape the consequences of what might happen there? Throughout the remainder of this century, the United States will likely remain a global power with geopolitical interests around the world. Which of these interests it will choose to protect, and by what means, is the question.

Purely geopolitical security frames of reference need to be broadened by associating them with a moral dimension. The almost one hundred fifty nations comprising the international system differ greatly in size, population, power, influence and in the degree of freedom their citizens enjoy. By tailoring our policies so that the defense of freedom and the safeguarding of security interests reinforce each other we may be able to reconcile our moral aspirations with the tough realities of the present international disorder. There are two freedoms to consider: one within nations and the other between them. The United States has always championed the latter — the self-determination of peoples. It has defended the right of a nation to exist despite the form of its government. For this reason we support the Republic of Korea even though we disapprove of some of President Park's internal policies.

It was easier for U.S. public officials to support the independence of Thailand against externally supported insurgency when Thailand was aspiring to be a constitutional democracy than since the return of Thailand to military rule. Yet an independent Thailand can retain the option of a restoration of democracy, whereas the triumph of an insurgency supported by Hanoi would close that option. If the United States seeks to establish diplomatic ties with Vietnam, it should first insist that Hanoi terminate support for the insurgency in Northeast Thailand. Such a policy would help to maintain Thailand's independence and preserve the option of developing greater internal freedom. It would also help to safeguard the other noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia. The independence of these countries would be in the security interests of Japan, Australia and the United States. This example suggests that the United States pursue a policy with greater weight given to our moral purposes, both in focus and in substance.

How to apply the basic principles of a foreign policy based on freedom will not be easy. For example, the question of nuclear weapons control and the policy of their first use is a thorny one. The practical application of our rejection of apartheid to our relations with South Africa is another. The moral implications of U.S. weapons sales to foreign countries need to be examined. The circumstances under which the United States should contemplate the use of force in support of its foreign policy merits rethinking. Expedient policies are far easier to devise than those based on the support of freedom. In view of the revulsion against nuclear war a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons seems sound and logical, yet such a policy might jeopardize the defense of freedom. We need to ask if it is moralistic to talk about majority rule in Africa when most countries there are run by military dictators or one-party rulers. Because we oppose apartheid, should we break off diplomatic relations with South Africa? How we might deal with the issues on the global agenda will not be easily resolved. Obviously, the task of defending and expanding the sphere of freedom will differ among our democratic allies, in our relations with the countries of the Third World and toward our ideological adversaries.

The First Circle

The closest circle of our relationship should be with fellow democracies, where most basic freedom exists. Though in the minority, these peoples possess far more power and influence than their numbers might suggest. Most free people live in the most economically advanced countries of the world. Many belong to the "Trilateral" group, many to the OECD; most are located in Western Europe, but the reach is to Israel, Japan, the South Pacific (Australia and New Zealand) and the Western Hemisphere (Canada, the United States, Costa Rica and Mexico, for example). The central task of U.S. diplomacy should be to generate the most effective diplomatic, economic and security cooperation among these democratic nations — the first tier among the world's states. Among other issues, these nations need common policies on energy, North-South relations, terrorism, the international monetary system and human rights.

Claimants for a New Order

Perhaps the most dismaying development in the past few years has to do with what some have called the "hostile majority."

While U.S. relations with allies and select adversaries have improved, the rest of mankind — the so-called Third World — seems to have exploded with hostility toward the United States' institutions, political philosophy and economic system. The demand for a "new international economic order," rigged according to state-controlled price formulas, has been accompanied by a crescendo of anti-Western campaigns, most notably at the UN.

Some observers, such as former Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, assigned part of the problem to insufficient advocacy. The United States, he argued, should undertake vigorous opposition to all ideas hostile to freedom and democracy. Moynihan's analysis drew upon his conviction, based on previous experience as ambassador to India, that a misguided Fabian socialism had retarded the development process; this in turn led to a rejection of parliamentary democracy, rather than to change in economic programs.⁷

Zbigniew Brzezinski, however, has cautioned against making the contest a simple one of liberal democracy versus despotism, lest U.S.-Third World relations be aggravated further:

In that context, for Americans to inject into American external relations the ideological claim that the contemporary world struggle is between liberal democracy and various forms of despotic statism is to provide a counterproductive economic reinforcement to the already noted political-philosophical tendencies toward America's global isolation.⁸

If we are to unite vigorous advocacy of freedom and pragmatic diplomacy toward the less developed countries, we should not allow ourselves to become bogged down in economic arguments, on the one hand, or assume that the rest of the world is hostile to our democracy, on the other. In the words of Sidney Hook:

The issue is not between capitalism and socialism. The issue is whether human beings are to be free to choose for themselves the economic system under which they wish to live or whether this is to be imposed upon them forcibly by a small group of self-selected rulers responsible to no one but themselves.⁹

Eventually we may persuade the troubled peoples of the Third World that their search for well-being may be aided more by freedom than by coercion. Their leaders face grave economic and political difficulties. Incapable of leading, they can only rule by

⁷ See Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," *Commentary*, March 1975.

⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1976, p. 76.

⁹ "New America," *Encounter*, January 1977, p. 50.

fiat. The basic problem, of course, is how the developing countries can have their people participate in the governing process in a way that stays clear of political chaos or slower progress in meeting their economic needs. For many countries in Asia and Africa, Western-style parliamentary democracy is not the answer. The record for this form of government has been poor in the arc of Asia stretching from Korea to Iran as well as in most of Africa and Latin America. There are no easy answers as to what type of democratic system works best, but there is a pressing need in all these countries to find adequate means for popular political participation in the not-too-distant future. A statement issued by the opposition Janata Party in India made this point effectively:

History is replete with instances where those who conspire against the rights of the people attempt to undermine freedom by portraying it as a luxury. They conceal the fact that fundamental freedoms are weapons that the poor need to fight tyranny. Bread cannot be juxtaposed against liberty. The two are inseparable.¹⁰

The Third World, with all its diversity, is the most active area of competition between the industrialized democracies and the "Marxist-Leninist" states. We should be responsive to the nations of the Third World, primarily in political and economic ways, if they ask our assistance in dealing with their problems. When a genuine democracy is endangered by an outside power we should consider intervention.

Nor should we be so naive as to ignore the internal political realities of besieged allies. The human rights standard is often used to mask attacks on anticommunist allies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Greece (under the colonels), Brazil and post-Allende Chile: "Their citizens do not enjoy the rights we enjoy. Equally true, they have far more freedom than [do] their Communist adversaries."¹¹ We are urged to tell countries with which we may have some linkage (for instance, South Korea or the Philippines) to mend their domestic ways if they wish our continued security support. This would run counter to one of the characteristics of the nation-state system — that each nation is sovereign within its own domain. For the United States to insist that it has the right to force its allies to toe the line would obviously be to interfere in their internal affairs. This does not imply, however, that we should condone violations of human rights anywhere.

An extraordinary feature of U.S.-Third World relations is

¹⁰ Quoted in *New York Times*, February 11, 1977.

¹¹ Ernest W. Lefever, "The Rights Standard," *New York Times*, January 25, 1977.

that while many Third World leaders chide the United States, most of the citizens they govern envy us. The United States is still the mecca of hope and freedom for millions of people throughout the world. The vast flow of immigrants to our country, legal and illegal, attests to the attraction of American life. Moreover, the United States is the educational center for students from all over the world.¹² We face an envious world, not a hostile one. As President Carter expressed it in his first address to the nation, "Peoples more numerous and more politically aware are craving and now demanding their place in the sun — not just for the benefit of their own physical condition, but for basic human rights." We should encourage them to adopt a democratic system compatible with their own cultures, and should respond with positive incentives to any steps they may take toward democracy. We should recognize that each nation should choose its own government and that some form of circumscribed democracy may be appropriate at a particular stage of development. In any circumscribed democracy, however, what must remain is the diversity of opinion and institutions that will provide the basis for the eventual flowering of freedom and democratic rights. Perfect tyranny, too easily created, produces a barren earth in which freedoms will never grow.

Dealing with Adversaries

The need for cooperation with adversaries on many global issues should be obvious. The spread of modern technology is generating problems of resource scarcity and environmental pollution for all nations, regardless of ideology. Instead of the progress that seemed so sure in the first Industrial Revolution, the major industrial societies seem to be facing diminishing resources, impure water and foul air, toxic effects from chemical fertilizers and insecticides, the possibility of major famines, dwindling ocean fisheries, chronic unemployment, persistent inflation, unstable currencies, sprawling urban problems, and a widening "rich nation-poor nation" gap. These symptoms of a fundamental dysfunction in the world system require *systemic* change if they are to be managed satisfactorily. The extent of that change is not yet clear, but one element has emerged. Basically, all states — but especially the more powerful ones — must recognize that none of the important problems confronting mankind can be solved unilaterally. Neither can

¹² "It is noteworthy that despite much global criticism of U.S. policies, the attraction of the United States for foreign students has continued to grow." (Brzezinski, p. 91.)

these problems be solved on the basis of a divisive ideological doctrine that ignores human rights.

Instead of an almost undifferentiated "containment" policy against all Marxist-Leninist regimes, American foreign policy perceives the great variety that exists among communist parties — in ideological commitment, in their ties to Moscow, and in the severity of their internal coercion when in power. The Soviet Union is by far the most powerful of the Marxist-Leninist states, but is less developed economically than are some countries in Eastern Europe. The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, is notable for what Edward Luttwak called "its unique, almost pure totalitarianism." Clearly, the variety in Marxist totalitarianism now requires a range of relationships characterized by varying degrees of cooperation or antagonism, rather than an inflexible containment policy. In short, we should use the fragmentation of Marxism-Leninism into nationalistic factions as a means of eliminating ideological commitment to it as a global moral system.

At the same time, we should understand that the most significant obstacle to the achievement of our goals remains the Soviet Union. If Moscow genuinely wishes to enter into the kind of long-term international cooperation that mankind so desperately needs, it will have to change its policy to something far more benign than the present version of "peaceful coexistence." Among other things, this would require some reordering of priorities away from the steady increase in military spending that has characterized Soviet budget allocations for the past fifteen years. Because of the closed nature of the system, Soviet intentions can be inferred only from Soviet behavior. Many Western statesmen find that behavior menacing in the strategic arena, opportunistic in the Third World, hegemonic in Eastern Europe, and divisive with respect to relations between the United States and Western Europe. It may be argued that these are misconceptions, but to the extent that they are, this is due in no small part to the contradictions between Moscow's declared peaceful intentions and the pace of Soviet arms acquisitions.

Struggle and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union need not result in war or in an irreversible shift in the global balance of power to Moscow's advantage. As the late President John F. Kennedy remarked in his speech at American University on June 19, 1963:

World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor: it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement.

And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever.¹³

When dealing with our powerful adversary, we should recognize that the minimal operational meaning of detente for the Soviets is a presumed and natural mutual desire to avoid nuclear war. We should also recognize that we and the Soviets remain competitors, politically, militarily and ideologically. The communists have never intended that detente should end the ideological struggle. As Brezhnev put it:

Détente and peaceful coexistence refer to interstate relations. This means mainly that disputes and conflicts between countries are not to be settled by war, by the use or threat of force. The détente does not in the slightest abolish, and cannot abolish or alter, the laws of the class struggle. . . . We make no secret of the fact that we see détente as the way to create *more favorable conditions for peaceful Socialist and Communist construction*.¹⁴

Brezhnev has also asserted that "the cause of freedom and progress is unconquerable."¹⁵ Obviously his idea of freedom is not ours.

Let the United States advance on the imperative of its own definition of freedom as linked to democracy. Our support of freedom for the individual need not bring back the acrimony of the Cold War any more than the Soviet denial of freedom will, by itself, do so. Each side knows the other's ideological position. Each can expose what it believes to be the fundamental errors of the other without demanding an immediate overthrow or elimination of the opposing system. Each should tolerate, even seek, a peaceful competition of systems. Eventually, the individual citizens of the world's nations may be able to choose the degree of freedom or governmental authority they want. We should be confident that competition under such rules will ultimately favor the Western democracies over the "Marxist-Leninist" regimes.

What Can Be Done?

President Carter, in his inaugural address, proclaimed a foreign policy dedicated to widening the frontiers of freedom: "The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peace-

¹³ Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1963, p. 3.

¹⁴ Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Report to the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, February 24, 1976.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

ful world that is truly humane." The task of translating this statement of purpose into national policy and into specific programs of action will be a difficult one. Nevertheless, several initiatives commend themselves as both readily available and effective.

The global revolution that has taken place in all forms of communications offers an ideal instrument with which to promote the expansion of freedom. The possibility of reaching the minds of people everywhere via the electronic media either exists or can be developed. The communist regimes have long used their monopoly of communications and information to indoctrinate their populations. They have sought to insulate the populations they control from the influence of alien ideas. Many Third World countries are attempting to follow the Soviet model, and efforts are under way in many of these nations to ensure government control of the flow of news within and between countries. Vidya Charan Shukla, the Indian information minister, addressing the New Delhi nonaligned conference, gave this rationale:

The theme of "free" flow of information, which was chanted in a chorus, was aimed to enable all countries in name but only the powerful countries in reality, to pump their information into all regions of the world without let or hindrance. . . . In fact, the idea of a "free" flow of information fits insidiously into the package of other kinds of "freedom" still championed by the adherents of 19th-century liberalism.¹⁶

Symbolic of the struggle between free and authoritarian societies will be whether a pluralistic global communications system, involving media, entertainment, cultural exchanges and international travel, can be sustained.

As the acknowledged leader of the industrialized democratic societies, the United States has a responsibility to assure freedom of information to the countries of the Third World. America should take the lead to block an effort, masterminded by the Soviet Union and some Third World countries, to obstruct the flow of global information via UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). UNESCO was created as a nonpolitical organization dedicated to furthering international cooperation in its areas of interest. But a concerted effort has been made by the Soviet Union and its Third World associates to trans-

¹⁶ Quoted in Leonard R. Sussman, "A Fateful Year for the News Media," *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1977, p. 4.

form it into a political agency, a vehicle for restricting the free flow of information.

It is time for the United States to join the battle against suppressing the flow of news in the crucial UNESCO forum. Imbalances in the flow of information between Third World countries and the industrialized world do exist, but these should not be corrected by applying further controls. Open communication of ideas is the lifeblood of freedom.

Another initiative needs to be taken in the context of East-West relations. The nature of man and the nature of society are at the root of the conflict between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. In 1950, President Truman approved NSC 68, the United States' first major philosophical and strategic analysis of continuing conflict between Soviet totalitarianism and the free democracies. In discussing the two systems, the document stated:

The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.¹⁷

An underlying assumption of NSC 68 — which has influenced American policy ever since its publication — is that the conflict between free and totalitarian societies will continue until the characteristics of a free society begin to emerge within the Soviet system. (Conversely, the conflict could end if free societies lacked the will or the power to defend their freedom.) The denouement may not come for many more years. A beneficial outcome will never arrive unless the Western democracies, particularly the United States, have the will and stamina to protect themselves while continuing to proclaim liberty throughout the world. Through spreading the revelations of the Alexander Solzhenitsyns and Vladimir Bukofskys concerning life in the Soviet police-state, we can bring home to the American people that the freedom they too often take for granted is priceless and easily lost. This in turn will induce them to support what needs to be done to assure protection for the existing frontiers of freedom. In fact, one of the harmful by-products of President Nixon's premature declaration of "a generation of peace" some years ago was the false sense of euphoria it evoked, which

¹⁷ *A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary: On U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security*, April 14, 1950. (Declassified February 27, 1975, by Henry A. Kissinger.)

made it more difficult to maintain the redoubts necessary to secure freedom's frontiers.

Open moral support of freedom in the USSR and elsewhere will also help us in our diplomatic dealings with the array of dictatorial regimes now flourishing in the Third World. Since 1960, the increase of Marxist-Leninist governments has been phenomenal.¹⁸ Many of these governments have come into existence through active Soviet support. This increase, together with the concomitant growth of Soviet power, has made it appear that totalitarian tyranny and not freedom is the wave of the future. By exposing the human implications of totalitarian tyranny at the center of the emerging Soviet international system, we can raise doubts about the validity of the Marxist-Leninist program for fulfilling human needs and aspirations.

At the July 1977 meeting in Belgrade, where "progress" in implementing the 1975 Helsinki accords is to be reviewed, the United States will have an excellent opportunity to speak up for human rights in the framework of Basket 3, which calls for greater freedom of travel and of contact and exchange between East and West. The thirty-five signatories to the Helsinki accords, including Brezhnev, pledged their governments "to assist in the improvement of distribution within their territory of newspapers, publications, periodicals and non-periodicals originating from other participant countries." Nonetheless, evidence is mounting that the Soviets and their East European client-states clamped down on individual freedom more after the Helsinki meeting than before.

The United States has faithfully lived up to the 1948 UN Human Rights Declaration, which eloquently asserted the inviolable conditions of humane societies:

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. . . . Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. . . . All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. . . . No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.¹⁹

We thus have the credentials to take the lead in assembling and auditing a public record of the state of human rights and the free flow of information in the thirty-five nations that signed the Hel-

¹⁸ W. Scott Thompson, "Toward a Communist International System," ORBIS, Winter 1977.

¹⁹ Quoted in Donald Wilhelm, Jr., *The West Can Win: A Study in Science and World Power* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 149-150.

sinki accords. The audit is likely to disclose Soviet obstructions that should be eased. To start with, some Soviet concessions having to do with freedom of information might be exacted without jeopardizing SALT II. If Western newspapers and magazines can be bought rather freely in Budapest, why not in Moscow?

It may take a long time for the seeds of freedom to take root in Soviet soil; we must learn patience and avoid provocation. We should press the Soviet Union for movement toward a wider meaning of detente that includes respect for human rights. One way to do this is to urge its leaders to observe all the conditions of the Helsinki accords, including Basket 3. Above all, we should maintain a prudent security posture — one that will preclude the Soviets from exploiting superior armed strength for political gains harmful to freedom's nurture and growth. The preservation of an adequate military shield for the protection of free people should be the overriding moral imperative of the United States.

Since President Kennedy pledged an overwhelming commitment of U.S. resources to the defense of freedom everywhere, our foreign policy has alternated between morality and expediency. The crusading spirit which has sometimes characterized our policy probably contributed to our deep involvement in Vietnam. Regardless of the merits of that intervention, the conduct of the conflict there was strategically unwise, and the mode of our withdrawal was morally flawed. As former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has written from intimate knowledge:

North Vietnam became a party to guaranteeing peace in South Vietnam, with the clear understanding that there was and would continue to be a separate South Vietnam. After these accords were signed, however, the United States did not take appropriate action . . . to stem violations by both North Vietnam and the Provisional Government, equipped by the U.S.S.R. and China. The strenuous efforts necessary to make the two Communist giants agree to restrict weapon flow were never undertaken. . . . even if our whole involvement with ground forces in Vietnam was questionable from the first, America's convenient neglect of its solemn pledge to guarantee the security of South Vietnam cannot be excused.²⁰

The abandonment of solemn pledges for the sake of expediency has characterized many of our actions and helped shatter the consensus that sustained our foreign policy from the Marshall Plan until the Tet offensive. If our foreign policy is to

²⁰ Melvin Laird, "America's Principled Role in World Affairs: A Realistic Policy of Peace and Freedom," in Robert J. Pranger, ed., *Détente and Defense* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 107.

win the consent and support of the American people, it must be consistent with our basic values.

The American Task

After years of "the best and the brightest," followed by the Nixon-Kissinger realpolitik attempt to lead us across "the threshold of a new era of peace," the United States is once again engaged in a reappraisal of what the fundamental thrust of its foreign policy should be. The central issue is not whether we will seek to play a major role in world affairs. There is no way we can escape from the responsibilities that flow from our power. The real issue is whether we will help shape the future world order to make it more compatible with freedom. Hence, the preservation of existing free societies should be the basic aim of American foreign policy. The United States should simultaneously maintain and disseminate a vision of freedom for all who seek it. When opportunities arise, our policy should be based on the promotion of freedom. An American foreign policy inspired once again with the advocacy of freedom will be less tempted to find expedient, short-term solutions to difficult problems.

It is our task to hold up the standard of a free society at home and call attention to restrictions on liberty abroad. The U.S. government, however, is ill equipped to monitor the human rights situation in various countries or to disseminate information concerning flagrant violations. The various operational arms set up by the government in the 1950s, such as the Psychological Strategy Board and the subsequent Operations Coordinating Board, were dismantled by President Kennedy and never replaced. We have never had a focal point in the government for monitoring the U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange program. Likewise, the executive branch has failed to create an agency within the State Department or the White House to keep track of performance regarding Basket 3, and it gave little assistance to a commission on compliance set up by Congress to monitor how the Eastern bloc countries perform on these matters.

In addition to the initiatives on free communication and vigorous advocacy of Basket 3 at the Helsinki review conference, previously mentioned, the government is in dire need of some reorganization to focus on the issue of human rights. The persistence of the U.S. government in keeping this matter before the forum of world public opinion is essential if it is to command the respect of

the American people and if it is to sustain those who cry for freedom throughout the world. The Carter administration has taken some admirable first steps with regard to the human rights issue. It has placed the spotlight of public opinion on Soviet violations of human rights and has been strongly rebuked by Moscow for doing so.

Freedom cannot be imposed on any country from without; it has to be won from within. This is especially true of the Soviet Union. There is little the United States can do directly to support the Soviet dissidents fighting for freedom against the immense power of the Soviet state. Yet the very fact that we care about their struggle for freedom brings light to their struggle and discomfort to the Soviet rulers.

Freedom as the touchstone of our diplomacy will have to be applied differently toward the first circle of our democratic allies than to the many envious, if not hostile, members of the Third World. Our policies toward our adversaries should be cooperative when necessary, but in no case should we shrink from ideological competition with totalitarian systems. The question is not, as Lenin asked of history, Who is stronger? Rather, we should ask, Which is best?

President Carter has called for a renewal of the "moral" dimension of American relations abroad. On the way to this goal, we will encounter the old difficulties between moral ideals and the demands of pragmatic policy. This dilemma will be resolved by the usual weighing of greater against lesser evil which comprises the unpleasant business of diplomacy and power. But perhaps the most important task on this road will be to fix a "weight" to the moral element in our cost-benefit analysis of foreign policy decisions. This weight will shape priorities, and our allies should be the beneficiaries. As Lord Palmerston declared over a century ago: "Constitutional states I consider to be the natural allies of this country; and whoever may be in office conducting the affairs of Great Britain, I am persuaded that no English ministry will perform its duty if it be inattentive to the interests of such states."²¹ The United States should now apply the same principle to the free, democratic societies of the world community.

In brief, there are many things the United States can do to expand the frontiers of freedom without rocking the global boat, reviving the Cold War, or accelerating the arms race. It is time to begin.

²¹ Quoted in Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (London: Panther Books, 1972), p. 216.

FRANK TRAGER THE MAN: A BRIEF IMPRESSION

by Frank Barnett

When it comes to the matter of Frank Trager, the man, let it first be stipulated that anything less than a 400-page biography would fail to do justice to at least several of his puissant incarnations. Moreover, unless his biographer had the five-dimensional vision of the author of *Rashomon*, his perspective would be faulted by perhaps the majority of those who have been touched by the Trager typhoon in seven decades of manifest energy. Not that FNT has been all things to all men (indeed, all men have been the focus of *his* life); but it is the nature of awesome elan vital, even when it is conjoined with purpose and integrity, to evoke a singular range of response from those human beings with whom it makes contact. (Heavy surf keeps most swimmers on the beach; but some are so exhilarated by the terror and pleasure of the Bonsai Pipeline that they are ready to risk a wipeout.) What follows in this brief space, therefore, is notably subjective and even unashamedly biased; for it has been my good fortune to coexist with the elemental force of Frank Trager over the past fifteen years. During that period, we have debated priorities and argued over tactics; but, in general, the harmony of our relationship has been accurately signified by our joint Christmas card to associates — signed simply, “the two Franks.”

When a man has been a philosophy teacher, author, editor, Socialist Party official, B’nai B’rith organizer, foreign aid director in Burma, New York University’s resident expert on Southeast Asia, War College professor and manager of an interuniversity teaching program in international security affairs, natural preference for order and pattern tempts one to ask, So who is the essential Frank Trager? Of course, the human condition is mostly one of paradox; but, to the extent that any life exhibits consistencies of behavior, FNT’s diverse careers embody three reinforcing traits: (1) social concern with issues great and small that involve human

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freedom and individual dignity; (2) personal commitment to organize and fight, not simply talk and write, in defense of a just cause, however unpopular or whatever the odds against; (3) intellectual adherence to the principle enshrined in the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D. C. — “eternal hostility to every form of tyranny over the mind of man.” Moreover, while such motivation in some men can seem quixotic, Frank Trager brings such businesslike precision to the practice of his ideals that he makes the barricades seem a normal office. He may agree to pursue the impossible dream — but never by way of a children’s crusade. Any commando he leads into political and moral battle has been well trained in map-reading, field survival and ways to avoid enemy stratagems.

Frank Trager is not likely to take offense at the use of a military analogy to illuminate a portion of his personality. Like Al Smith he is a happy warrior; and, unlike those academics who celebrate their contempt for military men, FNT cherishes the opportunity to interact (sometimes as vigorous critic) with senior commanders at Pentagon war games and in the seminar rooms of the National War College, where he spent two years on the faculty and helped redesign a key part of the curriculum. Surely, few civilian professors can have brought more zest to such an assignment or found themselves in a more congenial milieu. (For teachers who like challenge and results, it is gratifying to know that one’s “students” are forty-four-year-old officers, the pick of their peers, who have already commanded air-wings, regiments and Polaris submarines in every corner of the globe; and FNT is justifiably pleased that among the students who once looked to him as faculty supervisor of their advanced theses on strategy were two eventual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

Recollections of the Early Years

Given the nature of our common endeavor (national defense education for civilian opinion-leaders), it is appropriate that my first encounter with Frank Trager was at the National War College. It was June of 1961, and during my short stay as a part-time member of the faculty for the summer course for reserve officers, I was assigned a desk in a room that was normally the private turf of a Marine Corps colonel and an ebullient civilian scholar who took courteous pains to make an apprentice feel at home in the halls of geopolitics. While some of the other regulars were a bit skeptical of

an effort to brief reservists on questions of strategy in a mere fortnight, FNT threw himself into the enterprise with his characteristic verve. He applauded the mission of encouraging the reservist — often an educator or editor — to upgrade public discussion of defense needs and international security problems. As his subsequent role in acting as a national catalyst for the enrichment of ROTC was to prove, Frank Trager was the ideal scholar to help build an intellectual bridge between the public and private sectors on the issue of defense. But in the summer of 1961, that prodigious effort was still part of our unknown future. What I remember most clearly from our first meetings were his unreserved hospitality to a newcomer at the War College, the competence and intensity with which he conducted his academic chores, and his unflinching (and early) conviction that it would not prove possible to preserve the independence of South Vietnam by a passive strategy of containment and attrition. (Unlike most of the civilians and even many of the generals who shaped U.S. policy in Vietnam, Frank Trager knew a great deal about the efficacy of communist ideology, political warfare and a trained propaganda cadre; and these insights prompted him to urge a politico-military offensive against Hanoi throughout its own territory before the weight of the intangible factors in conflict overwhelmed our advantages in conventional materiel.)

These first impressions of FNT, sharpened by memory of his persuasive, persistent rationale for America's obligation to defend South Vietnam against subversion and invasion, were later enlarged by the recollections of mutual friends at Freedom House in New York. These included some of that rare tribe of liberal intellectuals who had fought side by side with Frank Trager in the political battles of the 1930s and have the distinction (as he does) of opposing both nazi and communist tyranny with the same resolution. In their view, FNT's even-handed opposition to both forms of totalitarianism had helped younger men renounce the noxious myths that only conservatives consistently uphold the case for security and that, somehow, national defense and civil liberty are incompatible ideals. (How often he has bridled when someone suggests that an initiative to counter Soviet aggression would be "right-wing" or that the "liberal" posture towards Moscow must necessarily be one of conciliation: Frank Trager, like George Meany and Sidney Hook, has never allowed his striving for social justice in America to corrupt his stance against communist oppression in the world at large.)

Combat Politics and the Moral Wrestler

His entry into the arena of combat politics took place more than forty years ago. Although FNT began his work as an academic philosopher — teaching for a season at The Johns Hopkins University — he belonged to that school which in the words of John Dewey regards ideas as “road maps for action.” Thus, his predilection to activism led him into the Socialist Party in the bleak days of the depression. By 1936, he was national labor secretary of the party, a post that placed him in daily contact with Norman Thomas, the party leader, and in the thick of those doctrinal struggles that splintered the Left in those hectic days when the capitalist system seemed on the verge of collapse throughout Europe and even, many feared, in America.

Frank Trager’s leading role in the “cutting-edge politics” of that troubled time — thrusting him into routine confrontation with Trotskyites, Stalinists, anarchists and neofascists — has been briefly summarized by Dr. Jerry Steibel, a mutual friend who interviewed some of FNT’s colleagues from the Socialist Party days:

The mid-1930s saw the apogee of the Communist-inspired “Popular Front.” Joseph Stalin, ever the flexible opportunist, ordered Communist Parties throughout the world to combine with other “democratic elements” in a common stand against Fascism. His minions in this country promptly made a show to embrace many of the progressive and reformist demands that non-Communists had been pressing; and in a supreme gesture of “solidarity” the CP removed its own candidate from the national ballot in 1936 to help re-elect Franklin Roosevelt.

Stalin’s version of the detente tactic had considerable popular appeal, at a time of mass unemployment when some Americans perceived their own reactionaries as a menace almost comparable to Hitler’s. A faction within its inner hierarchy believed that the Socialist Party should also submerge itself in the Popular Front by not running a candidate for President in both 1936 and 1940. Frank Trager disagreed vehemently. He argued that the Socialists should press their own battle for progressive change, understanding that the Communist tactic of self-denial could and would be reversed as soon as it seemed expedient. The Socialists, therefore, should put up their own ticket. Fortunately, Norman Thomas agreed and the anti-Moscow forces with which FNT was aligned won that fight.

The Popular Front tactic created another vexing problem within the American labor movement. These were the hectic organizing days for large industrial unions like the United Automobile Workers, taking advantage of the NRA’s Section 7-A and the Wagner Labor Relations Act. Within the UAW, as with some other unions at the time, a strong Communist faction made its bid for control. As Socialist Party Labor Secretary, Frank Trager could scarcely sit on the sidelines while American unionism was suborned by Moscow. With a handful of allies, and using all his

skills in polemics and practical politics, he fought to deploy the Socialist Party's influence and resources into the battle to stop the Communist takeover. If some wavered, hoping the intentions of the CPUSA had been modified, Frank Trager held to the certainty that its ultimate aim was not trade union democracy, but totalitarian control along lines dictated by Stalin's policies, and likely to be no more democratic than the state "unionism" practiced in the Soviet Union itself. Thanks at least in part to these efforts, the Communist hold within the UAW was eventually broken and the union's authentic democrats ultimately assumed leadership.

A third doctrinal struggle now loomed inside Socialist ranks, more wracking than the other two. Despite the massing of Hitler's armies and the Nazi war of nerves against its European neighbors, Norman Thomas saw Socialism as the epitome of "peace," as well as social and economic evolution. He had a congenital horror of war, believing that even the preparation for war would abort progress on other fronts—a belief that has sturdily survived into our own day. Mr. Thomas's position won him invitations to America First convocations, as neutrality and isolationism were temporarily placed ahead of fear of the class enemy in the list of Socialist concerns. Norman Thomas had no illusions that the Nazis were well-disposed, but he could not bring himself to support an American buildup of military defense against them in Europe.

A growing sector of his Party disagreed with Thomas, including Frank Trager. Much as the dissidents, too, abhorred war and militarism, they could not subscribe to the easy premise that pacifism and isolationism would be an adequate response to Hitler and Mussolini. A debate ensued as to whether turning away from the predators would produce either peace or a world in which Socialism could survive. The rift in the Party grew, and early in 1941 Thomas told his more outspoken opponents that their positions were incompatible with the Party leadership's, and asked for their resignations. Frank Trager left the National Executive Committee and the Party itself, along with Arthur McDowell, Paul Porter and Leonard Woodcock.

Jerry Steibel's outline of these sinuous contests might summon up the memory that Frank Trager's sport in college was varsity wrestling. Of course, coaches' sermons aside, athletes do not automatically transfer to professional life the skills of the playing field. Still, our appetite for symbolism is gratified by thinking of Frank Trager squaring off as a moral wrestler to employ tenacity of will, sure balance, sudden leverage and sheer stamina in the political free-for-all that preceded America's entry into World War II. (At least those are traits his friends will recognize.) To conclude this account of FNT in the turbulent arena of the 1930s, a footnote—Frank wrestled not only within the Socialist Party but, in 1939-1941, as one of the members of the Fight for Freedom Committee which offered vocal opposition to the isolationist views of the America First group. Two years later, at age thirty-eight, Frank Trager went to war, serving with the U.S. Army Air Forces in an enlisted rank—

which often gives him the advantage of reverse one-upmanship when he lectures to generals and admirals. (One of the tributes he cherishes most is the Air University Award—the highest honor given by that command—for his contributions to air force professional education while serving as guest lecturer at the Air War College, as a Thomas D. White series lecturer, and for his support of the Air Force ROTC program.)

At the end of World War II, Frank Trager left the air force to resume his wrestling in the ring of public affairs, this time as a program director for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. Here he helped engineer constructive changes in the baneful quota system that governed (often covertly) the admission policies of certain Ivy League colleges and universities. It was not long, however, before judgment, experience and instinct animated him once more to address the threat of totalitarianism. FNT had never been beguiled by the theme of Soviet-American friendship so overplayed during the war, and he was concerned that many of those in the vanguard of the fight for domestic social justice were indifferent to the fact that Moscow had replaced Berlin as a locus for danger to democracy. He therefore reasoned that the Anti-Defamation League should assume a wider role in defining public policy issues and should actively support those forces belatedly concerned with Stalin's launching of a cold war offensive in Europe. Frank was successful in persuading the ADL's leadership of this view, and he was empowered to bring out, under the imprimatur of the league's Freedom series, two powerful pamphlets analyzing communist ideology, strategy and tactics. With these two publications favorably received in liberal circles, Frank Trager was back on the front line of world politics, in the frequent company of those other New York intellectuals who opposed Stalinism by rallying around Freedom House, writing for the *New Leader* and (later) providing content for the campaigns of Radio Free Europe.

The Asian Experience

Now it is time to record an uncommon experience that, while leaving character and principles untouched, would subtly transmute for the rest of his days the ethos and Weltanschauung of a political wrestler from the sidewalks of New York. (So much so that Dr. Trager is now likely to introduce himself to a businessman in Dallas or a lawyer in Chicago by saying, "I'm an Asian, you know.")

Ever the activist, but also always the scholar, alternating study and work, Frank Trager finished his graduate education in 1951, when he obtained his Ph.D. at New York University. To all appearances, he was now ready to settle into the academic life he has embraced for the past twenty-five years. But first came an exceptional experience—the assignment in Burma that ever afterwards made Asia part of his blood and bone.

Those were the heady days when America had triumphantly salvaged Europe with the Marshall Plan and then turned with unabated confidence to similar work in Asia under President Truman's Point Four. Frank Trager became director of the U. S. AID Mission to Burma. Surely here was the ideal laboratory for his convictions and talents! Burma's leaders, headed by U Nu, were socialists in the democratic tradition and wanted to develop their country according to a philosophy compatible with the wisdom of Norman Thomas. For the future author of *Building a Welfare State in Burma*, it seemed a case of the right man in the right place at the right time. Moreover, from the standpoint of world politics, Burma stood squarely in the path of communist aggression. "The cold war was never cold in Asia" is one of FNT's original maxims, and he has cause to know. When he arrived in 1951, Burma was already beset by no fewer than four distinct insurgencies; for the communists well understood the strategic importance of the Burmese "hinge" between India and the Thailand-Indochina theater, an importance that had invited furious combat during World War II. FNT understood the stakes equally as well. Thus, Frank Trager's political rapport with Burma's socialist leadership complemented Washington's security objective of speeding Burma's economic development to bar the communists from an area where so much blood and treasure had been spent to halt the Japanese. However, despite prodigious effort—and the superior management talent that would have ensured business success had he chosen corporate life—events beyond Frank Trager's control doomed his cause. Burma's leadership broke into warring factions, U Nu was driven from office, and the country turned towards isolationism under his successors. In 1953, Frank's melancholy duty was to preside over the close-down of the AID mission.

Despite the unhappy ending, however, Frank's interest and profound affection were, if anything, reenlisted both for Burma and Southeast Asia in general. Here, perhaps, is a paradox in his personality; for Frank Trager's style features rationalism, efficiency,

deadlines and at times blunt communications — scarcely the most notable hallmarks of Asian culture. Yet, since leaving Burma, he has revisited Asia more than a dozen times, and literally scores of Asian students, scholars, generals, editors and ex-foreign ministers make annual visitations to his New York office. His “hobbies” (not an accurate word for any FNT endeavor, since he gives his professional best at every level) include the American-Asian Educational Exchange, the Chinese Cultural Center, the Burma Research Society and the Siam Society. When he travels abroad, where will you usually find him? At the National Defense College in Tokyo, or the University of the Philippines in Manila, or the Institute for Strategic Studies in Djakarta, or the office of the defense minister of Singapore, or at the Armed Forces University in Taipei. Then there are the scores of articles on Asian topics, five books on Burma alone, two more on Communist China and Marxism in Southeast Asia. Clearly, the peoples and problems of Asia are in his bone and blood. (Several months ago, FNT and I attended a multinational conference in Winchester, England, where the discussion centered on Soviet seapower and the defense of NATO through high technology. Frank Trager mingled easily with NATO generals and admirals, exchanging views on Moscow’s threats to Europe. When the conference adjourned, however, our New York “Asian” spent an extra five days in London with the coeditors of his forthcoming book, entitled *Burmese Sit-tans from 1762-1826: Records of Rural Life and Administration*.

The Enormous Classroom

Leaving the Burmese AID mission in 1953, Frank Trager came home to pursue his fifth profession, one that fostered growing unity between his parallel interests in Asian affairs and national security. His base is New York University, where he has held the rank of professor for nearly a quarter of a century; but his classroom encompasses continental USA and much of the Pacific Basin, as noted above. While giving his NYU students full measure (indeed, some regard him as an “educational Vince Lombardi” in his insistence on excellence and hard work), Frank’s abundance of energy has enabled him frequently to debate on national television, lecture to the Foreign Service Institute and the Defense Intelligence School, act as consultant to RAND and the Hudson Institute and become a perennial favorite on the platforms of virtually all of the staff and war colleges of the armed services.

His lectures, brimful of facts, are models of clarity and feature the analytical style one might expect from a trained philosopher. In debate, however, battered adversaries could testify that Frank Trager combines solid data with the forensic skills and instincts of a great prosecuting attorney. As the argument heats up, the philosopher becomes a combat scholar. Facts become bolts for his mental crossbow; and neither the armament nor the size of the opponent will deter his preference for the attack. Yet, despite his unconcealed appetite for the fray, he never stoops to *ad hominem* tactics and is inclined to chide allies who attribute questionable motives to a common foe. So when it comes to disputation, write him down as cheerfully intransigent in a just cause, disciplined, passionate, even relentless in defense of his position, but never vindictive. To the contrary, like the seasoned gladiator he *harbors an old-fashioned respect for a worthy foe*. (How often he remarks: "I don't agree with that guy on the issue, but he has a first-class mind, stands up for what he believes and deserves close attention.")

It would be easy to write a lengthy tome on the most recent phase of Frank Trager's career — director of studies for the National Strategy Information Center. Given his singular vitality, it should be no surprise that he fills this post with efficacy while simultaneously expanding his arduous duties at New York University as director of its National Security Education Program. (The habit in which his friends recognize him most readily features at least three hats!) But while I am tempted to combine further praise for FNT's talent with a dash of ethical advertising for NSIC, here is not the place. This piece is intended as an impression of the man, not a chronology of his latter-day achievement, though he richly deserves a twenty-one-point testimonial for his contributions to the enterprise on which we have labored together since 1963.

The aim of sketching salient traits, however, would be ill-served unless some account were given of Frank Trager's role — in which he has persisted for over a decade now — in making legitimate the study of politico-military affairs by college and university students from coast to coast. His first initiative was in support of ROTC during the turbulent years of the Vietnam war, when undergraduate lobbies sought to divorce every arm of the military from the campus, sometimes in their zeal resorting to intimidation and violence. Among faculties there was also an inclination to disestablish ROTC as being insufficiently intellectual to merit academic

status. The armed services seemed in danger of being routed from the groves of Academe. At this juncture, spearheaded by Frank Trager, a group of civilian professors volunteered to provide ROTC units with guest lecturers on such topics as geopolitics, arms control, Soviet interests in the Middle East, background of the Sino-Soviet split, the history of seapower, theories of detente, and negotiating with the communists.

Under Frank's leadership, these civilian scholars gave a total of more than 1,400 lectures on more than 125 campuses in what came to be known as the ROTC Academic Enrichment Program. In addition, at the request of the armed services, Frank innovated and supervised training programs for officers long absent from the campus who were about to be assigned "hazardous duty" as professors of military science in a hostile environment. What animated Frank in the midst of this battle to preserve and upgrade ROTC was the conviction that a pluralistic society benefits from the circulation through the military system of officers coming from the liberal arts colleges and returning to civilian life. To him, the "reactionary" policy was to abolish the traditional American process of fostering civil-military partnership and create a context in which the officer corps of the future would evolve as an isolated elite. In helping to safeguard and improve ROTC, the philosopher as well as the combat-scholar in Frank Trager found a fulfilling mission.

The five-year struggle to preserve and improve the ROTC program would have exhausted most men in their sixth decade of life; but to Frank Trager a beachhead won is a staging ground for a wider campaign. Beyond the ROTC issue lay the challenge of introducing national security studies to civilian students as well. Drawing on his experience in teaching national security and public policy at NYU, Frank took the lead in organizing regional conferences (during academic 1969-1970) for about 100 professors who evinced some interest in defense policy. Surprisingly, it was discovered that despite campus turmoil on the Vietnam issue, there was less opposition to national security studies in general. Frank and a few of his senior colleagues were thus encouraged to organize (in the summer of 1971) a teacher-training seminar in security studies at Colorado College. The participants were chiefly younger academics just beginning their teaching careers. These four-week sessions — continued each summer since 1971 — contributed substantially to the talent bank now teaching one or more courses in national security affairs at some 482 universities.

Meanwhile, Frank Trager's initiative has been running on

tracks parallel to the Colorado College summer program. He became involved in the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (based in Chicago). He was active in the Section on Military Studies of the ISA. He served as coauthor and coeditor of a widely used reader, *National Security and American Society: Theory, Process, and Policy*, published by the University Press of Kansas. He supervised the production of an annotated bibliography and a modular syllabus in security studies. He commissioned books on nuclear proliferation, Soviet seapower, the military balance, theories of disarmament, and the economics of national defense. He edited the NSIC's Strategy Papers and devoted long hours to his duties on the editorial boards of *ORBIS* and *Asian Affairs*. (Add to all that his travels: at age seventy he is living in a jet plane for nearly 50,000 miles a year, frequently en route to two-day academic workshops on national security education that supplement the Colorado College summer session. The statistics suggest the degree of his commitment — fifty workshops in five years, involving 1,500 scholars from 500 institutions of higher learning in all regions of the country.)

Astonishing to note, little controversy has attended an effort that might have been expected to evoke much hostility on the campus. Frank Trager is not only a hawk on defense issues; he wears his talons unashamedly on his sleeve. Yet, somehow, his belief in fair play and zeal for educational excellence communicate themselves to scholars who disagree with his policy views. Analysis, Yes! Polemics, No! is the standard he carries in the classroom. Moreover, while no one doubts the force of his ego, Frank Trager has never been a prima donna. Like the superior manager he trained himself to be, he recruits the best talent he can find and then delegates to others. Perhaps the sheer strength of his own personality makes it easy for him to cooperate with other men of outstanding ability (unlike some four-star generals in the academic world who prefer to surround themselves only with second lieutenants). Thus, the joint NYU/NSIC National Security Studies program has prospered in large part owing to the stature of the colleagues Frank Trager enlisted for the common cause: such men as Klaus Knorr of Princeton; Donald Brennan of the Hudson Institute; Fred Sondermann of Colorado College; Charles Moskos of Northwestern; Bernard Brodie of UCLA and Laurence Martin of the University of London.

Four-square Before the Wind

The limitations of space now dictate a summation. Through memory's kaleidoscope I see distinct images of the man

honored by so many of his friends in this issue of ORBIS. The professor, judged by some to be severe, gladly spending tedious hours on the human problems of students and coworkers — jobs, drugs, illness, divorce — helping out, intervening, working on solutions, never too busy to be effectively concerned. The editor, exasperated by a sloppy manuscript, writing a twelve-page letter to encourage better performance on the next draft and, despite the bruising candor of his critique, often getting it. The beleaguered commander of the academic remnant who supported to the very last America's intervention in Vietnam; veteran of three-score TV debates and "teach-ins"; unflinching defender of the unpopular position; author of newspaper ads; mobilizer of committees; fund-raiser for a dying cause. Resisting the advice of "prudent" men to abandon ship, he stayed the course to the tragic end, never doubting the moral obligation of the United States to contain aggression whatever the victim's faults and infirmities.

The negotiator and mediator, tirelessly meeting with parties to a proposed academic merger or spin-off, suggesting options to foundation executives, engineering consensus among a divided faculty, appealing to deans and trustees with the same candor he employs with peers. The husband, happily married for forty years to an exquisitely feminine Ph.D. named Helen, who cheerfully shares the hardships of his Asian excursions, chauffeurs him about in their Mercedes and graciously opens her home at a moment's notice to the scores of old and new friends whom Frank is likely to ask out on weekends. (Helen is a soft-spoken and gentle lady, but by no means docile; in her refined way, she is quite capable of restraining his verbal quarterstaff at a cocktail party when the small talk turns to politics.)

The bon vivant who, when the twelve-hour day is done, delights in his tenth cigar, a Jack Daniels old-fashioned and the most sophisticated Chinese cuisine. (For a serious man who confesses his inability to tell jokes very well, or suffer fools and small talk gladly, Frank visibly relishes a recounting by old friends of the personalities and excitement of past skirmishes — and when he laughs, with the customary gusto he brings to everything else, it is almost as if a justice of the Supreme Court had turned into a pixie.)

Have we obscured the man in this imperfect account of his extraordinary career? Partly, of course, for Frank Trager is too large a man to be confined by print and paper. But if the style is the man, Frank's style is achievement in the service of human free-

dom. His "fun" is work. *Laborare est orare*. But his is a form of work that ennobles us all. The essays in this issue, written by so many distinguished men who honor him, are the most persuasive tribute to his impact on at least two generations of academics and fellow activists in public affairs. Nothing more need be added, except for some lines of poetry which strike me as the essence of Frank Trager. They were written by Tennyson about the Duke of Wellington and are appropriate also for our warrior-scholar: "whole in himself, a common good . . . rich in saving common sense. . . . iron nerve to true occasion true. . . . that tower of strength which stood four-square to all the winds that blew!"

A BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE ON THE WORK OF FRANK N. TRAGER

During his long and distinguished career, Frank Trager has made a substantial contribution to the world of scholarship. A complete listing of his books and monographs, essays, scholarly papers, and contributions to the periodical literature would fill far too many pages. Through the years, scores of perceptive articles by Professor Trager have been published in an impressive assortment of journals and magazines—*Foreign Affairs*, the *New Leader*, the *New York Times Magazine*, *Current History*, *Pacific Community*, the *Journal of Asian Studies*, *Antioch Review*, *Combat*, *National Review*, the *Journal of International Affairs*, and ORBIS itself. Hence, we must here limit ourselves to a selection of Frank Trager's bibliographic works, books, and contributions to books. These alone provide ample testimony of his wide-ranging interests.

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